Rosado v. Wyman, 353
Citation | 437 F.2d 619 |
Decision Date | 21 December 1970 |
Docket Number | Dockets 35396,35548.,No. 353,426,353 |
Parties | Julia ROSADO, Lydia Hernandez, Majorie Miley, Sophia Abrom, Ruby Gathers, Louise Lowman, Eula Mae King, Cathryn Folk, Annie Lou Phillips, and Marjorie Duffy, individually, on behalf of all minor children, and on behalf of all others persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George K. WYMAN, individually and in his capacity, as Commissioner of Social Services for the State of New York, and the Department of Social Services for the State of New York, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Amy Juviler, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael Colodner, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for defendants-appellants.
Steven J. Cole, New York City (Nancy Duff Levy, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, New York City, Henry A. Freedman, Washington, D. C., Carl Rachlin, New York City, Lee A. Albert, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Edward R. Neaher, U. S. Atty., E.D. N.Y., Cyril R. Hyman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Wilmot R. Hastings, Gen. Counsel, Joel Cohen, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Esther G. Schiff, Regional Atty., Adele M. Blong, Deputy Regional Atty., New York City, HEW, for the United States as amicus curiae.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, HAYS and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.
New York State chose to revise its AFDC program effective June 1, 1970, in a complicated manner explained more fully below. Plaintiffs contended in the district court, as they had before, that New York had improperly lowered its pre-July 1969 standard of need and that since New York purported to pay benefits covering 100 per cent of that standard, the payments to welfare recipients were too low. Defendants maintained that its new schedules were not based on a lowering of the standard of need. A full hearing was held before Judge Weinstein at which the Department of Health, Education and Welfare made its views known. This time Judge Weinstein agreed in large part with the State, at least with regard to AFDC benefits in New York City and seven suburban counties covered by a schedule known as SA-1,1 which accounts for the bulk of AFDC payments in the State. The judge so ruled in an opinion dated October 27, 1970, 322 F.Supp. 1173. Plaintiffs have not appealed from that portion of the district court's opinion, so that the determination as to the SA-1 standard of need and level of payments is now final. However, the district court also held that the State has not met the required standard of need in 42 northern counties (SA-2)2 and in eight western counties (SA-3).3 The judge's findings and conclusions as to these areas were embodied in two opinions: one, dated September 16, 1970, granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, and the other, dated October 27, 1970 and referred to above, granted a permanent injunction.
Defendants appealed from both orders, and we stayed them pending disposition of the appeals. The ultimate effect of the orders was to raise the standard of need, and therefore the level of payment of benefits so long as New York continues to pay 100 per cent of need, in the SA-2 and SA-3 areas of New York State; the permanent injunction raised the standard slightly higher than that required by the preliminary injunction.4 However, the orders did not require the State to make the higher payments which would then be called for. In accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate, the State was enjoined only from receiving federal monies while its plan failed to comply with section 402(a)(23).5 The appeals from the September preliminary injunction and the October 27 permanent injunction were heard separately, but before the same panel. For reasons stated below, we affirm the permanent injunction and hold the September order moot.
The prior proceedings have been complex, due in part to a controversy over the subtle oddities of three-judge court jurisdiction. The issues before us now are comparatively simpler to state in their ultimate form, although explaining them, as will be seen below, requires considerable factual detail. As to the preliminary injunction, defendants-appellants argue to us only that there is no justiciable controversy with regard to levels of payments in the upstate areas covered by schedules SA-2 and SA-3 because all of the plaintiffs live in the SA-1 downstate area. As to the permanent injunction, appellants repeat this argument and add two more: that the challenge to the upstate schedule is moot because of an intervening decision of the District Court for the Northern District of New York, and that, in any event, Judge Weinstein erred in holding that the SA-2 and SA-3 standards of need had been lowered from their pre-July 1969 level.
Turning first to the claim that there is no case or controversy, appellants point out that no named plaintiff resides in the upstate areas or will receive individual benefits from the order. Indeed, according to defendants, "there is every possibility"6 that the named plaintiffs will be adversely affected by it. It is conceded that the State may choose to pay benefits of less than 100 per cent of the standard of need. Rosado, supra, 397 U.S. at 413, 414 n. 17, 90 S.Ct. 1207. Therefore, according to defendants, the named plaintiffs could actually be injured if the State decided to reduce the percentage of benefits paid to AFDC recipients across the State, using the district court schedule as 100 per cent of need for the SA-2 and SA-3 areas. The State's argument is as follows: The present schedules, exclusive of shelter costs paid separately, for families of four provide the following monthly payments:
SA-1 $231 SA-2 207 SA-3 203
The schedule adopted by the district court's permanent injunction would instead provide the following:
SA-1 $231 SA-2 225 SA-3 223
If the State chose to accept these as the proper standard of need, but elected to pay statewide benefits of only 95 per cent instead of 100 per cent of need, payments would be approximately as follows:
SA-1 $219 SA-2 214 SA-3 212
This would limit State AFDC payments upstate to modest increases, but materially reduce payments to downstate residents, including plaintiffs. Accordingly, argue defendants, plaintiffs have no personal stake in the outcome, see Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), and their interest is at best the same as, rather than adverse to, that of defendants.
The argument has a superficial logic which quickly disappears in the face of other facts, not emphasized by the State, and the history of the proceedings to date. When this litigation commenced in April 1969, the statutory scheme contemplated that, effective July 1, 1969, there would be two geographical areas for AFDC payments — one for New York City and the other for the rest of the State. This was done by the newly enacted section 131-a of the New York Social Services Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 55, which plaintiffs were then attacking because, inter alia, it eliminated special grants throughout the State.7 When the complaint was filed, named plaintiffs resided in both of these areas. Two temporary restraining orders and a preliminary injunction entered by the district court in April and May 1969 all enjoined the elimination of special grants throughout the State. On June 5, 1969, defendants administratively divided the non-New York City area into three separate areas.8 This made a total of four areas in the State, and named plaintiffs then resided in only two: the area for New York City alone, and the newly-created area for the seven counties near the City. Thus, the alleged lack of a justiciable controversy stems directly from the State's changes in the areas of payments. Indeed, the four areas were changed again in 1970 to the present three by combining New York City and the seven nearby counties into one area, now known as SA-1.9 This only emphasizes that if defendants' argument were accepted, plaintiffs' right to litigate obviously substantial questions would be at the mercy of defendants' administrative power to subdivide the State geographically. Cf. Kennedy Park Homes Association, Inc. v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970).
Moreover, the timing of appellants' argument gives pause. On June 18. 1969, after four geographical areas were created, Judge Weinstein entered an order permanently enjoining the elimination of special grants "th...
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