Rooker v. Ouray Cnty.

• Decision Date: 13 January 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. 11–cv–01057–LTB–CBS.
• Citation: 841 F.Supp.2d 1212
• Parties: Norman W. ROOKER, Plaintiff, v. OURAY COUNTY, a County of the State of Colorado, acting through The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Ouray, and A.D. Yeowell, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, Connie Hunt, in her official capacity, and Sherry Peck, in her official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

841 F.Supp.2d 1212

Norman W. ROOKER, Plaintiff,

v.OURAY COUNTY, a County of the State of Colorado, acting through The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Ouray, and A.D. Yeowell, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, Connie Hunt, in her official capacity, and Sherry Peck, in her official capacity, Defendants.

Civil Case No. 11–cv–01057–LTB–CBS.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Jan. 13, 2012.

Nathan Davidovich, Davidovich Law Firm, LLC, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Cathy Havener Greer, William Thomas O'Connell, III, Wells, Anderson & Race, LLC, David R. Demuro, Vaughan & Demuro, Denver, CO, Sara Ludke Cook, Vaughan & Demuro, Colorado Springs, CO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, District Judge.

This matter is before me on two motions, each filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The first is the Motion to Dismiss [Doc # 6] filed by Ouray County (the “County”) acting through the Board of County Commissioners, Connie Hunt (“Hunt”), and Sherry Peck (“Peck”) (collectively, “Ouray”). Their motion requests an order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff Norman W. Rooker's complaint against them. The second motion is Defendant A.D. Yeowell's (“Yeowell”), Motion to Dismiss [Doc # 13] that seeks an order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against him. After consideration of the parties' arguments, for the reasons herein I GRANT both motions in part and DENY them in part as moot according to my rulings below.

I. Background

Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following: Plaintiff is a certified emergency medical technician-paramedic (“EMT–Paramedic”), who worked for the County as the chief paramedic for Ouray County Emergency Medical Services (“OCEMS”), from April 28, 2005, until May 14, 2010. He was responsible for implementing certain quality programs mandated by Colorado law and for auditing the performance of those involved in providing emergency care. Yeowell was the medical director for OCEMS during the relevant period. The County granted him final policy making authority in all matters related to medical supervision of OCEMS. During the relevant period, Hunt was the County's administrator, and Peck was its human resources director.

Plaintiff's suit stems from an investigation he initiated regarding an April 21, 2010, OCEMS ambulance response to an emergency call involving the home delivery of a new-born baby who was not breathing. The paramedic at the scene requested permission from Yeowell to intubate the infant, which was standard procedure. Yeowell refused. Air ambulance was subsequently ordered to transport the infant to a Montrose, Colorado, hospital, but there was a delay in its arrival. When the ambulance was ordered, Plaintiff and Yeowell discussed whether the air ambulance could be sent without delay, for if not, it would be faster to transport the infant by regular ground ambulance. The air ambulance was delayed because Yeowell decided to have it return to pick up a pediatrician after it had left. When the air ambulance finally arrived, the pediatrician tried unsuccessfully to intubate the infant, causing further delay.

Plaintiff commenced a quality improvement audit of the above incident on April 21, 2010. That audit established that the air ambulance's delayed arrival, coupled with the pediatrician's repeated unsuccessful attempts to intubate, caused a significant delay to the infant patient receiving the care that is the national standard in these situations.

After learning that Plaintiff had initiated an audit of the April 21, 2010, occurrence, Yeowell immediately suspended him. Yeowell informed Plaintiff and Ouray that he would no longer allow Plaintiff to work as an EMT–Paramedic under his medical supervision. Ouray then removed Plaintiff from the work schedule. Then, on May 10, 2010, Ouray constructively terminated Plaintiff for initiating the audit by forcing him to accelerate his previously scheduled retirement date. Both the suspension and termination were effected without an opportunity to be heard.

Plaintiff filed this action on April 21, 2011, bringing nine claims for relief. The first two are federal claims. First, Plaintiff asserts that Ouray and Yeowell unlawfully deprived him of his property and liberty without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, they conspired to do the same in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The remaining claims are state law claims. Plaintiff asserts that I have original jurisdiction over his federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as well as under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, and that I have supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

II. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Whether a public entity is protected by sovereign immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (the “CGIA”), Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24–10–101 et seq., is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Swieckowski by Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 1383–84 (Colo.1997). If a public entity has sovereign immunity under the CGIA, the court does not have jurisdiction over the claims asserted against it, see id. at 1384, and the court is empowered to grant a motion to dismiss the case or claims made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (“Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction....”). Furthermore, discovery must be stayed. SeeColo.Rev.Stat. § 24–10–108.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Rather, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir.2007). Legal conclusions, however, do not receive this treatment. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In evaluating whether the complaint states plausible claims for relief, I consider the complaint itself and the County Personnel Manual (the “Manual”), which Ouray and Yeowell attached to their motions. I may consider the Manual because it is integral to Plaintiff's claims, as he relies upon and quotes it in his complaint, and Plaintiff does not dispute the document's authenticity. See Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.2002) (“[T]he district court may consider documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff's claim and the parties do not dispute the documents' authenticity”).

III. Discussion

Ouray argues that all of the claims brought against it should be dismissed with prejudice. Yeowell argues that the claims asserted against him should also be dismissed. Because Ouray and Yeowell make the same arguments with respect to many of Plaintiff's claims, I present and address their motions as one where applicable in the interest of brevity. Where I do present them jointly, I will refer to “the motions” or “both motions.” Where I feel it is necessary to make specific references to an argument in one of the motions, I will refer to that motion specifically. Because the motions, together, seek to dismiss all nine of Plaintiff's claims, my analysis will proceed seriatim—to wit, I examine each claim in turn and analyze the arguments made for dismissing it.

I address a preliminary issue raised in both motions at the outset. Hunt and Peck are sued in their official capacities, Yeowell in his official and individual. Ouray argues that the claims against Hunt and Peck should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff is also suing the County, making the claims against them redundant and superfluous. Yeowell contends that the claims against him in his official capacity should likewise be dismissed for those reasons. Plaintiff has no objection to these arguments. Accordingly, I grant the portion of Ouray's motion seeking to dismiss with prejudice the claims against Hunt and Peck, and I grant the portion of Yeowell's motion seeking to dismiss the claims against him in his official capacity. This ruling does not affect the claims against Yeowell in his individual capacity.

A. The § 1983 Claim Against Ouray and Yeowell

Plaintiff first alleges that Ouray and Yeowell deprived him of his property and liberty without due process of law in violation of § 1983 by suspending and terminating him without giving him an opportunity to be heard. Ouray's motion first argues that Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the County under Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and both motions contend that the claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a property or liberty interest required to invoke due process protection. I address the second, shared argument first and agree with Ouray and Yeowell. I therefore need not and do not address whether Plaintiff states a Monell claim against the County.

I engage in a...