Rosado v. Wyman, No. 69-C-355.
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York) |
| Writing for the Court | WEINSTEIN |
| Citation | 322 F. Supp. 1173 |
| Docket Number | No. 69-C-355. |
| Decision Date | 27 October 1970 |
| Parties | Julia ROSADO et al., Plaintiffs, v. George K. WYMAN et al., Defendants. |
322 F. Supp. 1173
Julia ROSADO et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
George K. WYMAN et al., Defendants.
No. 69-C-355.
United States District Court, E. D. New York.
October 27, 1970.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., by Amy Juviler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward R. Neaher, U. S. Atty., E. D. N. Y. by Cyril Hyman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Adele Blong, New York City, Office of the General Counsel, HEW, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WEINSTEIN, District Judge.
A year and a half ago plaintiffs brought this action challenging the validity of section 131-a of the New York Social Services Law effective July 1, 1969. They alleged that it did not meet the standards set by section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23), referred to below as section 402), for participation by a state in the federally-funded Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) Program.
Prior stages of the litigation have already been sufficiently described. See National Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 1350, 1354, 1356, (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). For our present purposes it is enough to point out that the United States Supreme Court held that on July 1, 1969 defendants implemented AFDC schedules which "impermissibly lowered the standard of need by eliminating items that were included prior to the enactment of § 402." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 416, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1219, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).
The Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to "review, taking into account the views of HEW the Department of Health, Education and Welfare should it care to offer its recommendations, any revised program adopted by the State, or, should New York choose not to submit a revamped program * * issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies." Id. at 421-422, 90 S.Ct. at 1222.
As a result of the litigation to date, it is apparent that since July 1969 New York has received hundreds of millions of dollars of federal money in violation
Effective June 1, 1970 New York State's AFDC program was revised. Defendants contend that this current program satisfies the requirement of section 402.
For the reasons indicated below the State is still in error. It must either comply with federal law or stop taking federal aid.
I. NEW YORK'S PRESENT AFDC PROGRAM
As in the past, the new State plan pays to AFDC recipients 100% of their need, as defined in the plan. In New York, therefore, the basic need schedule or standard of need serves two functions: It is a standard for determining eligibility to participate in the AFDC program and it represents the level of benefits that an AFDC recipient is to receive. The basic need schedules, effective June 1, 1970, are as follows (18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.1 and 352.2):
CURRENT BASIC NEED SCHEDULE
FAMILY SIZE
Ea
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 add
SA-1
(New York
City and
seven suburban
counties) $84 $134 $179 $231 $284 $329 $374 $45
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SA-2
(42 Northern
counties) $69 $115 $161 $207 $253 $294 $335 $41
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SA-3
(8 Western
counties) $65 $111 $157 $203 $249 $290 $331 $41
Generally, the payment received for basic needs by an AFDC recipient of given family size will not correspond exactly to the above schedule. Once it is determined that a family has a "budgetary deficit," i. e., its income is not equal to or greater than the need schedule, the eligible family only receives payments from the State to meet the budgetary deficit.
In addition to the current basic need schedule there are schedules for the cost of rent and heating fuel and a very few other items of need such as household moving expenses. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.6(a). This new system results from a desirable consolidation of scores of special need items. See Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 1356, 1369 (E.D.N.Y.1969) for an explanation of the advantages of this new flat-grant system. The schedules in effect on July 1, 1969 had also embodied a flat-grant system but the Supreme Court found that, in promulgating those schedules, the State had impermissibly eliminated some special need items.
During the year prior to July 1, 1969 New York State's AFDC program complied with federal law. During that year, as well as currently, the levels of benefits were designed "to fully make up budgetary deficits as defined by its standards of need." Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 1356, 1365 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). Posed is a simply stated question of fact: is the State's present standard of need lower than the one used in the base year, July 1, 1968 through June 30, 1969? Since the State has always claimed to pay 100% of its defined standard of need, the question can be rephrased to ask whether current payments under the schedules effective June 1, 1970 are no less than the amounts paid to like AFDC recipients in the base year. The simplicity of statement belies the difficulties encountered in making the required comparison.
II. STANDARD OF NEED COMPELLED BY SECTION 402
A. General Guidelines
The Supreme Court has decided that section 402 does not preclude a State from redefining its method of determining need. It may consolidate and simplify its standard of need by eliminating certain "special needs" supplied after individual request and authorization, and provide instead for meeting both special needs and basic needs out of a uniform allowance. But it must satisfy the fundamental requirment that "all factors in the old equation be accounted for." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).
