Romero v. Metro. Transp. Auth.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2020
• Docket Number: 19-cv-0694 (JGK)
• Citation: 444 F.Supp.3d 583
• Parties: Edwin ROMERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

444 F.Supp.3d 583

Edwin ROMERO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

19-cv-0694 (JGK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 12, 2020

Laine Alida Armstrong, Arthur Z. Schwartz, Advoctes for Justice, Charted Attorneys, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Joshua Samson Fox, Steven D. Hurd, Proskauer Rose, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs are current employees of subsidiaries or affiliated entities of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA"): the MTA Headquarters ("MTAHQ") and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority ("MABSTOA"). The plaintiffs bring this action against the defendants, the MTA, MTAHQ, and MABSTOA, alleging claims for nonpayment of overtime wages under (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., (2) the New York State Civil Service Law ("NYCSL") Section 134, and (3) Title 9, Section 135 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR"). They also allege violations of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution.

I.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).

II.

The Court accepts the following factual allegations for the purposes of this motion.

The plaintiffs are current employees of two entities related to the MTA: MABSTOA and MTAHQ. Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ¶ 1. They work in various positions, including Computer Aide, Computer Associate, Computer Specialist, Telecom Associate, Staff Analyst, Staff Analyst Trainee, Associate Staff Analyst, and Assistant Transit Management Analyst. Id. at ¶ 213. MABSTOA is a New York State public authority created in 1962 to take over the bus services of two bankrupt private companies in the Bronx and Manhattan and to employ bus operators and mechanics.¹ Id. at ¶ 200. In the last two decades, MABSTOA has also hired employees in computer-related and analyst positions. Id. MTAHQ is a public benefit corporation created to handle various administrative functions of the MTA. Id. at ¶ 201. MTAHQ is either a wholly owned subsidiary of the MTA, or is a name by which the MTA does business created to handle various administrative functions of the MTA. Id. ² The MTA is a New York State Authority created to coordinate transportation needs throughout New York State. Id. at ¶ 202.

Over the last six years, the plaintiffs have been required to work, during various weeks, in excess of 40 hours per week, either by working more than eight hours a day during a five-day week, during a weekend, or on a day scheduled as an off day. Id. at ¶ 208. When the plaintiffs have been scheduled to work more than 40 hours, they have been paid straight time, instead of at a rate of 1.5 times their regular pay. Id. at ¶ 209. The plaintiffs allege that they cannot, without access to the defendants' time records, determine which precise weeks they worked overtime without overtime pay and request leave of the Court to amend the SAC to provide specifics once such records become available. Id. at ¶ 210. The plaintiffs also admit that some plaintiffs began to receive overtime pay in 2017 or 2018 as a result of collective bargaining carried out by their union. Id. at ¶ 216.

The plaintiffs allege that the New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA") is another subsidiary agency of the MTA. Id. at ¶ 211.³ NYCTA employees have similar job titles and do substantially the same work as MABSTOA employees, but have different minimum and maximum pay rates for the jobs. Id. at ¶ 212. NYCTA positions have salary ranges that are approximately 5% higher than similar MABSTOA positions. Id. at ¶ 213. In the last 24 months, new employees have been hired as MTAHQ employees, given the responsibilities of NYCTA and MABSTOA employees, paid at the MABSTOA rate, and denied the right to participate in any pension plan. Id. at ¶ 212.

The plaintiffs allege that over the last six years, the defendants failed to pay overtime pay for work in excess of 40 hours per week, as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), NYCSL Section 134, and 9 NYCRR Section 135.1.⁴ They also allege that over the last six years, the defendants created an unequal compensation scheme in which the plaintiffs, who worked for MABSTOA or MTAHQ, received a lesser rate of pay than NYCTA employees, even though employees in the three agencies perform substantially the same work. They claim that the unequal compensation scheme serves no legitimate governmental purpose and violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III.

The first count of the SAC alleges violations of the plaintiffs' overtime rights under the FLSA. The FLSA generally requires an employer to pay an employee "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed" for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). "[T]o state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours." Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013). "Plaintiffs must provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week." Nakahata v. N.Y. Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that plaintiffs are not required to "plead their hours with mathematical precision," but are required to draw on their memory and experience to provide complaints with sufficiently developed factual allegations. See Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals found that the allegations in Dejesus, that for "some or all weeks" the plaintiff worked more than "forty hours" a week without being paid "1.5" times her rate of compensation, were "devoid of any numbers to consider beyond those plucked from the statute" and were insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 89-90.

In this case, the plaintiffs' allegations fall short of stating a claim for FLSA overtime violations. The SAC does not show that any plaintiff was required to work 40 hours per week as well as uncompensated time in excess of 40 hours. The plaintiffs have not provided information about work schedules of or actual hours worked by any employee, which might have allowed the Court to conclude that a plaintiff was eligible to receive overtime pay. See Almanzar v. C & I Assocs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that allegations of a work schedule beginning at 7:30 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. and ending by 5:00 p.m., six days a week were sufficient to satisfy the Lundy standard); Djurdjevich v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., No. 17-CV-261, 2018 WL 1478132, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018) (finding the plaintiff's allegations that he worked from 6:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m., six days a week were sufficient to plead an FLSA overtime claim). Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion in their opposition, paragraph 208 of the SAC does not establish that the plaintiffs were required to work at least 40 hours per week.⁵ The complaint's general allegations that the plaintiffs worked more than eight hours a day in a five-day week or worked during a weekend or on a scheduled off day neither explain the number of weeks that overtime pay was miscalculated nor specify any week in which overtime pay was unpaid. The allegations are insufficient because they simply repeat the language of the statute and are too general to put the defendants on notice of the alleged violations. See Dejesus, 726 F.3d at 89. Therefore, the plaintiffs' FLSA claims are dismissed without prejudice .

IV.

The second count of the SAC alleges that the defendants violated NYCSL Section 134 and 9 NYCRR Section 135.1, by failing to pay overtime at a rate of one and one-half times the hourly rate of an employee's regular rate of pay.

NYCSL Section 134 applies to "all state officers and employees," with other exclusions not...