Rose v. Cnty. of Sacramento

• Citation: 163 F.Supp.3d 787
• Decision Date: 16 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2:13-cv-01339-TLN-EFB,2:13-cv-01339-TLN-EFB
• Parties: Theodore Rose, individually and as joint successor-in-interest to Decedent Johnathan Rose; Karen Rose, individually and as joint successor-in-interest to Decedent Johnathan Rose; The Estate of Johnathan Rose, Plaintiffs, v. County of Sacramento; Scott Jones, in his official capacity as Sheriff for the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department; David Mcentire ; Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

163 F.Supp.3d 787

Theodore Rose, individually and as joint successor-in-interest to Decedent Johnathan Rose; Karen Rose, individually and as joint successor-in-interest to Decedent Johnathan Rose; The Estate of Johnathan Rose, Plaintiffs,

v.County of Sacramento; Scott Jones, in his official capacity as Sheriff for the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department; David Mcentire ; Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01339-TLN-EFB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed February 16, 2016

Filed February 17, 2016

Moseley Collins, Moseley C. Collins, III, a Professional Law Corporation, El Dorado Hills, CA, Stewart Lee Katz, Law Office of Stewart Katz, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Dayton Van Vranken Longyear, Peter Carlberg Zilaff, Longyear O'Dea & Lavra, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

Troy L. Nunley

, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants County of Sacramento, Sheriff Scott Jones, and Deputy David McEntire's (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 24.) Plaintiffs Theodore Rose and Karen Rose, both as individuals and as joint successors-in-interest to the Estate of Johnathan Rose (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) oppose Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 27.) Defendants have filed a reply to Plaintiffs' opposition. (ECF No. 34.) The Court has carefully considered the briefings filed by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. Factual Background

Decedent Johnathan Rose (“Johnathan”) was a 24 year old male diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia

and obsessive compulsive disorders and frequently exhibited behavior consistent with these conditions. (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Johnathan was 6 feet tall and weighed about 215 pounds. (Compl. at ¶ 17.) Johnathan was prescribed psychotropic medications and received regular psychiatric care while he lived at home with his family, who helped care for him. (Compl. at ¶ 18.) On the evening of January 17, 2012, Johnathan's father, Plaintiff Theodore Rose (“Ted Rose”) called 911 and requested officer assistance in administering medication to his son. (Compl. at ¶¶ 20-22.) Ted Rose communicated to the 911 dispatch operator that his son was mentally ill and that the call was potentially a Section 5150 call, a type of shorthand used to indicate that the subject of the call suffers from a mental illness and may pose a danger to himself or others. (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 24-1 at 2 and ECF No. 27 at 2.) Defendant Deputy David McEntire (“Deputy McEntire”) responded to the call. Defendants state, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Deputy McEntire was not dispatched to the call for nearly 40 minutes. (ECF No. 24-1 at 2.)

From this point forward, the parties' descriptions of events vary widely. Plaintiffs maintain that, during the time between the call and Deputy McEntire's arrival, Johnathan took his medication and went to sleep. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Plaintiffs allege that, at the time Deputy McEntire arrived at their home, Johnathan was asleep in his bed. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Plaintiffs further allege that, when Deputy McEntire arrived, he “brushed by” Ted Rose, who answered the door, and approached the bed where Johnathan was sleeping. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Deputy McEntire woke Johnathan and ordered him to lie face down on the ground to be handcuffed. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Plaintiffs then state that Johnathan refused to lie on the ground, but presented his hands to be handcuffed, and that Deputy McEntire responded by striking Johnathan on the head with his metal flashlight with such force that Johnathan received a gash on his head and partially fell through a sheet rocked wall. (ECF No. 27 at 2.) Plaintiffs state that an altercation ensued and that Deputy McEntire was “clearly in control and winning the fight when, without warning or provocation, he fatally shot [Johnathan] three times at point blank range.” (ECF No. 27 at 2.)

Alternately, Deputy McEntire alleges that as soon as he stepped into the home, he was verbally challenged by Johnathan and was attacked “with unrelenting aggression” and without warning or provocation. (ECF No. 24-1 at 3.) Defendants allege that Deputy McEntire received continuous blows to the face, head, and body and began to feel that he was losing consciousness. (ECF No. 24-1 at 3.) Defendants further state that Deputy McEntire felt Johnathan grab his service belt, which contained his firearm and his knife, and reacted by pulling his firearm and shooting Johnathan three times. (ECF No. 24-1 at 3.) Both parties agree that Johnathan died from these wounds

. (ECF No. 24-1 at 3 and ECF No. 27 at 2.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)

; First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank , 391 U.S. at 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575

. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’ ” Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)

; SEC v. Seaboard Corp. , 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines , 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd , 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. Analysis

On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging six causes of action: 1) Excessive force/unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Deputy McEntire; 2) Substantive due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; 3) Unconstitutional practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants County of Sacramento, Sherriff Jones, and Does 1-5; 4) Supervisory liability for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Jones and Does 1-5; 5) Wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.60 against all Defendants; and 6) Unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against Deputy McEntire. (Compl. at ¶¶ 54-83.) Defendants move for summary judgment at to Plaintiffs' second and third causes of action.

A. Count II—Fourteenth Amendment (Loss of Familial Relations)

Plaintiffs bring their second cause of action...