Rosa v. Borough of Leonia
| Decision Date | 12 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. HUD-L-607-18 |
| Parties | JACQUELINE ROSA, Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, BOROUGH OF LEONIA COUNCIL, TOM ROWE, in his capacity as acting Borough Clerk of the Borough of Leonia, and JUDAH ZEIGLER, in his official capacity as Mayor of the Borough of Leonia, Defendants. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Intervenor, v. BOROUGH OF LEONIA, NEW JERSEY, Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Jacqueline M. Rosa, Esq., pro se plaintiff.
Brian M. Chewcaskie, Esq. co-counsel for defendants (Gittleman Muhlstock & Chewcaskie, LLP, attorneys).
Ruby Kumar-Thompson, Esq. co-counsel for defendants (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri, Jacobs, LLC., attorneys).
Deputy Attorney General Philip J. Espinosa for plaintiff/intervenor (State of New Jersey, Office of the Attorney General, attorneys).
Bariso, A.J.S.C.
This motion comes in response to this court's August 30, 2018 order granting summary judgment to plaintiff/intervenor the State of New Jersey Department of Transportation ("DOT").1 Defendant Borough of Leonia ("Leonia") requests this court reconsider the summary judgment or, in the alternative, stay the summary judgment order and allow Leonia to cure the procedural infirmities by passing new ordinances and receiving DOT approval.
In the fall of 2017, Leonia enacted a series of ordinances to address traffic issues. Specifically, on December 4, 2017, Leonia's Council adopted Ordinance No. 2017-17, which added "Closing of Certain Streets" and Section 194-49, Schedule XVII "Streets Closed to Traffic" to Leonia's Code. (Leonia Ex. C.)
On January 17, 2018, the Council adopted Ordinance No. 2018-2, which established a $200 penalty or imprisonment for up to 15 days for anyone convicted of violating Section 194-25.1, which was first established under Ordinance 2017-19. (Leonia Ex. D.)
On March 5, 2018, the Council adopted Ordinance 2018-5, which repealed Ordinance No. 2017-19 and supplanted Sections 194-25.1 and 194-49, Schedule XVII to the Code. (Leonia Ex. E.)
Before Ordinance No. 2018-5 was enacted, on January 30, 2018, plaintiff Jacqueline Rosa ("Rosa") filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against Leonia, Leonia Council, Tom Rowe,and Judah Zeigler (collectively, "Defendants"). The complaint challenged the amendments made to Leonia's Code, Sections 194-25.1 and 194-25.2. On February 12, 2018, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On March 27, 2018, defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses.
On May 4, 2018, Rosa applied for an order to show cause, seeking preliminary injunction against enforcement of Leonia Code Sections 194-25.1 and 194-25.2 Ordinance No. 2018-5. This court heard oral argument on May 25, 2018 and denied Rosa's application for a preliminary injunction.
On June 8, 2018, a consent order was entered to allow DOT to intervene. On June 11, 2018, DOT filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and action in lieu of prerogative writs. On July 2, 2018, Leonia filed an answer to DOT's complaint. The discovery end date is May 24, 2019.
On July 11, 2018, DOT filed a motion for summary judgment and on July 16, 2018, Rosa filed for summary judgment. (DOT Ex. C.) Defendants opposed both motions and filed a cross-motion to the DOT's motion, seeking dismissal of the complaints based on the pleadings.
On August 30, 2018, this court heard oral arguments on all three motions and denied the defendants' cross-motion and denied Rosa's motion. This court granted DOT's motion declaring Ordinances Nos. 2017-9, 2018-2, and 2018-5 null and void and legally invalid. This court stated its reasons on the record, stating, (1) the Ordinance impacted Grand Avenue, a state road; (2) thus, the Ordinance was subject to N.J.S.A. 39:4-8(a), requiring approval by DOT; (3) the DOT did not approve the ordinance. During oral argument, defendants argued that this court could and should only invalidate the portions that impact Grand Avenue.
Subsequent to the August 30, 2018 order granting summary judgment to DOT, Leonia introduced two revised Ordinances to regulate street closures. On September 17, 2018, thoseOrdinances, Nos. 2018-14 and 2018-15, passed after a second reading. All neighboring municipalities received notice of both Ordinances before adoption and Leonia will be submitting Ordinance No. 2018-15 to DOT for approval.
