Romero v. City of N.Y.

Decision Date17 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 08–CV–2529 (KAM).,08–CV–2529 (KAM).
Citation839 F.Supp.2d 588,281 Ed. Law Rep. 520
PartiesPilar ROMERO, as biological mother and lawful guardian of Jane Doe, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK; New York City Department of Education; New York City Department of Investigation, Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District; Andre Jenkins; Julio Cesare Benavides, and Jack Roe and Jill Roe 1 through 48, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles Austin Whittier, The Whittier Law Firm, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

David Alan Rosinus, Jr., Heather Rae Skeeles, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

Julio Cesar Benavides, pro se.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, District Judge.

On June 25, 2008, plaintiff Pilar Romero commenced this action as the biological mother and legal guardian of her then-minor daughter Jane Doe (together with Pilar Romero, plaintiffs) against defendants the City of New York (the City); the New York City Department of Education (“the NYCDOE”); the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District (“SCI”), a subdivision of the New York City Department of Investigation; Andre Jenkins (Investigator Jenkins) in his official capacity as an investigator employed by SCI; Julio Cesare Benavides, individually and in his official capacity as a teacher employed by the NYCDOE; and unknown defendants Jack Roe and Jill Roe 1 through 48 (collectively, defendants). ( See ECF No. 87, Second Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 1–9.) The action arises out of an illegal sexual relationship that pro se defendant Mr. Benavides conducted with plaintiff Jane Doe when she was a fourteen-year-old freshman high school student in Mr. Benavides' mathematics class.

Plaintiffs allege two federal claims against all defendants: (1) that defendants engaged in sex discrimination against Ms. Doe in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.; and (2) that defendants deprived Ms. Doe of her constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( Id. ¶¶ 30–34.) In addition, plaintiffs bring five state law claims alleging that the City and the NYCDOE, either themselves or through their employees, engaged in intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, sexual assault and battery of a child, negligent hiring, and negligent retention. ( Id. ¶¶ 35–40, 46–60.) Finally, plaintiffs allege that all defendants engaged in sexual harassment in violation of New York State Human Rights Laws (the NYSHRL) pursuant to New York Executive Law § 296, which is the sixth state law claim. ( Id. ¶¶ 41–45.) For all these claims, plaintiffs seek in excess of $50 million in compensatory, special, and punitive damages as well as costs and attorneys' fees. ( Id. at 15.) The court has original federal—question jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Presently before the court are defendants' motions for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the motions for summary judgment by the City, the NYCDOE, SCI, and Investigator Jenkins are granted in their entirety on all claims against them. The court grants in part and denies in part Mr. Benavides' motion for summary judgment as follows: (1) grants Mr. Benavides summary judgment on plaintiffs' Title IX claims; (2) grants Mr. Benavides summary judgment on plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against him in his official capacity, and on Ms. Romero's Section 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity; (3) denies Mr. Benavides summary judgment on Ms. Doe's Section 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity for violations of Ms. Doe's constitutional rights to bodily integrity and to an educational environment free of sexual harassment; (4) grants Mr. Benavides summary judgment on Ms. Romero's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim; (5) denies Mr. Benavides summary judgment on Ms. Doe's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim; and (6) grants Mr. Benavides summary judgment on plaintiffs' NYSHRL claims.

BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2008, plaintiff Pilar Romero commenced this action as the biological mother and legal guardian of her then-minor daughter Jane Doe against the City, the NYCDOE, Mr. Benavides, and Jack Roe 1 through 10 and Jill Roe 1 through 10. ( See ECF No. 1, Complaint.) Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on July 16, 2008, adding certain claims against the City, the NYCDOE, and Mr. Benavides. ( See ECF No. 2, Amended Complaint.) After fact discovery was completed on December 9, 2010 ( see Minute Entry dated December 9, 2010), plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint on April 1, 2011, dropping certain claims and adding defendants SCI and Investigator Jenkins.

