Romines v. Illinois Motor Freight, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1959
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 11241
• Citation: 21 Ill.App.2d 380,158 N.E.2d 97
• Parties: Ruth Frances ROMINES, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Doyt Romines, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS MOTOR FREIGHT, INCORPORATED, a corporation, and Richard G. Goodrich, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 97

158 N.E.2d 97

21 Ill.App.2d 380

Ruth Frances ROMINES, Individually and as Administrator of

the Estate of Doyt Romines, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS MOTOR FREIGHT, INCORPORATED, a corporation, and Richard G. Goodrich, Defendants-Appellants.

Gen. No. 11241.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, First Division.

April 29, 1959.

Barr & Barr, Joliet, for appellants.

George M. O'Brien, Joliet, John A. Appleman, Urbana, Philip C. Zimmerly, Champaign, for appellee.

McNEAL, Justice.

This is a suit to recover damages for the death of Doyt Romines and for the destruction of his motor vehicle as a result of a collision. Decedent was 29 years of age and earning approximately $6,000 per year at the time of his death. He left a widow and three small children. The cause was heard by a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $25,900, and judgment was entered upon the verdict. Defendants' post trial motions were denied and this appeal followed.

The collision occurred at about 11:30 p. m., on August 17, 1955, on U. S. Highway 50 near Monee, in Will County, Illinois. The highway ran north and south and was two lanes wide. It was level and straight for a considerable distance north and south of the point of impact. The weather was clear and the pavement dry.

Decedent was driving a pick-up truck in a southerly direction on the highway and the defendant, Richard G. Goodrich, was driving a tractor-trailer unit in a northerly direction in the course of his employment by the defendant, Illinois Motor Freight, Incorporated. As decedent drove his pickup truck in a southerly direction, and approximately 1 1/2 miles from the scene of the accident, he passed another truck proceeding in the same direction. The driver of the other truck, who also was employed by the defendant corporation, testified that decedent had his headlights on and returned to his own side of the highway after passing said truck. He testified that decedent was driving between 70 and 80 miles per hour.

There was no eye-witness to the collision other than the defendant Goodrich, and in the absence of any competent eyewitness, plaintiff introduced evidence of decedent's careful driving habits. The bulk of the evidence deals with the positions of the vehicles after the collision, the various marks on and about the highway, and a great number of photographs of the scene and of the vehicles.

The tractor-trailer unit operated by the defendant Goodrich came to rest two or three hundred feet north of the point of impact. It was off the highway on the east side in a jack-knifed position, the tractor facing in a westerly direction and the trailer pointing in a northeasterly direction. Decedent's pick-up truck came to rest off of the highway on the west side. It was facing in a westerly direction.

Several witnesses who arrived upon the scene shortly after the collision testified that the unit operated by Goodrich did not have its headlights on. Most of the damage to the tractor-trailer unit was to the left side. The decedent's pick-up truck was smashed down in front. The evidence shows that decedent was carried from the west side of the highway to the east side of the highway after the accident in order to await the ambulance and because his pick-up truck was on fire. He lived only a short time after the collision.

The photographs show a dark stain on the highway partially in both lanes of traffic. There was evidence that the drive shaft of the tractor-trailer unit was down and the state patrolman and other witnesses testified that there were gouge marks in the northbound lane about 1 or 1 1/2 feet east of the center line. One witness testified that there were tire marks on the east shoulder. Apparently the tractor-trailer unit went out of control and proceeded north several hundred feet after the impact.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, counsel for plaintiff contended that the tractor-trailer unit did not have its lights on and that it was on the wrong side of the highway. This latter contention was based upon the premise that the gouge marks on the pavement close to the center line were made by the drive shaft on the tractor-trailer unit. The defense contended that the driver of the tractor-trailer unit turned off his lights after the accident, that the gouge marks were not made by the tractor-trailer unit but by the pick-up truck, and that the various marks on the highway indicated that decedent was on the wrong side of the highway.

It is contended on this appeal that there is no evidence to support the verdict; that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence; and that the trial court erred in its rulings on the evidence in instructing the jurors, and in making prejudicial remarks.

As stated in Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 130, 94 N.E.2d 847, a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict presents the single question whether there is in the record any evidence which, standing alone and taken with all of its intendments most favorable to the party resisting the motion, tends to prove the material elements of his case. Applying this rule to the instant case, we cannot say that the jurors had no reasonable basis for concluding that the defendants were negligent, and consequently we do not find that the verdict has no support in the evidence.

With reference to the contention that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is immaterial whether we agree or disagree with the jury's verdict. A court of review can set aside a verdict as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only when it is obvious or clearly evident that the jurors have arrived at an incorrect result. Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill.App.2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363; Olin Industries, Inc. v. Wuellner, 1 Ill.App.2d 267, 117 N.E.2d 565. Our study of the record does not indicate that an opposite conclusion was clearly evident, and consequently we do not believe that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

As to the claimed errors in the rulings on the evidence, counsel for defendant sought to introduce into evidence a self-serving statement by the defendant Goodrich as to how the accident happened. It appears that Goodrich made this statement after the collision and while he was helping carry the decedent across the highway. We believe that the trial court properly ruled that this statement was not a part of the res gestae and that it was therefore inadmissible. Johnson v. Swords Company, 286 Ill.App. 377, 379, 3 N.E.2d 705; Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 5 Ill.App.2d 327, 333, 125 N.E.2d 544; Petty v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 8 Ill.App.2d 367, 386, 132 N.E.2d 1. Counsel also claim that the trial court erred in refusing to permit Goodrich to testify with reference to the various marks on the highway. They contend that the evidence was admissible because Goodrich went to the scene of the accident the day following the accident and that he was testifying to facts which occurred after the death of Romines. However, the trial judge ruled that the marks were made at...