Rondini v. Bunn

• Decision Date: 13 January 2020
• Docket Number: Case No.: 7:17-cv-01114-RDP
• Citation: 434 F.Supp.3d 1266
• Parties: Michael W. RONDINI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Terry J. BUNN, Jr., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

434 F.Supp.3d 1266

Michael W. RONDINI, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Terry J. BUNN, Jr., Defendant.

Case No.: 7:17-cv-01114-RDP

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Western Division.

Signed January 13, 2020

Leroy Maxwell, Jr., Maxwell Law Firm, Austin Trevor Russell, Maxwell and Tillman Law Firm, Birmingham, AL, Julie E. Heath, Pro Hac Vice, Patricia Davis, Pro Hac Vice, Farrow-Gillespie & Heath LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Angela C. Shields, Thomas Coleman, Jr., Smith, Spires, Peddy, Hamilton & Coleman, PC, Richard E Smith, Christian & Small LLP, Birmingham, AL, W. Ivey Gilmore, Jr., Gilmore Rowley Crissey & Wilson, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is before the court on Defendant Terry J. Bunn, Jr.'s ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 121). The Motion has been fully briefed (see Docs. # 122, 139, 141) and is ripe for review.¹ After careful review, and for the reasons discussed below, this case is due to be stayed pending certification of a question to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Michael and Cynthia Rondini ("Plaintiffs") have sued Defendant and asserted claims arising out of the alleged sexual assault of their daughter, Megan Rondini, and her tragic suicide.²

According to a transcript from a video interview between Megan and the police on July 2, 2015, 20-year-old Megan Rondini met Defendant, a 34-year-old man, at a Tuscaloosa pub on July 1, 2015.³ (Doc. # 122-13 at 6).⁴ While leaving the pub, Megan was approached by Defendant, who drove Megan first to her apartment where they drank alcohol, and then to Defendant's residence in Cottondale, Alabama. (Id. at 10, 39; Doc. # 122-1 at 42). Once inside Defendant's house, Megan stated that Defendant asked her to go upstairs to his bedroom. (Doc. # 122-13 at 15). Contemporaneously, Megan sent a few text messages to her friends, saying things such as (1) "pick me up in the morning," (2) "we are going to guck." (Doc. # 122-11 at 2).

After Megan went to Defendant's bedroom, she stated that when Defendant came into the room, "he went and sat on his bed and he, like, wanted me to sit with him and I was just kind of, like, and then he kind of, like, made comments like he wanted to have sex and I really didn't want to and he walked over to me and, like, started trying to kiss me and I didn't really want to."⁵ (Id. at 17). During that time, Megan stated that she "wasn't really looking at him, I kind of – I had already said, like, I needed to leave and he wasn't really responding to that, so I kind of just let him do it. (Id. at 19).

While Defendant was asleep, Megan went into the bathroom, "kind of panicking," and she was trying to get her shoes on when she began contacting her friends asking them to come get her. (Id. at 22). Some of the text messages Megan sent to her friends included: "I can't get out of the room help," "Omg I ... he's asleep I can't get out help," "I can't get out the door is locked," and "please help me." (Doc. # 122-7). Megan then realized that the door to exit the bedroom was locked by a "little pin" that would not open. (Doc. # 122-13 at 22). She resorted to jumping out of a second-story bedroom window to leave Defendant's residence. (Id. at 23).

Before anyone arrived to pick her up, Megan searched for her keys but could not find them, so she climbed back up through his window to search for them in Defendant's room. However, she still could not find them. (Doc. # 122-10 at 10-11). Finally, her friends arrived and drove her home.

Megan's friends took her to their apartment first and then "to DCH Hospital in Tuscaloosa," where she reported to medical personnel and the Tuscaloosa Sheriff's Department that she had been raped. (Doc. # 122-13 at 25). Megan underwent a rape examination at the hospital. (Id. ).

That same day, police officers spoke with Defendant at his residence. (Doc. # 122-2 at 8-9). Defendant denied Megan's presence at his residence during the prior evening. (Doc. # 122-1 at 54). When Defendant was later questioned by the police at the Sheriff's Department, he and his attorney were left alone to talk. During this conversation, which was videotaped, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant admitted to his attorney that he could not remember anything from that evening because he was intoxicated. (Id. at 62).

After staying with her parents in Austin, Texas for a few months, in August 2015, Megan returned to the University of Alabama for the fall semester. She saw a psychotherapist, Dr. Susan Arnold, on September 25, 2015 and October 2, 2015, who diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder

("PTSD") and anxiety stemming from PTSD. (Doc. # 122-15 at 13). During Megan's first psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Arnold, Dr. Arnold reported that Megan was "very tearful and upset while she described [her rape]." (Id. ). Dr. Arnold also stated that Megan's thought content was "very[,] very afraid; in constant fear." (Id. at 17). After Dr. Arnold developed a treatment plan for Megan, which primarily consisted of medication for her anxiety and PTSD, Megan withdrew from the University in October 2015. (Doc. # 122-3 at 61). She returned to Austin, Texas after learning that one of the classes she was registered to take involved a volunteer project that was sponsored by one of Defendant's companies.⁶ (Id. ).

While in Texas, Megan began seeing a therapist by the name of Betty Bewley. (Id. at 65). Megan saw Ms. Bewley weekly from October 2015 to December 2015. (Id. ). Ms. Bewley also recommended that Megan see a psychiatrist, so Megan began seeing Dr. Ziba Rezaee. (Id. ). Dr. Rezaee "confirmed Megan's diagnosis of anxiety, depression, and PTSD" and prescribed her medication for those disorders, as well as medication for nightmares. (Id. ).

Around this same time, Megan was admitted to Southern Methodist University and began taking classes there. (Id. at 69). While at SMU, Megan began seeing Dr. Donna Cozort, a psychiatrist, in Dallas, Texas in late January/early February 2016. (Id. at 71). However, Megan did not like Dr. Cozort, so she only met with her once. (Id. ). Megan then sought additional counseling at the SMU Health Clinic.

On February 24, 2016, Megan filled out a "Health History Form" at the SMU Health Clinic. (Doc. # 139-1 at 16). She reported suicidal thoughts on the form. (Id. ). She recounted her history of "PTSD, depression, [and] anxiety stemming from sexual assault and rape on July 1, 2015." (Id. ). She reported the rape, police bullying, and her change of universities as major losses, changes, or crises in her life. (Id. at 19). On the morning of February 26, 2016, Megan committed suicide. (Doc. # 139-2 at 2).

Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint was filed on August 1, 2018. (Doc. # 100). Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint only contains one count: Wrongful death. (Doc. # 100 at 11, ¶¶ 49, 50). Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that: (1) Defendant "unlawfully and intentionally detained and imprisoned Megan Rondini [both in his car and then in his bedroom] against her will for a length of time whereby he deprived her of her personal liberty;" and (2) Defendant "intended to cause Megan imminent, harmful or offensive contact with her person when he forcefully and intentionally raped Megan." (Id. ).

II. Standards of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty. , 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007) ; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

When faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc. , 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to...