On July 18, 2011, the City, the NYCDOE, SCI, and Investigator Jenkins (collectively, the City Defendants) filed the pending summary judgment motion with respect to all of plaintiffs' claims. (See ECF No. 102, City Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“City Defs. Mem.”).) On July 20, 2011, pro se defendant Mr. Benavides filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims against him, which include claims under Title IX, Section 1983, and New York Executive Law § 296. ( See ECF No. 110–3, Benavides' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Benavides Mem.).) Plaintiffs oppose both the City Defendants' and Mr. Benavides' respective motions for summary judgment. ( See ECF No. 107, Memorandum in Opposition to City Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion (“Pls. City Opp'n); ECF No. 111, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Julio C. Benavides' Summary Judgment Motion (Pls. Benavides Opp'n).) Finally, the City Defendants and Mr. Benavides filed reply memoranda and supplemental reply memoranda in support of their motions for summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to serve defendants with a copy of their Local Civil Rule 56.1 Counter–Statement of Material Facts. ( See Order dated July 22, 2011; ECF No. 105, City Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“City Defs. Reply”); ECF No. 119, City Defendants' Supplemental Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“City Defs. Suppl. Reply”); ECF No. 113, Benavides' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Benavides Reply”); ECF No. 121, Benavides' Supplemental Reply in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Benavides Suppl. Reply”).)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts, taken from the parties' statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 and accompanying exhibits, are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. ( See generally ECF No. 100–2, City Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (City 56.1 Stmt.); ECF No. 107–2, Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts relating to City Defendants (“Pls. City 56.1 Stmt.); ECF No. 110–2, Benavides' Statement of Facts (Benavides 56.1 Stmt.); ECF No. 111–2, Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts relating to DefendantBenavides (“Pls. Benavides 56.1 Stmt.).) The court has considered whether the parties have proffered admissible evidence in support of their factual statements and has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiffs. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir.2010) (“It is well established that, in determining the appropriateness of a grant of summary judgment, ... the district court in awarding summary judgment, may rely only on admissible evidence.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Scotto v. Brady, 410 Fed.Appx. 355, 361 (2d Cir.2010) (“ ‘[A] district court deciding a summary judgment motion has broad discretion in choosing whether to admit evidence,’ and that [t]he principles governing admissibility of evidence do not change on a motion for summary judgment.’ (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 264 (2d Cir.2009))). Finally, the court has also considered other materials in the record that have not been cited by the parties. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

During the 20062007 school year, plaintiff Jane Doe (“Ms. Doe”) was a 14–year–old ninth-grade student 1 attending Richmond Hill High School (“Richmond Hill”) in Richmond Hill, Queens, New York, and pro se defendant Julio Benavides (Mr. Benavides) was a 28–year–old mathematics teacher at Richmond Hill employed by the NYCDOE.2 (City 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1–3; Pls. City 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Benavides 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1–3.) Ms. Doe was a student in Mr. Benavides' mathematics class in the Fall Semester of the 20062007 school year. (City 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4; Benavides 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 4–5.)

In or around November 2006, after having communicated outside of class via instant messenger, Mr. Benavides told Ms. Doe—a minor at the time—that he loved her and that he wanted to spend time with her. (Benavides 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6; Transcript of Deposition of Jane Doe dated April 29, 2009 (attached as Exhibit C to ECF No. 108, Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Opposition to City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls. Decl.”)) (04/29/09 Doe Dep. Tr.”) at 9–10.) Over subsequent months, Mr. Benavides proceeded to spend time with Ms. Doe, promising her love and affection and the two exchanged small gifts. (04/29/09 Doe Dep. Tr. at 10–13, 36–37.) In addition to class time, and in view of other students and school staff, none of whom were identified by name, Mr. Benavides and Ms. Doe also began to spend significant time together during the school day on a regular basis by having lunch together, walking together in the hallway, and sitting together in a secluded area of the library. (...

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