Roper v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 07 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | 15 Civ. 8899 (PAE) |
| Parties | XAVIER ROPER and WILLIAM LOGAN LOCKETT, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal entity; POLICE OFFICER JEREMIAH WINTER; POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL SHULTIS; INSPECTOR TIMOTHY BEAUDETTE; DEPUTY INSPECTOR JOHN HART; POLICE OFFICER "LOMBARDO"; NEW YORK CITY SUPERVISING POLICE OFFICER "JOHN DOE"; POLICE OFFICERS "JOHN DOES 1-10"; and other unidentified members of the New York City Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
On December 4, 2014, plaintiffs Xavier Roper and William Logan Lockett were arrested by officers of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") in the vicinity of Times Square in Manhattan. Roper and Lockett bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants, NYPD officers and the City of New York (the "City"), violated their federal constitutional rights in connection with the arrests. Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants' motion.
On the evening of December 4, 2014, demonstrators associated with the Black Lives Matter movement gathered to protest in Times Square. FAC ¶¶ 40, 92, 138. Black Lives Matter is a movement intended "to call attention to and change inequalities and ill effects created through systems of structural racism in American society," among them police misconduct and brutality directed at African Americans. Id. ¶ 121. On December 4, the Black Lives Matter protest concerned, in particular, the failure to indict an officer in the case of Eric Garner, an African-American man killed during an arrest on Staten Island in July 2014. See id. ¶¶ 135-39.
Roper went to Times Square on December 4 intending to document the protest. Id. ¶¶ 40-43. Roughly an hour after he arrived, Roper "moved into the street," which was closed to traffic, id. ¶ 54, in order "to photograph and video record the police action from a different perspective," id. ¶ 53. Sometime thereafter, defendant Inspector Timothy Beaudette ordered the protestors to move from the street to the sidewalk. Id. ¶ 55. As the result of barricades and a "wall of NYPD officers," Roper was unable to access the sidewalk in order to comply with the order. Id. ¶ 56. Roper heard an NYPD supervisor instruct his officers to "[j]ust takesomebody and put them in handcuffs."2 Id. ¶ 60. One of the officers then arrested Roper for "standing in the street," id. ¶ 62, and placed him in plastic "flex-cuffs," id. ¶ 76.
Lockett, a freelance photojournalist, also attended the December 4 protest in order to take photographs of the protestors, the police, and the interactions between the two. Id. ¶¶ 90, 92-93. During the protest, in an effort to locate a restroom, Lockett crossed a street that had been closed off to traffic. Id. ¶¶ 96-100. Lockett did not use a crosswalk, as those had been blocked off by police officers. See id. ¶¶ 97, 99. Police officers, including defendant Officer Lombardo, arrested Lockett for disorderly conduct and placed him in plastic flex-cuffs. Id. ¶¶ 101-02.
After their arrests, Roper and Lockett were each detained for several hours and eventually issued desk-appearance tickets. Id. ¶¶ 82-83, 106-07. At their court appearances, both plaintiffs received adjournments in contemplation of dismissal. Id. ¶¶ 87, 108. The charges against them have since been dismissed and sealed. Id. ¶¶ 88, 108.
On November 12, 2015, plaintiffs filed their original complaint, before the Honorable Analisa Torres. Dkt. 1. On February 25, 2016, they filed the FAC. Dkt. 23. A court-ordered mediation session was held on August 18, 2016, without success. Dkt. 34. On August 22, 2016, the case was referred to the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein for all general pretrial matters. Dkt. 35.
On October 4, 2016, Judge Torres denied defendants' request to stay discovery pending defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt. 46. On October 6, 2016, defendantsthen filed the instant motion to dismiss, which was fully submitted as of October 27.3 Dkts. 47-51. On November 22, 2016, the case was transferred to the undersigned. On January 25, 2017, Judge Gorenstein granted a request by the City to stay discovery concerning plaintiffs' claims for municipal liability against it. Dkt. 66. After multiple extensions, fact discovery on the balance of plaintiffs' claims ended on March 23, 2017. See Dkt. 66. Judge Gorenstein denied plaintiffs' requests to further extend the discovery period. See Dkt. 66, 72.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Dismissal is proper where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court must "accept as true all factual claims in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor." In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2016). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of theelements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "[R]ather, the complaint's '[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' i.e., enough to make the claim 'plausible.'" Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) () (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570).
Plaintiffs assert claims of false arrest and arrest in retaliation for protected speech in violation of their federal constitutional rights, as well as parallel false-arrest claims under New York law. FAC ¶¶ 155-205. The existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to each of these claims. See Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (false arrest); Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (retaliatory arrest).
Plaintiffs contend that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest them for failing to comply with orders to disperse (i.e., disorderly conduct) because, to the extent that such orders were issued, the surrounding police barricades inhibited plaintiffs from dispersing. However, the relevant inquiry is "whether probable cause existed to arrest for any crime," not necessarily for the crimes cited by the officers or ultimately charged. Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-56 (2004)); see also Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 385 n.2, 394-95 (2d Cir. 2013) (). Here, defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for offenses relating to pedestrian traffic. For the reasons discussed below, that is correct. The Court therefore need not assess whether plaintiffs' compliance with the dispersal orders was excused so as, potentially, to vitiate probable cause for disorderly conduct based on plaintiffs' failure to disperse.
"Probable cause exists 'when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.'" Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013)). And, whether someone is committing a crime for which probable cause may permit arrest is ordinarily a question of state law. Id. (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) ().
New York law imposes several restrictions on the ability of pedestrians to lawfully walk in the street. Relevant here, one New York statute directs that "[w]here sidewalks are provided and they may be used with safety it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway." N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1156(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2017 ch. 23). A violation of this provision is defined as a "traffic infraction" under New York law. See id. § 1101. Separately, a New York City traffic rule forbids "enter[ing] or cross[ing] a roadway at any point where signs, fences, barriers, or other devices are erected to prohibit or restrict such crossing" as well as "cross[ing] a roadway except at a crosswalk on any block in which traffic control signals are in operation at both intersections bordering the block." N.Y.C. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 34, § 4-04(c)(1), (3) (Westlaw through Mar. 31, 2017).
Defendants contend they had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for violating these traffic rules. Plaintiffs do not respond directly to defendants' argument on this point. Instead, they focus on the lawfulness of the dispersal orders and address the § 50-h transcripts from the examinations of the plaintiffs. See Pl. Opp'n at 20-21, Dkt. 50; see also supra note 3. Butdefendants' claim of justification to arrest has a solid foundation. Probable cause for these traffic violations is established on the face of the FAC, even assuming that compliance with the ensuing dispersal orders was not realistically possible. As pled, Roper and Lockett each voluntarily...
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