Rosalyn L. v. Saul

• Decision Date: 10 February 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 3:19cv345
• Parties: ROSALYN L., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

ROSALYN L.¹, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 3:19cv345

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

February 10, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), as provided for in the Social Security Act. Section 205(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

The law provides that an applicant for SSI must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than 12 months. . . ."42 U.S.C. §416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). It is not enough for a plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill. 1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).

Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner's] findings." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. §405(g). "Substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed, 42 U.S.C. §405(g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).

In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") made the following findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Actthrough December 31, 2021.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 29, 2016, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: anxiety with agoraphobia, depression, and lumbar spasms (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except she can lift no more than 50 pounds occasionally and lift and/or carry up to 25 pounds frequently. The claimant can stand, walk, or sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She can occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but can frequently stoop, crouch or crawl. She is limited, with respect to the left upper extremity, to frequent overhead reaching, reaching forward and to the side, pushing and/or pulling, handling and fingering. The claimant is limited to no more than occasional exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous, moving mechanical parts. The claimant is able to understand, remember and carry out simple and repetitive instructions. She is able to make judgments on simple and repetitive work related decisions. The claimant can respond to usual work situations and to occasional changes in a routine work setting without special supervision with simple and repetitive tasks. She can perform activities within a regular schedule and be punctual within customary tolerances. She is able to maintain concentration, persistence or pace for two-hour blocks but requires a job that provides for a break normally offered to all employees of about 10 minutes and a standard meal break of about 30 minutes. The claimant is limited to no direct interaction with the public but the claimant can work around co-workers and supervisors throughout a standard workday without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes so long as there is no more than brief and superficial interaction with supervisors and co-workers, but the claimant can interact sufficiently to receive daily task assignments and respond to brief status updates in an environment where the worker performs assignments generally alone and independently of others and is responsible only for his/her tasks.

6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born on December 9, 1976 and was 39 years old, which isdefined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claiant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).

10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 29, 2016, through the date of this deciaion (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 14- 24 ).

Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. The ALJ's decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals Council denied review. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff filed her opening brief on November 20, 2019. On December 30, 2019, the defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner's decision to which Plaintiff replied on January 13, 2020. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the ALJ's decision should be remanded.

A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test as follows:

The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimantpresently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled.

Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). From the nature of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that Step 5 was the determinative inquiry.

In support of remand, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's evaluation of her symptoms and limitations is patently wrong. An ALJ's symptoms evaluation is reviewed for legal error and will be reversed if, overall, the ALJ's factual conclusions are "patently wrong." See, e.g., Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2017); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006). An ALJ's assessment is "patently wrong" when the findings lack adequate explanation or are not "competently" explained, are not supported by substantial evidence from the record as a whole, or are otherwise factually or logically mistaken. Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Cullinan, 878 F.3d at 604 (credibility determination lacks support when it relies on inferences that are not logically based on specific findings and evidence). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (findings of fact conclusive when supported by substantial evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Because each person's response to pain and adversity is unique, a claimant's statements about her symptoms and limitations weighs heavily in the final determination of whether she is disabled. See, e.g., Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Outlaw v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) ("RFC determinations are inherentlyintertwined with matters of credibility."). For this reason, the ALJ must...