Rooding v. Peters

• Decision Date: 17 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94 CV 1070.,94 CV 1070.
• Parties: Ronald ROODING, individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Howard PETERS, III, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity, and the Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

864 F. Supp. 732

Ronald ROODING, individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Howard PETERS, III, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity, and the Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendants.

No. 94 CV 1070.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

August 17, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark K. Schoenfield, Schoenberg, Fisher, & Newman, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Ira T. Kaufman, Buffalo Grove, IL, for plaintiff.

Andrew Neal Levine, Iain D. Johnston, Illinois Atty. Gen. Office, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORAN, Chief Judge.

Ronald Rooding brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Howard Peters, III, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).¹ He alleges that Peters' policy requiring inmates to serve at least 60 days in an IDOC facility violated his rights under the United States Constitution and Illinois law, and continues to violate the rights of others now imprisoned. He asks the court to certify a class of complainants which he claims to represent, and for which he seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Peters now moves to dismiss, and for the reasons stated below, his motion is denied.

FACTS

On November 17, 1993, Ronald Rooding was convicted of criminal damage to property and sentenced to one year in jail (Cplt. ¶ 12). He claims that under Illinois law his one-year sentence would have been reduced 183 days for good conduct credits awarded for each day served in prison, and 90 days for good conduct credits awarded for meritorious service (Cplt. ¶¶ 14-5). Therefore, he alleges, his actual incarceration should have totalled 92 days. Id.

Rooding was incarcerated in non-IDOC facilities for 3 days when he was arrested and placed in custody, for 66 days when he was awaiting trial at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDC), and for 2 days at CCDC after sentencing (Cplt. ¶ 13). Adding these up, he claims he served 71 days in non-IDOC facilities out of the 92 days he was to be incarcerated, and that any further incarceration should have totalled 21 days (Cplt. ¶ 18). He estimates that his release date should have been December 10, 1993. Id. However, when Rooding was transferred to an IDOC facility his release date was set at January 19, 1994—60 days from his transfer, rather than the 21 days he says remained of his sentence (Cplt. ¶ 19). His release date was consistent with a policy requiring inmates to serve at least 60 days of their sentences at an IDOC facility (Cplt. ¶ 20).

On December 17, 1993, a week after Rooding claims he should have been released, he filed a petition against Peters in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking habeas corpus relief or a writ of mandamus. Rooding argued that his continued incarceration violated his due process and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution because, as a result of the time he served in non-IDOC facilities, his incarceration exceeded the time served by a person with the same sentence who was incarcerated exclusively in an IDOC facility (Cplt. ¶¶ 20-1). On December 22, 1993, the circuit court issued a writ of mandamus directing Rooding's release (Cplt. ¶ 22). On December 29, 1993, the court denied a motion for reconsideration, again ordered Rooding's release, and denied a request to stay its decision pending appeal. Id. Rooding, however, was not released until January 6, 1994, the day after an appellate court denied an emergency motion for a stay of the circuit court's decision (Cplt. ¶ 22). Rooding therefore claims he was released 27 days late (Cplt. ¶ 23). He alleges that his due process and equal protection rights under the Constitution were violated, that he was falsely imprisoned, and that others suffered and still suffer the same injuries.

DISCUSSION

Rooding's suit to recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment implicates issues recently addressed in Heck v. Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The Court held that

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Rooding's action, if successful, will neither demonstrate nor necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. He does not challenge his conviction for criminal damage to property or his one year sentence. Rather, he challenges the manner in which Peters administered his sentence. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, he is no longer a prisoner, and "individuals not `in custody' cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal court for violating federal rights. That would be an untoward result." Heck, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2379 (Souter, J., concurring). Heck does not preclude Rooding from bringing this action.

a. Alleged Constitutional Violations

Rooding contends the 60-day rule violated his equal protection rights because there is no rational basis related to a legitimate governmental interest for requiring a person who is not incarcerated entirely at an IDOC facility to spend more time incarcerated than someone who is (Cplt. ¶ 24). Peters argues that Rooding's equal protection claim must be dismissed because he does not plead discriminatory intent.

Rooding first responds that collateral estoppel precludes dismissal of his equal protection claim because it involves the same issues and parties under § 1983 that it involved in the state court proceedings in which Rooding prevailed. Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of an issue if the prior litigation involved the same issue and same party against whom estoppel is being asserted. Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 407 (7th Cir.1989); Gilldorn Sav. Ass'n v. Commerce Sav. Ass'n, 804 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1986); In re Nau, 153 Ill.2d 406, 180 Ill.Dec. 240, 249, 607 N.E.2d 134, 143 (1992). Courts require that in the prior litigation the issue was argued and decided on the merits and necessary to the result. Id.

Peters, whom Rooding seeks to estop, was fully represented in the state circuit and appellate court decisions. Peters argues, however, that the issue presented in state court was different than the one here because there Rooding only sought his release, whereas he now seeks monetary and injunctive relief for himself and others.

The strongest support for Peters' argument is the broad language in Ferrell v. Pierce, 785 F.2d 1372, 1384-5 (7th Cir.1986), quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). The court first observed that a prior determination on the same legal issue "is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Id. However, an exception exists when "`the significance of the issue for purposes of the subsequent action was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the first action.'" Id. at 1385, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment j. Another exception is when "`the party sought to be precluded, as a result of ... special circumstances, did not have an adequate ... incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.'" Id., quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(c).

Ferrell is very different from this case. See Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 73 n. 7 (7th Cir.1987) (finding Ferrell irrelevant because it "turned on ... specific facts"). In Ferrell, a consent decree was interpreted regarding one time period and the plaintiffs then sought to apply that interpretation to a separate three year period. The three year period, however, raised a question of interpretation the first decision did not address. Nor did the first decision suggest a particular conclusion regarding the separate time period. In sum, the defendant had no incentive to adjudicate the issue of another time period in the first action because it could not have anticipated the first decision's impact on that period.

Rooding prevailed in state court with his claim that the 60-day rule violates equal protection, and now makes the same claim. Rooding's request for a different remedy does not change the fact that the legal issue here is the same issue that was resolved in Rooding's favor in state court. When he sought his release in state court it was foreseeable that if he emerged victorious on the basis that his incarceration was improper he would seek additional relief. The incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action on the issue of equal protection was substantial as to Rooding and other prisoners. Accordingly, Peters moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's decision, and requested a stay from that court and the appellate court.² Collateral estoppel is therefore appropriate.

Even if collateral estoppel were inapplicable, Rooding sufficiently alleges that Peters intentionally violated his equal protection rights. See Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 539 (7th Cir.1990) (must establish discriminatory intent for prima facie case of discrimination); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1978) (discriminatory purpose implies that action is taken "at least in part `because of' ... its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").³ He alleges that Peters established the 60-day rule, and that as a result Peters set a release date later than it would...