Ronning v. Carter

• Decision Date: 11 November 1924
• Citation: 200 N.W. 652,185 Wis. 384
• Parties: RONNING ET AL. v. CARTER ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

185 Wis. 384

200 N.W. 652

RONNING ET AL.

v.CARTER ET AL.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 11, 1924.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dane County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act by Rossie Carter, for compensation for death of employé, opposed by C. O. Ronning, doing business as the C. O. Ronning Company, employer, and the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, insurer. From judgment reversing and setting aside award of compensation by Industrial Commission, claimant and Industrial Commission appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

It appears from the evidence that one C. O. Ronning operated a garage and was the local agent at Rice Lake, Wis., for the sale of Ford automobiles. One Carter, an employé of the conservation commission of this state, at an annual salary, on the 28th day of July, 1923, was engaged by Ronning to convey a Ford car from the assembling plant at Minneapolis to Rice Lake. During the year 1921, for a period of about 6 or 7 months, he was employed by Ronning as a salesman and in performing work in and about the garage. Several days before the accident Ronning asked Carter if he would come along and drive some cars from Minneapolis to Rice Lake, and Carter was asked what he wanted for doing this, to which he replied, “Anything you say is all right with me.” Ronning thereupon said, “It always costs me $5 and expenses, no matter which of the boys I send.” He then asked Carter whether this was all right, to which he replied in the affirmativè. On the morning of the accident, C. O. Ronning had with him in his automobile his brother Nels Ronning, one of his employés, and together they called for Carter and proceeded to Cameron Junction, where it was designed that Nels Ronning and Carter should proceed by train to Minneapolis. While on their way to Cameron Junction, the passengers in the car met with an accident which resulted in the death of Carter.

C. O. Ronning had in his employ about 10 men, 7 of whom were engaged as mechanics in the garage. These mechanics frequently undertook the trip to Minneapolis, to drive cars from that city to the Ronning garage at Rice Lake, and at times other men were employed for the same purpose. For the work thus performed by the employés and others, C. O. Ronning paid the uniform rate of $5 a day, which was the amount paid by him to his mechanics while engaged in garage work. Ronning also testified that when his employés were engaged in driving cars from Minneapolis to Rice Lake, this work was figured as a part of their work; that Carter had peculiar qualifications for doing that work, for in the event that any of the cars needed repairs he was able to repair them. Ronning also testified that he considered Carter as capable as anybody to take a car over the road.

The Industrial Commission made the necessary findings of fact, and among other things found that Carter at the time he met his death was an employé of C. O. Ronning and also found all the other necessary statutory requisites to entitle the widow to compensation. The circuit court set aside the award of the Industrial Commission, and found that Carter was an independent contractor.

Jones, J., dissenting.H. L. Ekern, Atty. Gen., T. L. McIntosh, Asst. Atty. Gen., and G. P. Gannon, of Rice Lake, for appellants.

Hanitch, Hartley & Johnson, of Superior, for respondents.

DOERFLER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

[1] In enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1923, §§ 102.01 to 102.41), the Legislature, in place of the master's liability for damages for negligence to his servant, substituted a uniform compensation to employés who had suffered injury, and a death benefit for dependents. This compensation under the act enured to the benefit of all employés subject to the provisions thereof. This departure, while practically an innovation in this country at the time of its adoption, had been in force for many years in European countries. The principle underlying this act recognizes a public interest in those engaged in the performance of services as employés, and such interest springs from the humane idea that an employé injured or incapacitated, or who meets his death in the course of and while engaged in his employment, should definitely be provided for by way of compensation based upon a uniform schedule. It is also further realized that the loss or damage incurred is an economic one, which should be borne by the industry in which the employé at the time of his injury is engaged. The measure is a beneficent one, springing from humane motives, and is founded upon sound economic doctrine, and for this reason the rule is universally applied wherever a compensation law has been enacted, and is in operation, that its provisions shall be liberally construed to accomplish the beneficent purpose for which it was passed. These fundamental ideas must always be prominently borne in mind when issues raised under the act are to be determined.

[2] The question of whether a person engaged to do work is an independent contractor or an employé is one which is oftentimes difficult to determine. While the general rules laid down in the decisions must be applied to each particular case, it must nevertheless become apparent that in the ultimate analysis the final results arrived at depend largely upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. “The vital test in determining whether a person employed to do certain work is an independent contractor...