Rosales-Mireles v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16–9493.,16–9493.
• Citation: 138 S.Ct. 1897,201 L.Ed.2d 376
• Parties: Florencio ROSALES–MIRELES, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

138 S.Ct. 1897

201 L.Ed.2d 376

Florencio ROSALES–MIRELES, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 16–9493.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 21, 2018.

Decided June 18, 2018.

Kristin L. Davidson, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.

Jonathan Ellis, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Jeffrey T. Green, Joshua J. Fougere, Julie M.K. Siegal, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C., Timothy Crooks, Houston, TX, Maureen Scott Franco, Fed. Public Defender, Kristin L. Davidson, Bradford W. Bogan, Assistant Fed. Public, Defenders, Western District of, Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, John P. Cronan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Robert A. Parker, Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistants to the Solicitor General, Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that a court of appeals may consider errors that are plain and affect substantial rights, even though they are raised for the first time on appeal. This case concerns the bounds of that discretion, and whether a miscalculation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant's substantial rights, calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) to vacate the defendant's sentence. The Court holds that such an error will in the ordinary case, as here, seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus will warrant relief.

I

A

Each year, thousands of individuals are sentenced to terms of imprisonment for violations of federal law. District courts must determine in each case what constitutes a sentence that is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to achieve the overarching sentencing purposes of "retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011) ; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3553(a)(2). Those decisions call for the district court to exercise discretion. Yet, to ensure " ‘certainty and fairness' " in sentencing, district courts must operate within the framework established by Congress. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) ).

The Sentencing Guidelines serve an important role in that framework.

" ‘[D]istrict courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.’ " Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ; emphasis in original). Courts are not bound by the Guidelines, but even in an advisory capacity the Guidelines serve as "a meaningful benchmark" in the initial determination of a sentence and "through the process of appellate review." 569 U.S., at 541, 133 S.Ct. 2072.

Of course, to consult the applicable Guidelines range, a district court must first determine what that range is. This can be a "complex" undertaking. Molina–Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1342, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016). The United States Probation Office, operating as an arm of the district court, first creates a presentence investigation report, "which includes a calculation of the advisory Guidelines range it considers to be applicable." Id., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 1342 ; see Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 32(c)(1)(A), (d)(1) ; United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1(a) (Nov. 2016) (USSG). That calculation derives from an assessment of the "offense characteristics, offender characteristics, and other matters that might be relevant to the sentence." Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, an offense level is calculated by identifying a base level for the offense of conviction and adjusting that level to account for circumstances specific to the defendant's case, such as how the crime was committed and whether the defendant accepted responsibility. See USSG §§ 1B1.1(a)(1)-(5). A numerical value is then attributed to any prior offenses committed by the defendant, which are added together to generate a criminal history score that places the defendant within a particular criminal history category. §§ 1B1.1(a)(6), 4A1.1. Together, the offense level and the criminal history category identify the applicable Guidelines range. § 1B1.1(a)(7).

B

The district court has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the Guidelines range it considers is correct, and the "[f]ailure to calculate the correct Guidelines range constitutes procedural error." Peugh, 569 U.S., at 537, 133 S.Ct. 2072. Given the complexity of the calculation, however, district courts sometimes make mistakes. It is unsurprising, then, that "there will be instances when a district court's sentencing of a defendant within the framework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed" by the parties as well, which may result in a defendant raising the error for the first time on appeal. Molina–Martinez, 578 U.S., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 1343. Those defendants are not entirely without recourse.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that "[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the [district] court's attention." In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), the Court established three conditions that must be met before a court may consider exercising its discretion to correct the error. "First, there must be an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Second, the error must be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious. Third, the error must have affected the defendant's substantial rights." Molina–Martinez, 578 U.S., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 1343 (citations omitted). To satisfy this third condition, the defendant ordinarily must " ‘show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) ). Once those three conditions have been met, "the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Molina–Martinez, 578 U.S., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is this last consideration, often called Olano 's fourth prong, that we are asked to clarify and apply in this case.

C

Petitioner Florencio Rosales–Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). The Probation Office in its presentence investigation report mistakenly counted a 2009 state conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. This double counting resulted in a criminal history score of 13, which placed Rosales–Mireles in criminal history category VI. Combined with his offense level of 21, that yielded a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. Had the criminal history score been calculated correctly, Rosales–Mireles would have been in criminal history category V, and the resulting Guidelines range would have been 70 to 87 months. See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).

Rosales–Mireles did not object to the double-counting error before the District Court. Relying on the erroneous presentence investigation report, and after denying Rosales–Mireles' request for a downward departure, the District Court sentenced Rosales–Mireles to 78 months of imprisonment, one month above the lower end of the Guidelines range that everyone thought applied.

On appeal, Rosales–Mireles argued for the first time that his criminal history score and the resulting Guidelines range were incorrect because of the double counting of his 2009 conviction. Because he had not objected in the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error. 850 F.3d 246, 248 (2017).

Applying the Olano framework, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Rosales–Mireles had established that the Guidelines miscalculation constituted an error that was plain, satisfying Olano 's first two conditions. It also held that the error affected Rosales–Mireles' substantial rights, thus satisfying the third condition, because there was "a reasonable probability that he would have been subject to a different sentence but for the error." 850 F.3d, at 249. In reaching that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Government's argument that Rosales–Mireles would have received the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines error, because the District Court had denied a downward departure "based, in part, on Rosales–Mireles' criminal history," which "erroneously included an extra conviction." Ibid.

The Fifth Circuit nevertheless declined to exercise its discretion to vacate and remand the case for resentencing because it concluded that Rosales–Mireles failed to establish that the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In its view, "the types of errors that warrant reversal are ones that would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge." Id., at 250 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because Rosales–Mireles' sentence of 78 months fell within the correct range of 70 to 87 months, the Fifth Circuit held that neither the error nor the resulting sentence "would shock the conscience." Ibid.

The Fifth Circuit's articulation of Olano 's fourth prong is out of step with the practice of other Circuits.¹ We...