Rose v. Civil Service Commission, Gen. No. 47029

• Decision Date: 19 June 1957
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 47029
• Citation: 144 N.E.2d 768,14 Ill.App.2d 337
• Parties: Charles ROSE, Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Stephen E. Hurley, John J. Ahern and Albert W. Williams, Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 768

144 N.E.2d 768

14 Ill.App.2d 337

Charles ROSE, Appellee, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Stephen E. Hurley, John J. Ahern and Albert W. Williams, Appellants.

Gen. No. 47029.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

June 19, 1957.

John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Sydney R. Drebin, Harry H. Pollack, Joan C. Miller, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, of counsel, for appellants.

Heber T. Dotson, Chicago, for appellee.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago to withdraw its consent to plaintiff's discharge as a probationary patrolman and directing the defendants to give plaintiff a hearing before authorizing or refusing to consent to his discharge. From this order defendants have appealed.

We will state the facts as they appear from the pleadings. Plaintiff made an application, took and passed a civil service examination for the position of patrolman in the Police Department of the City of Chicago, and on February 16, 1954, was appointed a probationary patrolman. On March 6, 1954 he was suspended by the Commissioner of Police because he had made the following false statements in his application. In answer to the question 'Were you ever in the service of the City of Chicago, or of Cook County?' he replied 'No,' when, as a matter of fact, he has been in the service of the city as a probationary patrolman in 1950. In answer to the question whether he had ever been discharged from the service of the City of Chicago or any other public corporation, he said, 'No,' although the fact was that he had been discharged in 1950. In answer to the question whether he had ever been examined for a position in any branch of the official services of the City of Chicago, he also answered 'None.' At the bottom of the application blank on which these questions appear was the following paragraph:

'Notice of Disqualification.

'Proof of false statement made in any application shall be grounds for excluding an applicant from any examination or for removal of name from any eligible list, or for discharge after appointment.'

The facts with respect to the misrepresentations made in plaintiff's application were reported by letter to the Civil Service Commission by the Commissioner of Police on March 5, 1954, with a request for authority to discharge plaintiff. Included in this letter from the Commissioner of Police to the Commission was a further report that plaintiff had falsely represented that he had worked for Pritkin Furniture Co. and that the director of personnel of the Department had been advised by that company that while they knew plaintiff, he had never worked for them.

Plaintiff does not deny the false representations he made. He contends, in effect, that his first discharge in 1950 was without a hearing, that his only method of getting a hearing was to misrepresent the facts in his second application and, if and when discovered, to insist on a hearing which would reveal the unfairness of the discharge in 1950. His argument appears to be that the misrepresentations he made in order to become a probationary policeman were 'white lies' designed to procure what he considered ultimate justice. Our Supreme Court has not looked with favor on such misrepresentations. In People ex rel. Jendrick v. Allman, 396 Ill. 35, 71 N.E.2d 44, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an amendment to the Civil Service Act providing that no person in civil service entitled to military preference should be removed or discharged because he had misstated his age. The court said that this not only granted immunity for the consequences of a fraudulent act but rewarded it by reinstating the guilty party to a position obtained fraudulently. This, the court said, was repugnant not only to the constitutional provision against granting special privileges and immunities to favored classes but is likewise repugnant to basic morality.

The language of the statute with respect to probationers is clear. It specifically provides for discharge by the head of the department in which the candidate is employed, with the consent of the Commission, upon assigning in writing to the Commission his reason therefor. Sec. 10, Cities Civil Service Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, Ch. 24 1/2, Par. 48). Thus, only two things are required by law to make the discharge of a probationer effective: 1. The assignment of a reason therefor to the Commission; and 2. The consent of the Commission to the discharge. The decisions of this state support the only reasonable interpretation of this statute. Fish v. McGann, 205 Ill. 179, 68 N.E. 761; Kenyon v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill.App. 227; People ex rel. Wiechern v. Smykal, 12 Ill.App.2d 398, 139 N.E.2d 839; People ex rel. Heffernan v. Smykal, 13 Ill.App.2d 342, 142 N.E.2d 133. In Fish v. McGann, supra, the conclusion of the opinion reads as follows [205 Ill. 179, 68 N.E. 765]:

'Whether the provision of the statute is wise or not, the Legislature in section 10, has certainly conferred upon the head of the department or office, by and with the consent of the commission the right to discharge such a probationer upon assigning in writing the reason therefor to the commission. If this provision of the statute is not wise, it is for the Legislature to change it, and not for the courts to put upon it a different interpretation from that, which the plain meaning of the words employed justifies.'

In Kenyon v. City of Chicago, supra, the plaintiff, a probationer, was discharged by the department head with the consent of the Civil Service Commission. He contended that he was removed without a trial, upon written charges, and without an opportunity to defend himself. The court held that he was not entitled to a trial. In the recent cases of People ex rel. Wiechern v. Smykal, supra, and People ex rel. Heffernan v. Smykal, supra, this court likewise so held. In Dalton v. Darlington, 123 App.Div. 855, 108 N.Y.S. 626, at pages 627-628, the court said:

'In considering this question it must not be overlooked that the primary purpose of civil service laws and rules is to promote the good of the public service, and that purpose is not to be frustrated by technical or narrow constructions. The purpose of the probationary period is to enable the appointing officer to determine whether a permanent appointment is desirable. That question is left solely to his judgment, and he has the whole probationary period in which to decide it.'

The Dalton case was cited and approved in Marasco v. Morse, Sup., 22 N.Y.S.2d 315.

Plaintiff cites People ex rel. Bergquist v. Gregory, 337 Ill.App. 661, 86 N.E.2d 434. There, it was charged that the plaintiffs, who...