Ronan v. Michigan Public School Employee Retirement System
| Decision Date | 08 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 216633,216633 |
| Parties | (Mich.App. 2001) JUDITH RONAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
Defendant Michigan Public School Employees Retirement Board ("the Board") denied plaintiff's request that she be permitted service credit for three school years in which she was not teaching. As to those years, plaintiff had filed worker's compensation claims which resulted in redemption orders. Plaintiff appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court which concluded that service credit could be made available to plaintiff under the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement Act ("the Act") as interpreted by Adrian School District v Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System, 458 Mich 326; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). We conclude that Adrian School does not allow for any provision of service credit to plaintiff under the facts of this case and we reverse and remand.
Plaintiff is a retired school teacher and a member of the Michigan Public School Employee Retirement System (MPSERS). For purposes of calculating her retirement benefit, plaintiff was not allowed service credit for school years in which she was off work and claimed a worker's compensation disability. The filing of a claim for worker's compensation often results in payment of weekly benefits, for the period during which an employee is unable to work because of work related injury or illness. Alternatively, a worker's compensation claim may be settled with the payment of a lump sum amount pursuant to a worker's compensation redemption order. Plaintiff received such settlements following her claims for worker's compensation benefits for the three school years in which she was not teaching.
The Board does allow service credit for time periods for which weekly worker's compensation payments are made, a policy that was affirmed in Adrian School, supra. However, the Board here decided plaintiff is not entitled to the same treatment with respect to time away from work which resulted in a worker's compensation redemption order, without provision of any weekly worker's compensation payments. On appeal, the trial court reversed this decision, concluding that, under Adrian School, plaintiff is entitled to the service credit requested. The matter was remanded and defendant was ordered to determine if plaintiff's absence from work was the result of work-related health problems. The Board challenges that decision on appeal, arguing that it is contrary to the Act. We agree and reverse the decision of the trial court.
This Court reviews a decision of an administrative agency in the same manner as the circuit court. Wyckoff v Detroit, 233 Mich App 220, 222; 591 NW2d 71 (1998). Reviewing courts may set aside an order of an administrative agency if it violates the constitution or a statute or if the ruling contains a substantial and material error of law. MCL 24.306(1)(a), (f); MSA 3.560(206)(1)(a), (f); Adrian School, supra at 332. The present case involves only statutory interpretation, a matter of law and subject to de novo review. See Colbert v Conybeare Law Offices, 239 Mich App 608, 614; 609 NW2d 208 (2000); Wyckoff, supra at 222.1 This Court has discussed its duties in judicial interpretation as follows:
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). We look to the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the statute's purpose. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). [Conybeare, supra at 616.]
The issue presented is similar to that considered in Adrian School. Under the Act, public school employees are entitled to service credit for time spent off work while receiving "compensation." See generally, Adrian School, supra at 338-339 (Taylor, J., dissenting). The Act, as it was written during the relevant time frame for this case, defined "compensation" as including "sick leave pay while absent from work." MCL 38.1304(1); MSA 15.893(114)(1).2 The majority opinion in Adrian School concluded that weekly worker's compensation benefits qualified under this statutory definition. It reasoned that "workers disability compensation benefits are a form of sick leave pay because they are compensation for illness or injury suffered by a public school employee while on the job." Adrian Schools, supra at 334. The Adrian School majority further noted that, while the case before it was pending on appeal, the Legislature had amended the definition of "compensation" to expressly include "weekly workers
disability compensation payments." Id. at 337; MCL 38.1303a; MSA 15.893(113a). The Adrian School majority concluded that this legislative amendment did not suggest a change in legislative intent as to whether such payments should be considered compensation but, instead, clarified the statute's consistent intent that those payments should be considered compensation. Id. The three judges joining in the dissent concluded that this was an unwarranted extension of the provisions of the statute to provide relief in consideration of the "compelling situation" of the plaintiff there, who had been allowed service credits that left her just short of a full thirty years. Id. at 329-330.
While we are, of course, bound by the majority opinion in Adrian School, the question before us is whether the Act's language can be further extended to include the service credit that plaintiff seeks here. Because the reasoning employed by the Adrian School majority does not apply here, we conclude such a further interpretive extension cannot properly be afforded to the statutory language.
Payment of weekly worker's compensation benefits, such as were at issue in Adrian, School, results from a recognition by an employer (or, in a contested case, a determination by the worker's compensation bureau) that an employee has an injury or illness requiring an absence from work. It is a payment made for that reason and as a replacement for the wages that are lost. In that sense, weekly worker's compensation benefit payments are, in the words of the Adrian School majority, "compensation for illness or injury" which prevents an employee from working. Id. at 334. Thus, "a reasonable interpretation of 'sick leave pay' encompasses" those payments. Id.
In contrast, the worker's compensation redemption awards plaintiff received in this case are merely settlements of her claim for benefits and do not constitute any recognition or determination that she was prevented from working because of illness or injury. See, e.g., MCL 418.835(1); MSA 17.237(835)(1); White v Weinberger Builders, Inc, 397 Mich 23, 34; 242 NW2d 427 (1976); Leupp v All Day All Night Laundromat, 117 Mich App 368, 373; 323 NW2d 708 (1982), remanded on other grounds 418 Mich 887 (1983). In fact, plaintiff here acknowledged that the redemption settlements she received were intended, at least in part, to cover medical care and retraining expenses. The redemption agreements do nothing to establish that plaintiff...
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