Rompilla v. Beard, No. 04-5462.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtJustice Souter
Citation162 L. Ed. 2d 360,125 S. Ct. 2456,545 U.S. 374
Decision Date20 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-5462.
PartiesROMPILLA v. BEARD, SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
545 U.S. 374
125 S. Ct. 2456
162 L. Ed. 2d 360
ROMPILLA
v.
BEARD, SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
No. 04-5462.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 18, 2005.
Decided June 20, 2005.

Petitioner Rompilla was convicted of murder and other crimes. During the penalty phase, the jury found the aggravating factors that the murder was committed during a felony, that it was committed by torture, and that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence. In mitigation, five members of Rompilla's family beseeched the jury for mercy. He was sentenced to death, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. His new lawyers filed for state postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance by his trial counsel in failing to present significant mitigating evidence about Rompilla's childhood, mental capacity and health, and alcoholism. The state courts found that trial counsel had sufficiently investigated the mitigation possibilities. Rompilla then raised inadequate representation in a federal habeas petition. The District Court found that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, concluding that trial counsel had not investigated obvious signs that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and suffered from mental illness and alcoholism, unjustifiably relying instead on Rompilla's own description of an unexceptional background. In reversing, the Third Circuit found nothing unreasonable in the state court's application of Strickland, given defense counsel's efforts to uncover mitigation evidence from Rompilla, certain family members, and three mental health experts. The court distinguished Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510—in which counsel had failed to investigate adequately to the point of ignoring the leads their limited enquiry yielded—noting that, although trial counsel did not unearth useful information in Rompilla's school, medical, police, and prison records, their investigation had gone far enough to give them reason to think that further efforts would not be a wise use of their limited resources.

Held: Even when a capital defendant and his family members have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the trial's sentencing phase. Pp. 380-393.

[545 U.S. 375]

(a) Rompilla's entitlement to federal habeas relief turns on showing that the state court's resolution of his ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The state court's result must be not only incorrect but also objectively unreasonable. Wiggins, supra, at 520-521. In judging the defense's investigation in preparing for a capital trial's sentencing phase, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to "counsel's perspective at the time" investigative decisions were made and by giving deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, supra, at 689, 691. Pp. 380-381.

(b) Here, the lawyers were deficient in failing to examine the court file on Rompilla's prior rape and assault conviction. They knew that the Commonwealth intended to seek the death penalty by proving that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence, that it would attempt to establish this history by proving the prior conviction, and that it would emphasize his violent character by introducing a transcript of the rape victim's trial testimony. Although the prior conviction file was a public record, readily available at the courthouse where Rompilla was to be tried, counsel looked at no part of it until warned by the prosecution a second time, and even then did not examine the entire file. With every effort to view the facts as a defense lawyer would have at the time, it is difficult to see how counsel could have failed to realize that not examining the file would seriously compromise their opportunity to respond to an aggravation case. Their duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn what they could about the offense the prosecution was going to use certainly included obtaining the Commonwealth's own readily available file to learn what it knew about the crime, to discover any mitigating evidence it would downplay, and to anticipate the details it would emphasize. The obligation to examine the file was particularly pressing here because the violent prior offense was similar to the crime charged and because Rompilla's sentencing strategy stressed residual doubt. This obligation is not just common sense, but is also described in the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which are "`guides to determining what is reasonable,'" Wiggins, supra, at 524. The state court's conclusion that defense counsel's efforts to find mitigating evidence by other means were enough to free them from further enquiry fails to answer the considerations set out here, to the point of being objectively unreasonable. No reasonable lawyer would forgo examination of the file thinking he could do as well by asking the defendant or family relations what they recalled. Nor would a reasonable lawyer compare possible searches for school reports, juvenile records, and evidence of drinking habits to the

[545 U.S. 376]

opportunity to take a look at a file disclosing what the prosecutor knows and plans to read from in his case. Pp. 381-390.