The obvious question is how New York State is to determine the amount to be included to meet the former special need items since by their very nature, they were provided to some but not all of the recipients with varying frequency and in varying combinations. To this the Supreme Court responded that the State might consolidate items on the basis of statistical averages — so long as this represented a fair averaging — and thereby arrive at a flat dollar amount for each family or person. Id.
B. Study
At hearings conducted in June 1970 the defendants attempted to demonstrate that the revised schedules were in compliance with section 402 by showing the theory upon which the new schedules were devised. At that time HEW advised the Court that it could not — using materials supplied by the State — determine whether the revised AFDC schedules complied with section 402. The Court agreed with HEW's conclusion and ruled that defendants had not adequately justified the June 1, 1970 schedules. They had failed to demonstrate that the new schedules accounted for those items of special need eliminated on July 1, 1969 and not otherwise provided for under current regulations.
All parties, HEW and the Court agreed that since an AFDC recipient's need was determined much differently currently than in the base year no meaningful comparison could be made between need "schedules" for the two periods without further information. A comparison would have to be made, therefore, between current payments to individuals under the AFDC program and payments made to like individuals during the base year. The data, which was not then available but was required for any meaningful comparison between the base year and present payments, was the amount per recipient per month paid for "special need items" as defined in the AFDC program in effect during the base year. This data could not be obtained from a schedule because the special need items were individually tailored payments made upon individual application and verification. The problem was to convert these special need item payments — by their nature not uniform throughout the population — into a dollar value which would apply uniformly to all AFDC recipients for the base year. In
Neither defendants nor any local social service district had retained full records with respect to special need payments made during the base year. There were not even skeletal records for any area of the State other than New York City. Within the City of New York the problem was compounded by changes since the base year in record-keeping techniques, and by lack of computer records for critical periods.
An added complication in making comparisons is that the base year itself was not stable. A number of substantial adjustments were made in the AFDC program during that year. For instance, some special need items apparently were absorbed into the basic need grant. See the discussion of laundry at p. 1185, infra. In New York City there was substituted for some special need payments a flat payment of $100 per recipient per year that became the New York City cyclical grant.
All concerned concurred in the decision that a statistical sampling of New York City caseload should be undertaken in order to ascertain the average value per recipient per month of special need items included in the need standard prior to July 1, 1969 and for which provision is not specifically made by current regulations. Accepting the suggestion of defendants, the Court ruled that the appropriate base period was...
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Mowbray v. Kozlowski, Civ. A. No. 89-0014-H.
...is essentially that the named plaintiffs' claims not be antagonistic to the claims of other members of the class. See, Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 (1971). As all class members trace their claims to the same statu......
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Michigan Dept. of Educ. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 88-3560
...New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 349 F.Supp. 501 (D.N.J.1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.1973)); and Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 Moreover, mathematical and statistical methods are well recognized as ......
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Hall v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., No. 69-C-273
...1329, 1341 n. 37 (1971); J. M. Maguire et al., Cases and Materials on Evidence, 547-550 (5th ed. 1965); citations in Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173 Defendants argue further that the requisite causal connection between the unknown member or members of the group and the injuries cannot be ......
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Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877(WHP).
...represents that population."); accord Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1978); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173, 1181-82 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 (1971). Representativeness can usu......
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Mowbray v. Kozlowski, Civ. A. No. 89-0014-H.
...is essentially that the named plaintiffs' claims not be antagonistic to the claims of other members of the class. See, Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 (1971). As all class members trace their claims to the same statu......
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Michigan Dept. of Educ. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 88-3560
...New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 349 F.Supp. 501 (D.N.J.1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.1973)); and Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 Moreover, mathematical and statistical methods are well recognized as ......
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Hall v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., No. 69-C-273
...1329, 1341 n. 37 (1971); J. M. Maguire et al., Cases and Materials on Evidence, 547-550 (5th ed. 1965); citations in Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173 Defendants argue further that the requisite causal connection between the unknown member or members of the group and the injuries cannot be ......
-
Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877(WHP).
...represents that population."); accord Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1978); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F.Supp. 1173, 1181-82 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 157 (1971). Representativeness can usu......