Romanello v. Maguire

• Decision Date: 14 August 1979
• Docket Number: Nos. 77-210-A,s. 77-210-A
• Citation: 404 A.2d 833,122 R.I. 171
• Parties: Richard ROMANELLO et al. v. Robert H. MAGUIRE et al. Richard ROMANELLO et al. v. Vinnie RICHMOND. ppeal, 77-309-Appeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 833

404 A.2d 833

122 R.I. 171

Richard ROMANELLO et al. v.Robert H. MAGUIRE et al.

Richard ROMANELLO et al. v.Vinnie RICHMOND.

Nos. 77-210-Appeal, 77-309-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 14, 1979.

[122 R.I. 177] Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Providence, Thomas D. Gidley, Robert C. Bruns, for plaintiffs.

V. James Santaniello, Providence, for Robert H. Maguire et al.

Stone & Clifton, Walter R. Stone, Edward C. Clifton, Providence, for Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. and Henry Davis.

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

These are civil actions in which the promoters of the Folk-Blue Grass Music Festival (the festival), Richard Romanello and American Music Productions, Inc., the plaintiffs herein, seek to recover damages for the nonperformance of the festival at Stepping Stone Ranch, West Greenwich, Rhode Island, on July 24-27, 1975.We have consolidated these two cases for the purposes of this decision.

Both cases arise from the same factual situation.On April 4, 1975, Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. submitted an application, along with a license-fee check, to the West Greenwich Town Council(town council) for an entertainment license for the festival activities.On July 9, 1975, the town council conducted a public meeting regarding the application and following this meeting voted to deny the application for all performances at Stepping Stone Ranch.

As a result of the town council's actions, plaintiffs instituted these two actions in Superior Court.The plaintiffs initially filed a three-count amended complaint against the town council, Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. and Henry V. Davis.¹In Counts I and II of their complaint, plaintiff alleged that the town council had acted in an illegal manner in denying the application and that the denial violated the terms of G.L.1956, §§ 5-22-1, -2, -4²(the statute), and the West Greenwich Town Ordinance³ relating to the licensing of entertainment activity (the ordinance).The plaintiffs further contended that the town council was estopped from denying the application because the town council neither rejected nor returned the license-fee check ⁴ submitted with the application.Finally, plaintiffs alleged that both the statute and the ordinance violated plaintiffs' rights to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.In Count III, plaintiffs alleged that Stepping Stone had misrepresented to them that the entertainment license had been issued by the town council.The plaintiffs further contended that Stepping Stone knew this representation was false and that plaintiffs relied detrimentally upon this statement.

The plaintiffs also filed a separate two-count complaint against Vinnie Richmond, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Town of West Greenwich(town treasurer) pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956(1970 Reenactment)§ 45-15-5.⁵In this complaint, plaintiffs incorporated most of the same allegations that they had made against the town council in their earlier action.

In the first action, the town council and Stepping Stone filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).Stepping Stone, however, also chose to file an answer to the complaint.This answer contained a cross-claim against the town council.The town council also moved to dismiss the cross-claim.After hearings thereon, the trial court granted both of the town council's motions to dismiss.

In the second action, the town treasurer also made a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).After a hearing, the motion was granted by the trial court.

The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in granting the three motions to dismiss.

Because the complaints filed by plaintiffs against the town council and the town treasurer were almost identical, we shall initially consider the reasons used by the trial justices who granted these two motions to dismiss.In granting the town council's motion, the trial justice reasoned that, based upon Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews, 531 F.2d 1(1st Cir.1976), plaintiffs were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from complaining that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional.He concluded that plaintiffs' only basis for complaint was the failure of the town council to give plaintiffs notice of the July 9, 1975, hearing.The trial justice resolved this matter by finding that because plaintiffs were not a party of record before the town council, they were not entitled to notice.In granting the town treasurer's motion to dismiss, the trial justice initially noted that the town treasurer did not have the power to grant or deny public entertainment licenses.He opined that plaintiffs acted unreasonably when they concluded that the application for the festival was accepted because the town treasurer negotiated the license-fee check.The trial justice thus concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim against the town treasurer, and he granted the motion to dismiss the complaint.

We have stated on numerous occasions that the sole function of a Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.Dutson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., R.I., 383 A.2d 597, 599(1978).It is well established that such a motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to any relief no matter what facts could be proved in support of their claim.Id.In drawing his conclusions, the trial justice is bound to resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs' favor and to accept the allegations in their complaint as true.Noble Co. v. Mack Financial Corp., 107 R.I. 12, 14, 264 A.2d 325, 327(1970).In order to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs' complaints against the town council and the town treasurer failed to establish any factual basis upon which recovery could be based, we have examined the two complaints.

In their complaints against the town council and the town treasurer, plaintiffs alleged, Inter alia, that the town council failed to apply properly the legislative standards established in the statute and ordinance to the license application for the festival.Although plaintiffs did not submit the license application to the town council, plaintiffs did make an allegation in their complaints that they authorized Stepping Stone to submit the license application on their behalf.When this assertion is read together with the remaining allegations in the complaint, with all doubts resolved in plaintiffs' favor, the complaint establishes a limited principal-agent relationship between plaintiffs and Stepping Stone for the purpose of submitting the license application.As a result of this relationship, plaintiffs, as principals, would thereby possess the requisite...