Romano v. Oklahoma

Decision Date13 June 1994
Docket Number929093
Citation129 L.Ed.2d 1,114 S.Ct. 2004,512 U.S. 1
PartiesJohn Joseph ROMANO, Petitioner v. OKLAHOMA
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus *

During the sentencing phase of petitioner's first-degree murder trial in Oklahoma, the State introduced a copy of the judgment and death sentence he had received during an earlier trial for another murder. The jury ultimately found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed a second death sentence on petitioner. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the evidence of petitioner's prior death sentence was irrelevant to determining the appropriateness of the second death sentence, but held that admission of the evidence did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, or so infect the sentencing determination with unfairness as to amount to a denial of due process.

Held: The admission of evidence regarding petitioner's prior death sentence did not amount to constitutional error. Pp. ____.

(a) Admission of the evidence at issue did not contravene the principle established in Caldwell, supra, at 342, 105 S.Ct. at 2646 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), because the evidence did not affirmatively mislead the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility for the capital sentencing decision. Such evidence was not false at the time it was admitted and did not even pertain to the jury's sentencing role. The trial court's instructions, moreover, emphasized the importance of that role and never conveyed or intimated that the jury could shift its responsibility in sentencing. Pp. ____.

(b) Although the evidence in question may have been irrelevant, the jury's consideration of it did not render the sentencing proceeding so unreliable that it violated the Eighth Amendment under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (plurality opinion), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991-2992, 49 L.Ed.2d 944. That the evidence may have been irrelevant as a matter of state law does not render its admission federal constitutional error. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 475, ----, 116 L.Ed.2d 385. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1093, ----, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, are plainly inapposite, since petitioner does not argue that admission of the evidence allowed the jury to consider, in aggravation, constitutionally protected conduct. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 586, 590, n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1986-1987, 1989, n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 575, is also inapposite, since it is perfectly consistent with the Court of Criminal Appeals' approach and does not stand for the proposition that the mere admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence requires the overturning of a death sentence. This Court declines petitioner's request to fashion a federal code of general evidentiary rules, under the guise of interpreting the Eighth Amendment, which would supersede state rules in capital sentencing proceedings. Pp. ____.

(c) Introduction of the evidence in question did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process under the analytical framework set forth in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431. Presuming that the trial court's instructions were followed, they did not offer the jurors any means by which to give effect to the irrelevant evidence of petitioner's prior sentence, and the relevant evidence presented by the State was sufficient to justify the imposition of the death sentence in this case. Even assuming that the jury disregarded its instructions and allowed the irrelevant evidence to influence its decision, a finding of fundamental unfairness on the basis of this record would be an exercise in speculation, rather than reasoned judgment, since it seems equally plausible that the evidence in question could have influenced the jurors either to impose, or not to impose, the death sentence. Pp. ____.

847 P.2d 368, (Okl.Cr.1993), affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.

Lee Ann Jones Peters, for petitioner.

Andre' Diane Blalock, for respondent.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner murdered and robbed Roger Sarfaty in 1985. In 1986, he murdered and robbed Lloyd Thompson. Petitioner was tried separately for each murder. The Thompson trial occurred first, and an Oklahoma jury found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death. Petitioner was then tried for the Sarfaty murder. A different Oklahoma jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. During the sentencing phase of the Sarfaty trial, the State introduced a copy of the judgment and sentence petitioner received for the Thompson murder. Petitioner contends that the admission of evidence regarding his prior death sentence undermined the Sarfaty jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We disagree and hold that the admission of this evidence did not amount to constitutional error.

In Oklahoma, capital trials are bifurcated into guilt and sentencing phases. Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1981). The sentencing jury may not impose a death sentence unless it unanimously finds the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and that any aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Tit. 21, § 701.12. At the sentencing phase of the Sarfaty trial, the State sought to prove four aggravating circumstances, two of which are relevant to our decision: (1) that petitioner had been previously convicted of a violent felony; and (2) that petitioner would constitute a continuing threat to society.1

In attempting to establish these two aggravating circumstances, the State introduced evidence relating to the Thompson murder. The State presented testimony by Thompson's neighbor concerning her observations the day of the murder, Thompson's autopsy report, and photographs and fingerprints showing that the defendant in the Thompson case was in fact petitioner. The State also introduced a copy of the judgment and sentence from the Thompson murder conviction. That document revealed that petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder and had been sentenced to death. App. 5-6. It also showed, and the trial court told the jury, that petitioner planned on appealing from the judgment and sentence. Id., at 7. Petitioner's counsel objected to the admission of the document. He argued that, regardless of the admissibility of the evidence of petitioner's conviction, the death sentence petitioner received was not proper for the jury to consider. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence. Petitioner later presented evidence in mitigation.

Before closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. It identified the four aggravating circumstances the State sought to establish and told the jury that "[i]n determining which sentence you may impose in this case, you may only consider those [four] circumstances." Id., at 9. The court then identified the 17 mitigating circumstances offered by petitioner. The jury was instructed that it could not impose the death penalty unless it unanimously found that one or more aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt and that any such circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. Id., at 8-12. In closing, the court admonished the jury:

"You are the determiner of facts. The importance and worth of the evidence is for you to decide.

"I have made rulings during the second part of this trial. In ruling, I have not in any way suggested to you, nor intimidated [sic ] in any way, what you should decide. I do not express any opinion whether or not aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances did or did not exist, nor do I suggest to you in any way the punishment to be imposed by you.

"You must not use any kind of chance in reaching a verdict, but you must rest it on the belief of each of you who agrees with it." Id., at 13.

The jury found that all four aggravating circumstances existed and that they outweighed the mitigating circumstances. It accordingly imposed a death sentence. Petitioner appealed. While his appeal in this case was pending, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals overturned petitioner's conviction for the Thompson murder. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 827 P.2d 1335 (1992) (Romano I ). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that petitioner's trial should have been severed from that of his codefendant; it therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.2

In his appeal in this case, petitioner argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his conviction and sentence for the Thompson murder. He asserted that it was improper to admit the conviction because it was not final at the time of admission, and it had since been overturned. He also contended that the evidence of his death sentence in the Thompson case impermissibly reduced the Sarfaty sentencing jury's sense of responsibility for its decision, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 847 P.2d 368, 390 (1993) (Romano II ). The Oklahoma Court concluded that the...

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