Rose v. Fox Pool Corp.
| Decision Date | 01 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 105,105 |
| Citation | 335 Md. 351,643 A.2d 906 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,973 John B. ROSE v. FOX POOL CORPORATION. , |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Charles J. Muskin, Glen Burnie, for appellant.
John B. Kaiser (Kevin J. McCarthy, McCarthy, Bacon & Costello, all on brief), Lanham, for appellee.
Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., * Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.
Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol. & 1993 Cum.Supp.) § 5-108(A) OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE1 provides that no cause of action for personal injury resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property accrues if the injury occurs more than 20 years after the date the entire improvement first became available for its intended use. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturer on the ground that § 5-108(a) barred the plaintiff's suit. This appeal followed.
We issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion prior to consideration of the case by the Court of Special Appeals, 332 Md. 701, 632 A.2d 1207. The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether § 5-108(a) applies to a cause of action brought against the manufacturer of a residential, in-ground swimming pool for injuries caused by an alleged defect in the pool's design. We answer that question in the affirmative. We hold, however, that summary judgment was improperly granted as there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's injury occurred more than 20 years after the date the entire improvement first became available for its intended use. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.
In 1971, Rudi and Hannelore Schanne decided to install an in-ground swimming pool at their home in Glen Burnie, Maryland. The Schannes purchased the pool from Appellee Fox Pool Corporation [Fox], a designer, manufacturer and supplier of residential swimming pools. The pool consisted of a vinyl liner supported by metal bracing, measured 20 feet in width by 40 feet in length, and was designed such that it had both an area of shallow water for wading and an area of deeper water, ostensibly for diving. In the deeper end, the pool's interior walls sloped at a 45 degree angle towards a small "target area" for diving in the center. Although the depth of the water in the "target area" was 7 feet 6 inches, the water in other areas of the deeper end was as shallow as 3 feet deep because of the pool's sloping walls.
In early 1971, Fox shipped the unassembled pool to the Schannes, who subsequently hired B & H Construction Company [B & H] to install the pool at their home. In deposition testimony, Mr. Schanne recalled that the pool was installed "early in the spring" of 1971, "somewhere around March." Also in deposition testimony, Mrs. Schanne recalled that installation of the pool was completed by May 1971 and that she began swimming in the pool by the end of that same month. Mrs. Schanne also testified that B & H gave her a warranty card for the pool on the day that construction was completed. When she was given the card, Mrs. Schanne filled in the necessary information and returned the card to B & H, which in turn sent the card back to Fox. The date on the completed warranty card, obtained from Fox during pre-trial discovery, is July 12, 1971.
On July 4, 1991, Appellant John B. Rose attended a party at the Schannes' home. Rose was a neighbor of the Schannes and had enjoyed the use of their pool numerous times over the years. When Rose dove from the side of the pool on this occasion, however, he struck his head on either the bottom or the side of the pool and was rendered quadriplegic. He subsequently filed suit against Fox in the Circuit Court for AnneArundel County, asserting causes of action in negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The gravamen of Rose's complaint against Fox was that the pool was defectively designed and generally unsafe for diving and that Fox had failed to adequately warn its customers of the pool's dangerous condition.
On November 16, 1992, Fox filed a motion for summary judgment based upon § 5-108(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 5-108 provides, in full:
(a) Injury occurring more than 20 years later.--Except as provided by this section, no cause of action for damages accrues and a person may not seek contribution or indemnity for damages incurred when wrongful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property occurs more than 20 years after the date the entire improvement first becomes available for its intended use.
(b) Action against architect, professional engineer, or contractor.--Except as provided by this section, a cause of action for damages does not accrue and a person may not seek contribution or indemnity from any architect, professional engineer, or contractor for damages incurred when wrongful death, personal injury, or injury to real or personal property, resulting from the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, occurs more than 10 years after the date the entire improvement first became available for its intended use.
(c) Three-year limitation after accrual of cause of action.--Upon accrual of a cause of action referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an action shall be filed within 3 years.
