Rooney v. Levinson
| Decision Date | 22 December 1920 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | ROONEY v. LEVINSON. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Edwin C Dickenson, Judge.
Action by Joseph Rooney against Nathan Levinson for damages for injuries to the plaintiff's person and to his motorcycle alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Error and new trial ordered.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and BEACH, GAGER, CASE, and CURTIS, JJ.
Jacob Schwolsky, of Hartford, for appellant.
Edward W. Broder and Edward J. Myers, both of Hartford, for appellee.
The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict was properly denied. Under the evidence the jury could reasonably find the issues for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury as follows:
" Unless you find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence your verdict should be for the plaintiff."
The court charged as requested. This request could not be granted properly unless the jury, under the evidence, could not reasonably find otherwise than that the defendant was guilty of negligence on one or more of the grounds alleged, and that this was a proximate cause of the collision. Under the evidence it clearly appears that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant was free from any negligence which was a proximate cause of the injury. This portion of the charge was therefore erroneous.
The court, at the plaintiff's request, charged the jury as follows:
These requests were intended to present to the jury the law pertinent to the case in relation to what is known as " the last clear chance doctrine."
If under the evidence presented this case was a proper one in which to present the " last clear chance doctrine" to the jury, the court should not have assumed that the expressions " last clear chance" and " intervening cause" have such a well-defined meaning in common knowledge that a jury can comprehend and apply them to the evidence presented in a case.
The court should apply such terms to the situation presented by the evidence by informing the jury, in substance, that negligence on the plaintiff's part which brings him into a place of peril will only be obviated by the negligence of the defendant, where the jury finds: (1) That the injured party has already come into a position of peril; (2) that the injuring party then or thereafter becomes, or in the exercise of ordinary prudence ought to have become, aware not...
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Smith v. Gould
... ... Virginia decisions are "too broad and misleading," ... and winds up by adopting certain requirements enumerated in ... the opinion of Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466, ... 469, 111 A. 794, 795. I have already demonstrated that the ... Connecticut court does not countenance the majority ... ...
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Smith v. Gould, (No. 6942)
...decisions are "too broad and misleading" and winds up by adopting certain requirements enumerated in the opinion of Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466, 469, 111 Atl. 794, 795. I have already demonstrated that the Connecticut court does not countenance the majority conclusion and the Rooney ca......
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Correnti v. Catino
...of the doctrine. Radwick v. Goldstein, 90 Conn. 701, 710, 98 A. 583; Lukosevicia v. Bartow, 99 Conn. 723, 122 A. 709; Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466. 468, 111 A. 794; Notarfrancesco v. Smith, 105 Conn. 49, 55, 134 151. But the plaintiff may claim its application if the evidence affords a ......
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Barnes v. Ashworth
...contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, continuing to the time of his injury, will bar his recovery. In Rooney v. Levinson, 95 Conn. 466, 111 A. 794, 795, the court, following the well-considered opinion of Prentice, C. J., In Fine v. Connecticut Co., 92 Conn. 626, 103 A. 901,......