Rosas v. Bexar Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:14-CV-1082-DAE,5:14-CV-1082-DAE |
| Parties | GEORGE ROSAS, Plaintiff, v. BEXAR COUNTY; SUSAN PAMERLEAU, Bexar County Sherriff; SUSAN D. REED, Bexar County District Attorney; JOHN DOE, Bexar County Assistant District Attorney; and ABELARDO GARZA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge Pamela Mathey (Dkt. # 7). Plaintiff George Rosas ("Plaintiff") has filed Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 11) as well as a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 12). Pursuant to Local Rule CV-7(h), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing. After careful consideration, and for the reasons given below, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims under § 1983, DISMISSES WITHOUTPREJUDICE Plaintiff's state law claims, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Bexar County Adult Detention Center. (Dkt. # 13.) On September 15, 2014, Plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Susan Reed, the former Bexar County District Attorney; David Davila, an officer in the Bexar County Sherriff's Office; and Eddie Alvarado, a homicide detective in the Corpus Christi Police Department. (Dkt. # 1, Cv. No. 5:14-CV-827-XR.) These claims were dismissed by Judge Xavier Rodriguez on February 2, 2015. Rosas v. Reed, No. SA-14-CA-827-XR, 2015 WL 510110, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2015).
Plaintiff filed the action currently before the Court on December 8, 2014. (Dkt. # 1.) In response to an order to show cause issued by Magistrate Judge Mathey, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 12, 2015. (Dkt. ## 3, 4.) Plaintiff asserts claims against Bexar County, Texas; Susan Pamerleau, the Bexar County Sherriff ("Pamerleau"); Susan Reed, the former Bexar County District Attorney ("Reed"); an unnamed Bexar County assistant district attorney; and Abelardo Garza ("Garza"), Plaintiff's court-appointed criminal defense counsel. (Dkt. # 4.) In his claims brought under § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that he never received a probable cause hearing following his arrest and that he has beendenied access to the courts by a conspiracy between the Bexar County officials and his own defense counsel. (Id. at 7-10.) Plaintiff also asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, legal malpractice, and false imprisonment. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and an injunction requiring Bexar County to implement procedures to ensure that all pretrial detainees arrested without a warrant are afforded a prompt probable cause hearing. (Id. at 11-15.)
Judge Mathey issued a Report and Recommendation on January 31, 2015, recommending that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief. (Dkt. # 7.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on February 18, 2015. (Dkt. # 11.) On March 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, seeking to amend his Amended Complaint to add claims against Donna Kay McKinney, the district clerk for Bexar County, Texas, for allegedly failing to properly file Plaintiff's motions. (Dkt. # 12.)
The Court must conduct a de novo review of any of the Magistrate Judge's conclusions to which a party has specifically objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (). Any party may contest the Magistrate Judge's findings by filing written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations that the party wishes to have the district court consider. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985). A district court need not consider "[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections." Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)). Findings to which no specific objections are made do not require de novo review; the Court need only determine whether the Report and Recommendation is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendations to dismiss his claims under § 1983, his claims for injunctive relief, and his state law claims for malpractice and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. # 11.) The Court will therefore review these recommendations de novo.
As a prisoner of the State of Texas, Plaintiff's claims are subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires dismissal of any claim or complaint that is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." § 1915A(b). The Court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 763 (5th Cir. 2014). Dismissal under § 1915A is governed by the same standard used to review claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Additionally, a court may dismiss a claim as frivolous under § 1915(e) when the claim lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). Examples of indisputably meritless legal theories include"claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (citation omitted).
"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Plaintiff has asserted § 1983 claims against Sherriff Pamerleau in her individual and official capacities, former District Attorney Reed in her individual and official capacities, an unnamed Bexar County district attorney in his individual capacity, Garza in his individual capacity, and Bexar County. The Court will first address Plaintiff's claims against the county officials in their official capacities, followed by Plaintiff's claims against the officials and Garza in their individual capacities, and finally Plaintiff's claims against Bexar County.
Official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). InKentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]here is no longer a need to bring official capacity actions against local government officials [because] under Monell . . . local government units can be sued directly." 473 U.S. 159, 165 & 167 n.14 (1985).
Plaintiff has not proffered any relief that can be granted on his official-capacity claims that cannot be obtained through his § 1983 claims against Bexar County. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to dismiss the official-capacity claims against Pamerleau and Reed as redundant. See Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2010) (); Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (). The Court therefore DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Pamerleau and Reed.1
Pamerleau, Reed, and the unnamed prosecutor are Bexar County government officials. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [are entitled to] a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted). In suits brought under federal law, government employees are presumptively entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and once the defense is asserted the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that immunity does not bar recovery. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992); Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 198...
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