(c) Because the state courts found counsel's representation adequate, they never reached the prejudice element of a Strickland claim, whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result . . . would have been different," 466 U. S., at 694. A de novo examination of this element shows that counsel's lapse was prejudicial. Had they looked at the prior conviction file, they would have found a range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up. The imprisonment records contained in that file pictured Rompilla's childhood and mental health very differently from anything they had seen or heard. The accumulated entries—e. g., that Rompilla had a series of incarcerations, often related to alcohol; and test results that would have pointed the defense's mental health experts to schizophrenia and other disorders—would have destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla's upbringing and mental capacity counsel had formed from talking to five family members and from the mental health experts' reports. Further effort would presumably have unearthed much of the material postconviction counsel found. Alerted to the school, medical, and prison records that trial counsel never saw, postconviction counsel found red flags pointing up a need for further testing, which revealed organic brain damage and childhood problems probably related to fetal alcohol syndrome. These findings in turn would probably have prompted a look at easily available school and juvenile records, which showed additional problems, including evidence of a highly abusive home life. The evidence adds up to a mitigation case bearing no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury. The undiscovered "mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, `might well have influenced the jury's appraisal' of [Rompilla's] culpability," Wiggins, supra, at 538, and the likelihood of a different result had the evidence gone in is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" actually reached at sentencing, Strickland, supra, at 694. Pp. 390-393.

355 F.3d 233, reversed.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 393. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 396.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Billy H. Nolas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Maureen Kearney Rowley.

[545 U.S. 377]

Amy Zapp, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Gerald J. Pappert, Attorney General, Richard A. Sheetz, Jr., Executive Deputy Attorney General, and James B. Martin.

Traci L. Lovitt argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.*

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.


This case calls for specific application of the standard of reasonable competence required on the part of defense counsel by the Sixth Amendment. We hold that even when a capital defendant's family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.

I

On the morning of January 14, 1988, James Scanlon was discovered dead in a bar he ran in Allentown, Pennsylvania, his body having been stabbed repeatedly and set on fire. Ronald Rompilla was indicted for the murder and related offenses, and the Commonwealth gave notice of intent to ask

545 U.S. 378

for the death penalty. Two public defenders were assigned to the case.

The jury at the guilt phase of trial found Rompilla guilty on all counts, and during the ensuing penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to prove three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence: that the murder was committed in the course of another felony; that the murder was committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant history of felony...

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2525 practice notes
  • Detrich v. Ryan, No. 08–99001.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • May 2, 2012
    ...even where a defendant is “actively obstructive,” counsel must investigate available records. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381, 383, 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (holding that the state court's conclusion that counsel did not perform deficiently was “objectively unreasonable” under the AEDPA). Third, e......
  • Lebar v. Thompson, CIVIL NO. 3:CV-08-0072
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • May 13, 2013
    ...from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456,162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527,156 L.2d.2d 471 (2003)). For purpose......
  • Williams v. United States, No. C13-4025-MWB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • August 13, 2014
    ...were reasonable and legitimate based on predictions of how the trial would proceed" (citing Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770)); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) ("In judging the defense's investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to 'c......
  • Williams v. Anderson, No. 04-3515.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 28, 2006
    ...mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In those case......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2523 cases
  • Detrich v. Ryan, No. 08–99001.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • May 2, 2012
    ...even where a defendant is “actively obstructive,” counsel must investigate available records. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381, 383, 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (holding that the state court's conclusion that counsel did not perform deficiently was “objectively unreasonable” under the AEDPA). Third, e......
  • Lebar v. Thompson, CIVIL NO. 3:CV-08-0072
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • May 13, 2013
    ...from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456,162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527,156 L.2d.2d 471 (2003)). For purpose......
  • Williams v. United States, No. C13-4025-MWB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • August 13, 2014
    ...were reasonable and legitimate based on predictions of how the trial would proceed" (citing Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770)); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) ("In judging the defense's investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to 'c......
  • Williams v. Anderson, No. 04-3515.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 28, 2006
    ...mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In those case......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Institutionalizing the Culture of Control
    • United States
    • International Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 24-4, December 2014
    • December 1, 2014
    ...v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977)Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994)Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988)Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990)Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.......
  • Attorneys’ Use of Hegemonic Tales and Subversive Stories in the Presentation of Capital Mitigation
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 41-1, March 2016
    • March 1, 2016
    ...and serviceneeds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).Sandys, M., & McClelland, S. (2003). Stacking the deck for guilt and death: The failure of deat......

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