Ronken v. Board of County Com'rs of Snohomish County, 562
| Citation | 572 P.2d 1,89 Wn.2d 304 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 562,No. 44310,U,562,44310 |
| Parties | Stanley C. RONKEN, Peter Hylbeck, Loren Bogart, and Carpenters' Localnited Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, an employee association, A. E. Wilcox and the Associated General Contractors of America, Seattle Chapter Inc., a Washington Corporation, Respondents, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY, Charles Hill and N. Richard Foresgren and C. Earl Torgeson, Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Robert E. Schillberg, Pros. Atty., Richard S. Lowry, Deputy Pros. Atty., Everett, for appellants.
Ferguson & Burdell, William B. Moore, Seattle, for respondents.
Robert E. Beaty, Olympia, amicus curiae.
Plaintiffs, union members, a union local, a contractor, and a contractors' association (respondents), sought declaratory and equitable relief against appellants, the Board of County Commissioners of Snohomish County (commissioners). The commissioners made it a practice to have road work and other public work projects done by county employees, rather than letting the work out to the private sector through competitive bidding procedures. This practice was enjoined by the Snohomish County Superior Court as violative of the statutory scheme under RCW 36.32.240, .250, and 36.77.060. From a detailed order of the trial court, the commissioners appeal to this court. Respondents cross-appeal from the trial court's definition of "day labor". We affirm the trial court on all issues.
The commissioners had been using county road crews (day labor) for construction work, other than ordinary maintenance, on projects having a true cost in excess of $25,000, without calling for competitive bids. This they did by dividing into units and classes of work, what was in reality a single project, and then listing these units or classes of work in authorizing resolutions as separate projects each costing $25,000 or less. A project extending into another calendar year was frequently treated as two projects, one in each year. In addition, structures and other public works, which clearly did not constitute road work, were constructed by county employees without requesting competitive bids, though such public works had a true cost in excess of $1,000 1 each.
Where work having a cost in excess of $2,500 was performed without competitive bids, the commissioners failed to maintain records of the estimated and final costs of such projects. Nor was public notice of such projects provided as required by RCW 36.77.070 or RCW 39.04.
The above facts come from a stipulated record that is quite sketchy. This state of the record is troublesome to the Washington State Association of Counties which has favored us with a brief as amicus curiae. It is the concern of amicus "that counties as a whole are left with workable administrative standards in the aftermath of the Snohomish County Road District scandal." The counties' main concern is that the more onerous and expensive notice requirements of RCW 39.04, imposed by the trial court on Snohomish County for day labor road projects costing over $2,500, not be imposed on all counties. Amicus urges that Snohomish County alone be subjected to the requirements of the trial court's order, and other counties be held only to those less detailed and less costly notice requirements in RCW 36.77.070.
Commissioners' arguments are as follows:
1. Respondents should not have been permitted to bring this action (a) because they did not have any more direct or extensive interest in the subject matter of the action than any other taxpayer, therefore they were required to serve notice on the attorney general or county prosecutor prior to this suit, which they did not do; (b) they were not entitled to declaratory relief, as necessary elements for declaratory jurisdiction were absent, and they had an alternative remedy at law in the form of a direct appeal from the decision of the commissioners, RCW 36.32.330; and (c) the necessary elements for injunctive relief were absent.
2. In conducting county affairs in the manner most conducive to the welfare of the citizens, the commissioners must use their best judgment in deciding whether public works generally and road projects costing less than $25,000 could be more economically accomplished by using hourly-paid county employees and county-owned equipment, than by letting the work to private contractors. Statutes regulating the manner of accomplishing public works should be construed to effect such a policy.
3. Projects accomplished in conformity with the standards of good practice promulgated by the County Road Administration Board 2 in WAC 136-18 are lawfully constructed, and the stricter guidelines imposed on Snohomish County by the trial court should be overturned.
4. Publication requirements imposed by the trial court on Snohomish County day labor road construction projects costing in excess of $2,500 are stricter and more extensive than demanded by RCW 36.77.070. Those simpler, less onerous, less expensive requirements should be permitted, not the more detailed ones in RCW 39.04 applied by the court.
Respondents contend in their cross-appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that persons regularly and continuously on the county payroll could be treated as "day labor" for purposes of RCW 36.77.
Amicus curiae is in complete support of the trial court except for conclusion of law No. 8, 3 insofar as it imposes public notice advertising requirements of RCW 39.04 on activities carried out under RCW 36.77.070 ().
Considering the commissioners' first contention regarding respondents' standing, we are clear that a union local and its individual members and a contractors' association and its individual members have a distinct interest over and above the general public or a random taxpayer. They have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case. We find this matter to be more nearly comparable to Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash.2d 531, 496 P.2d 334 (1972) than to Tabor v. Moore, 81 Wash.2d 613, 503 P.2d 736 (1972), upon which the commissioners rely. Consequently, there was no requirement that demand first be made by respondents on the Attorney General or the Prosecuting Attorney of Snohomish County to institute proceedings as a condition precedent to their initiating this action.
The commissioners' contention that respondents were not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief was properly rejected by the trial court. To the contrary, a declaratory action, together with the coercive remedy of injunction, is a convenient and appropriate method for settling the issues presented herein. We find the trial court's detailed explicit order well-suited to prevent the problem from continuing or again arising in Snohomish County. It is true as the commissioners contend, that a statutory right of appeal from a decision or order of the board of county commissioners exists under RCW 36.32.330. However, respondents were not parties to the record of any of the proceedings or decisions challenged by them in this lawsuit. See State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Comm'rs, 146 Wash. 449, 263 P. 735 (1928). Neither were they harmed by a single decision of the county commissioners, such that appeal would be an appropriate remedy. Rather, it was a continuing policy of the commissioners and an ongoing series of decisions by the board which adversely affected respondents, thus the remedy sought was particularly well-suited.
The granting of declaratory relief is discretionary with the trial court, and here the court properly allowed such relief. The rule previously followed by Washington with the sparse company of Indiana and Pennsylvania, that declaratory relief will not lie where any alternative remedy is available, was changed by court rule in 1967. CR 57 provides in part:
The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.
Therefore, cases relied on by commissioners, Reeder v. King County, 57 Wash.2d 563, 358 P.2d 810 (1961), and those following, no longer control on this issue. Still, the courts will be circumspect in granting such relief. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting the relief here. Writs of prohibition and mandamus were dismissed on motion of the prosecutor.
Elements to invoke the court's declaratory power are set forth in Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wash.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137, 139 (1973), as follows:
(1) . . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.
We are clear that all the elements are presented by this controversy.
However, the fourth element presents an interesting issue when considered in light of the injunction. The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the injunctive order as to future disputes which may arise, and stated in the order:
Jurisdiction of the Court is continued and alleged non-observance of the requirements imposed hereby may be brought before the Court by any party upon notice, motion and a show cause application.
We are in complete agreement with the trial court that the basis for injunctive relief exists here. There was sufficient proof of irreparable and continuing injury were the commissioners' practices to continue, and the legal remedy was inadequate as we have stated.
As to whether an order can be "final and conclusive" when continuing jurisdiction is retained, we find the declaratory aspect of the order declaring the rights...
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