Rosado De Velez v. Zayas, No. CIV. 02-1777(SEC).

• Citation: 328 F.Supp.2d 202
• Decision Date: 26 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 02-1777(SEC).
• Parties: Olga ROSADO DE VELEZ, et al. Plaintiffs v. Yolanda ZAYAS, et al. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 202

328 F.Supp.2d 202

Olga ROSADO DE VELEZ, et al. Plaintiffs v. Yolanda ZAYAS, et al. Defendants

No. CIV. 02-1777(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 26, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John F. Nevares, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Mariana Negron-Vargas, Commonwealth Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, Narylu Figueroa-Estasie, Sanchez Betances & Sifre, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket # 30). Although Plaintiffs on two separate occasions requested and were granted extensions of time to oppose Defendants' motion (Dockets 32-35), Plaintiffs nonetheless failed to oppose Defendants' motion. After carefully considering Defendants' motion, as well as the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.¹

Standard of Review

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986); NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 29 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401.

In this regard, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that for a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992); see also Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) ("[a] `genuine' issue is one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.") (citations omitted).

By like token, "material" means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994). "A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues that have been properly raised by the parties." Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2725 at p. 419. "Not every genuine factual conflict necessitates a trial. It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 983-84 (1st Cir.1995).

In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). Summary judgment "admits of no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails." Id. (citing Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987)). Accordingly, if the facts permit more than one reasonable inference, the court on summary judgment may not adopt the inference least favorable to the non-moving party. Casas Office Machs., 42 F.3d at 684.

While the moving party has the burden of initially establishing that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1984); the nonmovant has a "corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions." Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, "the nonmovant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trialworthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.")

Local Rule 56(b)², moreover, requires the moving party to file annexed to the motion "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Unless the non-moving party controverts this statement, all the material facts set forth therein "shall be deemed to be admitted." Id.; Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2004). This is the so-called "anti-ferret rule." See, e.g., Orbi, S.A. v. Calvesbert & Brown, 20 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D.P.R.1998). While failure to comply with this rule does not automatically warrant the granting of summary judgment, "it launches the nonmovant's case down the road toward an early dismissal." Tavarez v. Champion Prods., Inc., 903 F.Supp. 268, 270 (D.P.R.1995). Because Plaintiffs have failed to oppose Defendants' motion, Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts is deemed admitted.

Applicable Law and Analysis

Plaintiffs, Olga Rosado de Velez, Rene Velez Marichal, and the conjugal partnership composed between them, filed the present civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the alleged politically motivated discrimination, all in violation of Plaintiff Rosado's First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also assert supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. At the time of filing the complaint, Plaintiff Rosado, an affiliate of the New Progressive Party (NPP) was employed as Director of Systems and Procedures at the Department of the Family (Docket # 2). The named Defendants are Yolanda Zayas, Secretary of the Department of the Family and Maribel Roque, Assistant Secretary of Administration of the Department of the Family (Docket # 2).

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants aver that: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under which any remedy may be granted under Section 1983 since (a) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any of the Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violation; (b) Plaintiffs have failed to evidence that Plaintiff Rosado's political affiliation was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the alleged impermissible personnel transaction(s); (c) Plaintiffs have failed to produce clear and convincing evidence indicating that Plaintiff Rosado suffered an adverse personnel transaction or was assigned functions unreasonably inferior to those of her career position; and (d) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the complained personnel transactions are sufficiently severe to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation; (2) Plaintiffs have failed to evidence a deprivation of property without due process, in as much as Plaintiff Rosado has no property interest in her job functions; (3) Plaintiffs have failed to establish a deprivation of Plaintiff Rosado's rights under the equal protection clause; (4) Defendants, acting in their individual capacity, are immune from the claims for monetary damages pursuant to qualified immunity; (5) pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiffs are barred form obtaining monetary relief from Defendants in their official capacity; and (6) Plaintiffs' supplemental jurisdiction claims should be accordingly dismissed (Docket # 30).

Section 1983

Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In order to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first show that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989); Saugus v. Voutour, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir.1985).

Second, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908; Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 559. This second prong has two aspects: 1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights; and 2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 559; Voutour, 761 F.2d at 819. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires that the plaintiff establish: 1) for each defendant,...