(d) Supplier defined.--(l ) In this subsection, "supplier" means any individual or entity whose principal business is the supply, distribution, installation, sale, or resale of any product that causes asbestos-related disease.
(2) This section does not apply if:
(i) The defendant was in actual possession and control of the property as owner, tenant, or otherwise when the injury occurred;
(ii) In a cause of action against a manufacturer or supplier for damages for personal injury or death caused by asbestos or a product that contains asbestos, the injury or death results from exposure to asbestos dust or fibers which are shed or emitted prior to or in the course of the affixation, application, or installation of the asbestos or the product that contains asbestos to an improvement to real property;
(iii) In other causes of action for damages for personal injury or death caused by asbestos or a product that contains asbestos, the defendant is a manufacturer of a product that contains asbestos; or
(iv) In a cause of action for damages for injury to real property that results from a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property:
1. The defendant is a manufacturer of a product that contains asbestos;
2. The damages to an improvement to real property are caused by asbestos or a product that contains asbestos;
3. The improvement first became available for its intended use after July 1, 1953;
4. The improvement:
A. Is owned by a governmental entity and used for a public purpose; or
B. Is a public or private institution of elementary, secondary, or higher education; and
5. The complaint is filed by July 1, 1993.
(e) When action accrues.--A cause of action for an injury described in this section accrues when the injury or damage occurs.
In support of its contention that § 5-108(a) bars Rose's claims, Fox asserted (1) that the Schannes' swimming pool is an "improvement to real property"; (2) that Rose's injuries resulted from the alleged "defective and unsafe condition" of the pool; and (3) that at the time Rose was injured, more than 20 years had passed since the pool "first bec[ame] available for its intended use." Following an oral hearing on the motion, Judge H. Chester Goudy granted summary judgment in favor of Fox on the ground that Rose's claims were barred by § 5-108(a). Rose appealed.
Rose's principal contention before this Court is that § 5-108(a) should not and was never intended to apply to manufacturers of consumer goods. Rose also submits two alternative arguments in support of his assertion that summary judgment was improperly granted. First, Rose asserts that his injuries did not "result from" a defective and unsafe condition of an "improvement to real property" within the meaning of § 5-108(a). Rose contends that an in-ground swimming pool is a consumer good within the meaning of Maryland Code (1975, 1992 Repl.Vol.), § 2-105 and § 9-109(1) of the Commercial Law Article and suggests that the pool should therefore not be considered an "improvement to real property." Second, relying upon Mrs. Schanne's testimony that she was given the pool's warranty card on the day that construction of the pool was completed and the fact that the warranty card was dated July 12, 1971, Rose asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether, at the time of his injury on July 4, 1991, the requisite 20 years had passed since the entire improvement first became available for its intended use. We shall address each of Rose's arguments in turn.
The issues raised in this appeal require us to discern the meaning of § 5-108(a). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate and carry out legislative intent. See, e.g., Comptroller v. Jameson, 332 Md. 723, 732, 633 A.2d 93, 97 (1993); Geico v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993). Every statute is enacted to further some underlying goal or purpose--"to advance some interest, to attain some end"--and must be construed in accordance with its general purposes and policies. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987); see also State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1680, 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976). When called upon to construe a particular statute, we begin our analysis with the statutory language itself...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harris v. State
...428, 435 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994). The primary source of legislative intent is the text of the statute itself. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906, 909 (1994). To determine if a criminal statute requires specific intent, we look first to the language of the statute. See R......
-
McNeil v. State
...are "external manifestations of intent" which the court may consider in determining the purpose of the legislature. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906 (1994); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Pearce, 329 Md. 602, 620 A.2d 941 (1993). Further, "[t]hat which necessarily is implied in the......
-
Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor
...(1994) (quoting Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employment, 309 Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987)); see also Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906, 909-10 (1994) ("[A] statute must be construed as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, s......
-
Blackstone v. Sharma
...legislative history, we will also look at "the statute's relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation[.]" Rose v. Fox Pool Corp. , 335 Md. 351, 360, 643 A.2d 906 (1994). This Court should also consider "the context in which the statute appears ... and that context may include related ......