Rosario v. Miami-Dade County

• Decision Date: 08 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-23020-CIV.,06-23020-CIV.
• Parties: Alexis ROSARIO, as guardian of Juan Carlos Rosario, Maribel Calzado as guardian of and on behalf of Rachel Rosario, a minor, and Piedad Vergara as guardian of, and on behalf of Carolina Rosario, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY d/b/a Miami-Dade County Corrections and the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Health System d/b/a Miami-Dade County Corrections Health Services Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

490 F.Supp.2d 1213

Alexis ROSARIO, as guardian of Juan Carlos Rosario, Maribel Calzado as guardian of and on behalf of Rachel Rosario, a minor, and Piedad Vergara as guardian of, and on behalf of Carolina Rosario, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY d/b/a Miami-Dade County Corrections and the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Health System d/b/a Miami-Dade County Corrections Health Services Defendants.

No. 06-23020-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

May 8, 2007.

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Richard Bodin Sharp, Sharp, Diamond, PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Oren Rosenthal, Rachel M. Wilhelm, Dade County Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, Paul Henry Field, Scott Edward Solomon, Falk Waas Hernandez Cortina Solomon & Bonner, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SEPARATELY FILED MOTIONS TO DISMISS

UNGARO, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Miami-Dade County's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, filed March 6, 2007. (D.E.22.) Plaintiff filed its Response on March 16, 2007. (D.E.24) Defendant Miami-Dade County filed its Reply on March 26, 2007. (D.E.29.) Also before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed on March 20, 2007, by Defendant Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Public Health Trust").¹ (D.E.25.) Plaintiff filed its Response on April 3, 2007. (D.E.31.) Defendant Public Health Trust filed its Reply on April 10, 2007. (D.E.31.) The matters are ripe for disposition.

THE COURT has considered the motions and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

By way of Background, Plaintiffs² have brought three claims against Miami-Dade County, alleging liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1), negligence (Count II), and spoliation of evidence (Count V). Plaintiffs also have brought three claims against Public Health Trust alleging liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III), medical malpractice under sections 766.101 et seq. of the Florida Statutes (Count IV), and spoliation of evidence (Count VI). In its motion, Miami-Dade County seeks dismissal of Counts I and V of Plaintiffs' second amended complaint. (Def. Miami-Dade County's Mot. to Dismiss ("County MTD") at 1.) Public Health Trust seeks dismissal of Counts III, IV, and VI of Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.³ (Def. Public Health Trust's Mot. to Dismiss ("Trust MTD") at 3.)

FACTS

The Court recites the following facts taken from Plaintiffs' second amended complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of deciding Defendants' separately filed motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs allege that on August 18, 2004, Juan Carlos Rosario ("Rosario") began serving a thirty-day sentence for probation violations after he received a suspended sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol with his child in the vehicle. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 13.) According to Plaintiffs, Rosario was intoxicated when he arrived at the Dade County Pre-Trial Detention Center ("Detention Center") to begin his thirty day suspended sentence. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 14.) On August 20, 2004, Rosario was assessed by the staff of the Detention Center's medical clinic. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that the clinic "was and is manned by Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust employees." (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 15.) The assessment made no indication of the fact that Rosario was a "chronic alcoholic or that he was intoxicated at the time of his incarceration two days before." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs further assert that "Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust employees made no mention of the fact that [Rosario] was experiencing delirium tremors ... from lack of alcohol." (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 15.)

At approximately 7:30 p.m. on August 20, 2004, Rosario "was violently shaking and experiencing tremors" and as a result he was readmitted to the Detention Center's medical clinic. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 16.) Detention Center records state that Rosario stayed at the clinic for four hours. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege that Rosario was sent back to his cell at 11:30 p.m. despite the fact that he was experiencing delirium tremors. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) According to Plaintiff, the Detention Center clinic's records from 7:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. on August 20, 2004 were either lost or destroyed by Detention Center staff.⁴ (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 16.) According to Plaintiff, instead of transferring Rosario to the hospital or keeping him in the Detention Center's clinic for further observation, "Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust representative/final policy maker showed deliberate indifference to [Rosario's] serious medical needs by returning him to his cell." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) During the early morning on August 21, 2004, Rosario suffered grand mal seizures due to the delirium tremors, resulting in a brain hemorrhage that has left Rosario in a permanent vegetative state. (2d Am.Compl. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust representative who determined that Rosario should be transferred back to his cell instead of to a hospital had final policymaking authority regarding Rosario's medical needs, and that his decision was not subject to administrative review. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 21, 31.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust representative was aware that Rosario was experiencing delirium tremors and in need of immediate hospitalization when making the decision to transfer Rosario back to his cell, and that given Rosario's obvious need for medical attention, the decision to send Rosario back to his cell was unjustifiable, amounted to a total failure to provide medical care, and constituted deliberate indifference to Rosario's serious medical needs. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 31-32.) Plaintiffs allege that if the Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust representative "used even the slightest care with regard to [Rosario's] medical condition on August 20, 2004, [he] would not be in a permanently vegetative state." (2d Am.Compl. ¶¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that the Miami-Dade County and/or Public Health Trust representative "did in fact have final policy making authority and was not subject to meaningful review with regards to [Rosario's] medical care was and his reckless acts and omissions with regards to [Rosario's] `care constituted the customs, policies, and practices' of Miami-Dade County and Public Health Trust." (2d Am.Compl. ¶¶ 34, 52.)

LEGAL STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir.1984). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant does not need to "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99. Rather, "all the Rules require is a `short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id.; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may not look beyond the four corners of the complaint. Milburn, 734 F.2d at 765 ("Consideration of matters beyond the complaint is improper in the context of a motion to dismiss but proper in the context of a motion for summary judgment."). However, where the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and if a defendant attaches such documents to the motion to dismiss, the court may consider them without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997). On a motion to dismiss, "the facts stated in [plaintiff's] complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as true." Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.1990); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that "the threshold of sufficiency to which a complaint is held at the motion-to-dismiss stage is `exceedingly low.'" United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir.2003).

ANALYSIS

Counts I & III: Claims for Liability Under § 1983 Should be Dismissed

Section 1983 is violated where a United States citizen or other person within the jurisdiction of the United States is deprived of his or her rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States by any person who acts "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia."⁵ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and other local government entities are subject to liability under § 1983, and may be "sued directly for money, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A municipality or other local government entity "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (recognizing that, "in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality...