Rose v. Cnty. of Sacramento & Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't Deputy David Mcentire
| Decision Date | 07 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-01339-TLN-EFB,2:13-cv-01339-TLN-EFB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ESTATE OF JOHNATHAN ROSE, deceased by and through his parents, THEODORE ROSE, JR. and KAREN ROSE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and Sacramento County Sheriff's Department Deputy DAVID MCENTIRE, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Sacramento and David McEntire's (collectively "Defendants") Motion for Order Altering/Amending the Judgement to Strike the Award of Noneconomic Damages to Plaintiff Theodore Rose, Jr. and/or for Judgement as a Matter of Law and/or in the Alternative an Order for a New Trial. (ECF No. 166.) Plaintiffs Estate of Johnathan Rose, Karen Rose, individually, and Karen Rose, Tiffany Rose, and Theodore Rose III, as successors-in-interest to Theodore Rose, Jr., (collectively "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion. (ECF No. 178.) The Court has carefully reviewed the arguments made by the parties and for the reasons set forth below GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion. (ECF No. 166.)
The parties are aware of the facts in this case. Thus, the Court will provide only a brief synopsis of the events forming the basis for this case and then move to a discussion of the relevant procedural history.
This case arises out of the fatal shooting of Johnathan Rose ("Johnathan") by Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff David McEntire ("Defendant McEntire"), on January 17, 2012. Plaintiffs argued at trial that Defendant McEntire used excessive and unreasonable force when he struck Johnathan with a police flashlight and shot Johnathan three times. Plaintiffs sought damages arising out of the death of their son. Defendants asserted at trial that Defendant McEntire's use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, denied all liability, and disputed the nature and extent of damages.
A jury trial commenced on September 19, 2017. (ECF No. 125.) Plaintiffs argued two claims at trial: (1) a § 1983 claim for violation of Johnathan's Fourth Amendment Rights by use of excessive force; and (2) a California state law claim for wrongful death pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 337.60 based on state law battery. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs intended to call Johnathan's father, Plaintiff Theodore Rose, Jr., ("Rose, Jr.") to the stand during trial. Unfortunately, Rose, Jr., passed away after the second day of trial and prior to his testimony. (ECF No. 127.) The Court resumed the trial with the understanding that Plaintiffs would gather all necessary paperwork to substitute in Rose, Jr.'s successors-in-interest. (ECF No. 172 at 7-8.) The Court also acknowledged that pain and suffering damages — as to Rose, Jr. — did not survive his death. (ECF No. 172 at 7:16-18.)
In lieu of live testimony, Plaintiffs presented Rose, Jr.'s deposition testimony by video to the jury. (ECF Nos. 132 & 135.) Both sides had an opportunity to choose portions of the testimony that conformed to the Court's pretrial in limine rulings and to object to portions they believed were outside the scope of the Court's rulings. (ECF No. 172 at 19:2-33:8.) The remainder of the trial proceeded as would any other trial.
At the close of evidence, the jury found Defendant McEntire's use of a firearm on Johnathan constituted a battery and Defendant McEntire used excessive force in violation of theFourth Amendment. (ECF No. 146 at 1:6-12.) The jury awarded a total of $6.5 million to Plaintiffs, $2 million of which was awarded to Rose, Jr. for his "past loss of Johnathan Rose's love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support." (ECF No. 146 at 1:26-28.) The Court withheld issuing judgment until the successors-in-interest were afforded an opportunity to gather the death certificate and file declarations.1 After appropriate motions and documentation, the Court substituted Karen Rose, Tiffany Rose, and Theodore Rose III nunc pro tunc as successors-in-interest to Rose, Jr. (ECF No. 151.) Judgment was then issued. (ECF Nos. 152 & 153.) Defendants timely filed the instant motion to alter or amend judgment and for a new trial. (ECF No. 166.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 59 provides that a court may "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues and to any party after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). "Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted." Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). "Rather, the court is 'bound by those grounds that have been historically recognized.'" Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). Recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, allegations "that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940).
The Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000)). "Upon the Rule 59 motion of the party against whom a verdict has been returned, the district court has 'the duty to weigh theevidence as the court saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in the court's conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.'" Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990)). "In considering a motion for a new trial, the court may weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and the court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., Ltd., 880 F.2d 176, 190 (9th Cir. 1989).
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding, based on several listed reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) reads in relevant part:
As an initial matter, without any analysis or discussion, Defendants move for a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). (ECF No. 166-1 at 9:16-18.)2 Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 556 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009). As Defendants did not move for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), they are procedurally barred from bringing a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). Accordingly, the Court hereby denies Defendants' motion insofar as Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b).
Having dispensed with Defendant's motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law, the Court will now turn to a discussion of the two remaining issues: whether to alter/amend judgement to strike the award of $2 million in damages to Rose, Jr.'s successors-in-interest, and whether to grant the request for a new trial. (See generally ECF No. 166-1.)
Defendants contend the successors-in-interest to Rose, Jr. are not entitled to collect damages for Rose, Jr.'s loss of love, society, consortium, and company of his son up to and until his death. Defendants assert those types of damages are precluded under California's survivor statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.34. Plaintiffs argue the successors-in-interest may still recover those damages as they are not specifically precluded under § 377.34. Thus, the parties dispute whether Rose, Jr.'s successors-in-interest — substituted in under the survival statute — are entitled to the aforementioned damages under § 377.34. For clarity's sake, the Court will first discuss the statutory schemes for wrongful death and survival statutes, and then turn to a discussion of the positions of the parties before determining the effect of § 377.34 on recovery of the successors-in-interest damages for loss of Johnathan's love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 creates a "cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another," that may be raised by a decedent's personal representative. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60(a). A person suing under § 377.60 is entitled to damages "that, under all circumstances of the case, may be just, but may not include damages...
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