La Rosa v. State, NUMBER 13-18-00537-CR
| Decision Date | 21 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-18-00537-CR |
| Parties | JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Tijerina
Appellant Javier De La Rosa Jr. appeals his conviction of murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b). De La Rosa raises five issues on appeal, which we have renumbered and reorganized: (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to preside over this case because the juvenile court never relinquished its original jurisdiction;1 (2) the trial court improperly sustained the State's challenges for cause during voir dire; (3) the trial court erred in allowing "into evidence recorded jail calls without the proper foundation and translation"; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of an extraneous offense; and (5) the trial court erred in denying his request for mistrial. We affirm.
On August 25, 2010, seventeen-year-old Tiffany Galvan's body was found on an isolated park trail in Brownsville, Texas by Cameron County park employees. Forty-eight stab wounds covered her face and body. Galvan's mother told police Galvan was last seen with her ex-boyfriend, sixteen-year-old De La Rosa. On August 26, 2010, a warrant was issued for De La Rosa's arrest.
On September 10, 2010, the State filed a "Petition for Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court," arguing that "because of the seriousness of the offense and the background of the child, the welfare of the community requires that the Juvenile Court waive jurisdiction . . . for the following felony offense(s) and all criminal conduct occurring in said criminal episode:"
JAVIER DE LA ROSA, JR. on or about August 24, 2010, in the County of Cameron and the State of Texas, did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, namely, TIFFANY VANESSA GALVAN, by stabbing the victim with a knife, against the peace and dignity of the State, in violation of a penal law of this State, punishable by imprisonment, to-wit: Section 19.02 of the Texas Penal Code.
On October 8, 2010, De La Rosa, represented by appointed counsel, submitted a "Waiver of Discretionary Transfer Hearing and Consent to Stipulation." De La Rosa "agree[d] and consent[ed] to the stipulation of testimony, of the social evaluation and investigation, the diagnostic studies and the affidavits of witnesses." On the same day, the juvenile court issued its "Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to Criminal Court."
On January 12, 2011, De La Rosa was indicted for the offense of capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (providing that a person commits capital murder if "the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat." It was alleged that in the course of "intentionally caus[ing] the death of [Galvan], by stabbing [Galvan] with a knife or an object unknown to the Grand Jury," De La Rosa was also "then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of obstruction or retaliation against [Galvan]"; "was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery of [Galvan]"; and "was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of kidnapping [Galvan]."
On March 8, 2012, De La Rosa pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of murder pursuant to a plea bargain agreement with the State. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b). A trial was held solely on the issue of punishment, and the jury assessed punishment at ninety years' imprisonment with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Institutional Division. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a).
De La Rosa timely appealed the trial court's judgment to this Court, and on February 12, 2015, this Court affirmed the judgment.2 See De La Rosa v. State, No. 13-12-00368-CR, 2015 WL 601761, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 12, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). De La Rosa subsequently filed a pro se petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the Anders brief filed by former counsel failed to address the previously identified "arguable issues" set forth by this Court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily denied De La Rosa's request without written opinion.
De La Rosa then filed a state habeas petition in the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas. See La Rosa v. Davis, No. 1:17-CV-0099, 2018 WL 4356748, at *4 (S.D. Tex., Brownsville Div. Sept. 12, 2018) (order). The federal court granted De La Rosa's petition for a writ of habeas corpus "on the basis that he was denied adequate and effective appellate review under the Fourteenth Amendment" and remanded the case back to the district state court "for reentry of judgment upon which time for [De La Rosa] to file a notice of appeal . . . anew." Id. at *1, *4.
This appeal followed.
De La Rosa maintains the trial court was without jurisdiction to preside over a capital murder indictment because the juvenile court's order only waived originaljurisdiction to the offense of murder—the only offense before the juvenile court at the time; thus, the juvenile court, having never waived its jurisdiction to the offense of capital murder, still retained original jurisdiction.
A person accused of committing a felony offense between his tenth and seventeenth birthday is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of a juvenile court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a); see Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
In order to effectively waive jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile to be tried as an adult, the juvenile court had to find that: (1) the juvenile was alleged to have committed a felony; (2) the juvenile was fourteen years old or older at the time he committed the alleged offense; (3) after a full investigation and a hearing, there was probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged offense; and (4) that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings because of the alleged offense's seriousness or the juvenile's background. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a)(1)-(3); Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 38 (citing Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)); Matthews v. State, 513 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). If the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction, then it must specifically state its reasons for doing so in a written order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h); Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 49 (); see also In re M.G., No. 13-18-00294-CV, 2018 WL 6241036, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 29, 2018,no pet.) (mem. op.). The burden is on the State "to produce evidence to inform the juvenile court's discretion as to whether waiving its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate in the particular case." Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 45.
Under article 4.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:
A claim that a district court or criminal district court does not have jurisdiction over a person because jurisdiction is exclusively in the juvenile court and that the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under Section 8.07(a), Penal Code, or did not waive jurisdiction under Section 8.07(b),3 Penal Code, must be made by written motion in bar of prosecution filed with the court in which criminal charges against the person are filed.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.18(a). If the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest, his motion must be filed and presented before the plea. Id. at 4.18(b)(1). If the defendant's guilt or punishment is tried or determined by a jury, he must act before jury selection begins. Id. at 4.18(b)(2).
In other words, a juvenile defendant's challenge to a trial court's jurisdiction following a transfer from the juvenile court is waived if the juvenile fails to file a timely written motion. See id. at 4.18(a)-(b); Rushing v. State, 85 S.W.3d 283, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see generally Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (); see also Rios-Barahona v. State, No. 13-17-00567-CR, 2019 WL 3952949, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 22, 2019, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Nothing in the record indicates De La Rosa filed a written motion objecting to the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction, as required by article 4.18. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.18. De La Rosa has, therefore, waived error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Alberty v. State, 250 S.W.3d 115, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ( ); Rushing, 85 S.W.3d at 284; see also Campos v. State, No. 14-18-00989-CR, 2020 WL 1528122, at *2-3 () (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( appellant failed to preserve any complaint for appeal where he did not comply with the requirements of article 4.18); Eguade v. State, ...
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