POINT I - The court should reconsider its summary judgment order in favor of DOT.
There was clear error in the court's decision because discovery was not complete when the order was entered and the order invalidating all three ordinances in their entirety is overbroad. (Leonia Br. 6.) Also, the interests of justice and Leonia residents were not served by the court's refusal to grant Leonia a stay to cure the procedural errors by giving notice to DOT. Thus, Leonia's Motion for Reconsideration should be granted. (Leonia Br. 6.)
POINT II - The court's finding of an "impact on a state highway" was premature.
In invalidating the Ordinances, this court made a factual finding that "since you cannot turn off a state highway, you are impacting the state roadway." (Leonia Ex. B, T23:5-24-7.) In doing so, the court presumed that the prohibition against turning for non-residents and those persons who are not travelling to a location within Leonia would "back up traffic" on a state highway. Therefore, the Ordinances triggered N.J.S.A. 39:4-8(a), which invalidates any such ordinance absent DOT approval. (Leonia Br. 6.) So, the court construed "impact on a state highway" to be analogous to preventing vehicles from turning onto Leonia's side streets from Grand Avenue.
In deciding motions for summary judgment, a court cannot resolve issues of fact unless the party resisting such motion has an opportunity to complete discovery that is relevant and material to defense of the motion. See Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 109 N.J. 189, 193 (1988); Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 493 (2003) (). In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it is premature, a party must demonstrate with some specificity the discovery sought and its materiality. Mohamad v. Iglesia Evangelica Oasis De Salvation, 424 N.J. Super. 489, 499 (App. Div. 2012); see also Auster v. Kinioian, 153 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 1977).
A trial court should not resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment if a rational fact-finder could go either-way following presentation of the evidence at trial on the merits. See Gilhooley v. County of Union, 164 N.J. 533, 545-46 (2000).
Legislative intent is a matter for the fact finder to determine. When a plain reading of a statute suggests "more than one plausible interpretation," the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence in search of the legislature's intent. Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450 (2014 (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005)). When an issue turns on the interpretation of terms that have more than one plausible meaning, the court should leave the doubtful provision to the fact finder to decide after a trial. Driscoll Constr. Co., Inc., v. Dep't of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 314 (App. Div. 2004).
In Driscoll, the Appellate Division held that the trial judge erred in refusing to consider evidence of the surrounding circumstances of a contract when granting summary judgment on the issue of contract interpretation. Driscoll, 371 N.J. Super. at 316, 318. Because a reasonable trier of fact might conclude that DOT's prior practices provided objective evidence of what the parties intended, Driscoll's reliance upon the prior practice based on identical language in the Crisdel contract should have been considered. Id. at 317. Thus, plaintiffs were at minimum entitled to complete discovery before summary judgment was granted. Id. at 318.
Here, the interpretations of "impact" and "undue impact," when the legislature set forth the standards under which approval of an ordinance may be denied, are susceptible to more than oneinterpretation. (Leonia Br. 8.) As such, discovery should have been afforded to Leonia to determine the implications of the ordinances and whether they affected state roadways. The discovery end date for this matter is May 24, 2019 and no discovery was conducted prior to this court's entry of summary judgment in favor of DOT on August 30, 2018. Inasmuch as this court based its order on the opinion of Mark Hiestand, the DOT traffic engineer, Leonia should have been afforded discovery in his opinions. (Leonia Br. 9.) A deposition of Mr. Hiestand may have determined whether DOT has rendered similar opinions regarding traffic restrictions in other municipalities and whether Mr. Hiestand is credible to render such opinions.
Furthermore, as in Driscoll, evidence of DOT's past practice with respect to other municipal traffic controls along a state highway may be relevant to what the State Legislature intended when it removed DOT oversight from local traffic legislation except for those impacting state highways. (Leonia Br. 9.) DOT's past practice would also be relevant in determining when the legislature required a finding of "undue impact" as the reason for withholding DOT approval in the fourth paragraph of N.J.S.A. 39:4-8(a). N.J.S.A. 39:4-8(a) requires a finding after an investigation by the DOT of an undue impact. Therefore, Leonia is entitled to discovery to defend their argument that the ordinances' impact on a state highway alone does not invalidate an ordinance absent approval from the Commissioner. (Leonia Br. 9-10.) The evidence gathered in discovery may show that DOT never required submission of other similar...
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