Rosas v. Donat

• Decision Date: 24 March 2012
• Docket Number: 3:06-cv-00387-LRH-VPC
• Parties: RAYMOND PAUL ROSAS, Petitioner, v. BILL DONAT, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

RAYMOND PAUL ROSAS, Petitioner,

v.BILL DONAT, et al., Respondents.

3:06-cv-00387-LRH-VPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

Dated: March 24, 2012

ORDER

This habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court for a final decision on the remaining claims.

Background

Petitioner Raymond Paul Rosas challenges his 2000 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, and conspiracy to commit murder. Petitioner challenged his conviction both on direct appeal and state post-conviction review. The factual particulars regarding the claims, including the trial evidence pertaining to petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, are discussed infra in the discussion of the particular claims.

Standard of Review on the Merits

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a "highly deferential" standard for evaluating state-court rulings that is "difficult to meet" and "which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Underthis highly deferential standard of review, a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely because it might conclude that the state court decision was incorrect. 131 S.Ct. at 1411. Instead, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court may grant relief only if the state court decision: (1) was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court based on the record presented to the state courts; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 131 S.Ct. at 1398-1401.

A state court decision is "contrary to" law clearly established by the Supreme Court only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court case law or if the decision confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result. E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 10, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). A state court decision is not contrary to established federal law merely because it does not cite the Supreme Court's opinions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state court need not even be aware of its precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of its decision contradicts them. Id. Moreover, "[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." 540 U.S. at 16, 124 S.Ct. at 11. For, at bottom, a decision that does not conflict with the reasoning or holdings of Supreme Court precedent is not contrary to clearly established federal law.

A state court decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if it is demonstrated that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case was not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable." E.g., Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18, 124 S.Ct. at 12; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

To the extent that the state court's factual findings are challenged, the "unreasonable determination of fact" clause of Section 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). This clause requires that the federal courts "must be particularly deferential" to state court factual determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the state court finding was "clearly erroneous." 393 F.3d at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires substantially more deference:

. . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.

Discussion

Sufficiency of the Evidence of First-Degree Murder - Ground 6

The Court addresses petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the outset for two reasons. First, a conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction would moot other grounds in whole or in part, because such a conclusion would require that the first-degree murder conviction be vacated without opportunity for a retrial as to first-degree murder. Second, consideration of the prejudice issue on petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involves a consideration of the overall evidence at trial.

In Ground 6, petitioner alleges that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the evidence at trial allegedly was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the premeditated, willful and deliberate murder of the victim as required for a conviction of first-degree murder as opposed to second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada summarized the trial evidence and rejected the claim presented to that court as per the following:

Appellant's sole contention is that the State adduced insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the first-degree murder charge. In particular, appellant argues that he accidentally shot the victim, and therefore the facts are more consistent with voluntary manslaughter or second-degree murder than first-degree murder. We disagree.

When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the relevantinquiry is "'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Furthermore, "it is the jury's function, not that of the court to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses."

Our review of the record on appeal reveals sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. Appellant rented a room in the home of the victim, Homer Mitchell Stockmann during August and September of 1999. Over the Labor Day weekend, appellant had a party at the house. During that party, appellant and two other individuals, Edward McQueen and Cecele Linton, discussed a plan to kill Stockmann. McQueen testified that the discussion was just a joke; appellant and Linton did not give similar testimony. The plan involved appellant sitting behind Stockmann in his vehicle and stabbing Stockmann in the neck. Although the plan originally involved McQueen, he became intoxicated and fell asleep before the plan could be carried out.

Appellant used a ruse to get Stockmann to leave the house. The prior week, Stockmann's truck had been stolen. Unknown to Stockmann, appellant and some friends had stolen the truck, driven it to Frenchman's Lake, vandalized it, and attempted to set it on fire. After arranging for another friend, Brad Kimes, to provide Stockmann with information regarding the location of the truck, appellant and Linton agreed to accompany Stockmann on the evening of September 4, 1999, as he drove toward Frenchman's Lake in search of his truck. Appellant sat behind Stockmann, who was driving. Although appellant had a knife with him, he did not stab Stockmann during the drive. Appellant testified that he got too scared to stab Stockmann.

Stockmann eventually stopped the car to get out and look for his truck. Appellant accompanied him, while Linton waited in the car. According to appellant, Stockmann took a shotgun out of the trunk of the car because he was afraid that the person who stole the truck might be in the area. Appellant and Stockmann walked away from the vehicle into the dark. Appellant asked Stockmann if the shotgun worked. Stockmann said that it did and fired a shot into the air. When appellant asked to look at the shotgun, Stockmann put the safety on and handed the gun to appellant. Appellant, who had prior military training, turned the safety off and, while walking behind Stockmann, shot him in the back. Appellant returned to the car and informed Linton that "he was done." Linton, however, observed Stockmann's head moving and told appellant to shoot Stockmann in the head. Appellant did so. Appellant and Linton then dragged Stockmann's body away from the dirt road.[FN3]

[FN3] Linton pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and testified against appellant. In exchange for her guilty plea, the State dismissed the weapon enhancement and kidnapping and conspiracy charges and agreed to recommend a sentence of life in prison. McQueen also testified against appellant; however, he was never charged in connection with Stockmann's murder and received no deals for his testimony.

Appellant eventually returned to Stockmann's home later that evening and bragged to McQueen that he had shot Stockmann in the back and the head. Appellant also contacted Kimes and told him that Stockmann had been taken care of. Appellant later contacted Kimes a second time and eventually gave the shotgun to Kimes, telling Kimes that he had shot Stockmann in the back and the head.

Stockmann's body was discovered on September 6, 1999. He had died of gunshot wounds to the back and head.

When interviewed by police, appellant gave several different stories. Appellant

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