Ron v. Lennane, Civ. No. B-77-363.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B-77-363.
• Citation: 445 F. Supp. 98
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Aharon RON, Petitioner, v. Andrew J. LENNANE et al., Respondents.

445 F. Supp. 98

Aharon RON, Petitioner, v. Andrew J. LENNANE et al., Respondents.

Civ. No. B-77-363.

United States District Court. D. Connecticut.

December 22, 1977.

David Flynn, Law Student Intern, and Judith Resnik, Jerome N. Franke Resnik, Legal Services Org., New Haven, Conn., for petitioner.

Frank Santoro, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Haven, Conn., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

DALY, District Judge.

The central and most important of the morning prayers recited by Orthodox Jews — the Amidah — should begin at sunrise. For Orthodox Yemenite Jews, among whom the petitioner places himself, these morning prayers normally continue for more than one hour. All must be spoken audibly, and without interruption. Prayers must also be said in the afternoon and evening. In order for the petitioner to conform to this religious practice, he must rise before dawn, leave the dormitory to avoid disturbing sleeping inmates, and begin his prayers in the seclusion of the television room. The morning head-count at the Danbury Federal Correctional Institution often occurs during the petitioner's prayers. Because of the importance attributed to the head-count in maintaining institutional security, the defendants on at least one occasion have prevented the petitioner from completing his prayers. As a result of this interference and related conduct, the petitioner claims that the prison officials violated his rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. On the basis of the testimony and exhibits provided at an expedited hearing, this Court holds that the petitioner has failed to prove even a single constitutional violation.

The First Amendment guarantees the free exercise of an individual's religious beliefs, even within prison walls, as long as the exercise is "not inconsistent with this status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). In analyzing whether the First Amendment has been violated, the Court must first discern from the evidence whether the petitioner has established the requisite constitutional interest. First, the petitioner must prove that the conduct prohibited by the prison authorities is "deeply rooted in religious doctrine." Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F.Supp. 947, 949-50 (D.Conn. 1977); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1975). Second, the petitioner must prove that his conduct is the product of a sincere, personal religious belief. Id. at 360-61; Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 394-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974), remanded sub nom., Theriault v. Silber, 391 F.Supp. 578 (W.D.Tex.1975); Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, supra at 951 & n.13; cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).

Petitioner has clearly met his burden of proof on the first element of the test. The thrice-daily prayers and, in particular, the recitation of the Amidah at sunrise are traditional and highly praiseworthy religious practices. However, the petitioner has failed to convince this Court that his regular devotions are the product of a sincerely held religious belief. Petitioner's testimony was incredible, both in speech and demeanor. Although the border between genuine mannerism and theatrical display is sometimes obscure, the petitioner's explanation of his religious faith, in so far as it related to the practices in question, was contrived. The Court's conclusion as to the petitioner's credibility, initially formed during the hearing, was later corroborated by an examination of the documentary evidence submitted by the Government, evidence of a criminal past that included successful schemes to defraud charitable Jewish Americans.

By recalling the petitioner's criminal record, this Court does not mean to imply that those with a shameful past are beyond reform. Indeed, the loneliness of imprisonment has been known to alter significantly an inmate's religious outlook. See, e. g., C. Colson, Born Again (1976). But that is not the case here. Furthermore, to find a good-faith religious belief in this case would be to reduce that element of the First Amendment analysis to insignificance. And merely requiring a petitioner to prove that his disruptive conduct conforms to traditional religious practice would dangerously inflate the number of First Amendment claims. In so far as the established borders of prison religious practices protected by the First Amendment are based upon the expected frequency of such conduct, see, e. g., Kahane v. Carlson, supra at 495, the final result might well be a narrower definition of...