Rose v. Oakland Cnty. Treasurer

Decision Date21 February 2020
Docket NumberCase Number 19-13066
PartiesSHARRON ROSE, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND COUNTY TREASURER, CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, and SOUTHFIELD NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION INITIATIVE, LLC, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Honorable David M. Lawson

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINT, DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Sharron Rose lost ownership of her Southfield, Michigan home when she failed to pay her property taxes and a judgment of foreclosure was entered against her in the Oakland County, Michigan circuit court. She challenged that judgment in a separate lawsuit filed in that court, which was dismissed. The state appellate court denied her delayed application for leave to appeal for "lack of merit." She then filed the present case in this Court raising similar claims, which was met by motions to dismiss from each of the defendants. They argue that this case amounts to an appeal of the state court judgment, which this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain. They also contend that the dismissal of the state court case on the merits forecloses revisiting those issues here. They are correct on both counts. Their motions to dismiss, therefore, will be granted. The plaintiff recently filed a motion to file a second amended complaint, but that proposed pleading suffers from the same defects as the prior complaints. The motion to amend, therefore, will be denied.

I.

Except as otherwise cited, the following facts are taken from the plaintiff's amended complaint.

Plaintiff Sharron Rose lived at 29555 Heritage Lane, Southfield Michigan. In 2011, after a divorce, title to the home was conveyed to her solely, subject to liens of more than $25,000 in back taxes owed to Oakland County. Over the ensuing years, she entered into various repayment agreements with the County, which she struggled to satisfy. In January 2017, Rose entered into another payment plan under which she was required to post a down payment of $6,000 and a first monthly payment of $2,500 by February 1, 2017. Rose could not make those payments, but she did pay $3,000 on February 6, 2017, and another $5,000 on February 13, 2017.

Notwithstanding the plaintiff's attempts to repay the tax debt, Rose's home was included in the schedule of properties subject to tax foreclosures in Oakland County as a parcel under a June 2016 "bulk foreclosure" action authorized by Michigan's General Property Tax Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 211.78 et seq. On February 8, 2017, a judgment of foreclosure was entered in the Oakland County, Michigan circuit court vesting the County with fee simple title to the home. Judgment of Foreclosure dated Feb. 8, 2017, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.334-337.

Rose made no attempt to redeem the home from foreclosure within the time allowed, and she did not appeal the foreclosure judgment. Instead, on August 9, 2017, she filed suit against the County in a separate state court civil action. Her complaint pleaded, among other things, that the foreclosure violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and was an unconstitutional taking of her property. On June 1, 2018, the state court issued an opinion granting a motion for summary disposition and dismissing all the claims with prejudice, after concluding that there was no improper taking or due process deficiency, and all of the other claims werewithout merit. Opinion & Order, Rose v. Oakland County, No. 17-160234 (Oakland Cty. June 1, 2018) (ECF No. 4-4, PageID.354-364). Rose filed a delayed application for leave to appeal, which was denied by the Michigan Court of Appeals in a one-line order stating only that the denial was for "lack of merit in the grounds presented." Rose v. Oakland County, No. 346309 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (ECF No. 4-5, PageID.366). She did not pursue any further appeal.

The plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on October 17, 2019, followed by an amended complaint, against Oakland County, the City of Southfield, and the Southfield Neighborhood Redevelopment Initiative. The amended complaint pleads three counts alleging that (1) the foreclosure of the home and seizure of the plaintiff's equity in excess of the back taxes owed was barred by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, citing Timbs v. Indiana, --- U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), (2) the plaintiff's rights to procedural due process were violated by the County's handling of the repayment plans and its unilateral imposition of changes in the plan terms, and (3) the foreclosure of the property was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The defendants responded separately with their various motions to dismiss. The City of Southfield also filed a motion asking the Court to strike the amended complaint based on the allegedly inartful, profuse, and disorganized drafting of the pleading.

The latest of the motions to dismiss was filed on December 20, 2019, but the plaintiff did not respond timely to any of the defendants' motions. Instead, on February 10, 2020, just two days before the scheduled hearing, the plaintiff filed voluminous purported responses to all three motions comprising hundreds of pages, with no explanation for the untimely filings and no request for permission to file responses out of time. The Court struck those filings because they were late, no explanation for the tardy filings was offered, and the plaintiff never moved to enlarge theresponse time. The scheduled oral argument was cancelled. Nevertheless, a read of those stricken papers does not provoke hesitation to address the motions on the papers submitted.

II.
A.

The defendants brought their motions to dismiss under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) "provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). Defendant Oakland County took the lead with the argument that the plaintiffs' amended complaint amounts to little more than an attack on the state court judgment of foreclosure. Therefore, it says, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a challenge, according to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It also argues that the suit is foreclosed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, because it is an attempt to interfere with the collection of a state tax. The City of Southfield echoes that same argument. So does the City's Redevelopment Initiative.

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from conducting appellate review of final state-court judgments because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests sole jurisdiction to review such claims in the Supreme Court." Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). "Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), hold that only the Supreme Court may review judgments entered by state courts in civil litigation." Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir. 2019). The eponymous "doctrine, therefore, bars a lower federal . . . court from reviewing a plaintiff's claim when a state court's judgment is the source of the plaintiff's injury." Ibid.

When assessing whether an action is barred by the doctrine, "'[t]he inquiry [must focus on] the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third-party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.'" Id. at 255 (quoting McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006)). "The doctrine . . . does not bar federal jurisdiction 'simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.' Instead, [it] applies only where a state-court loser initiates an action in federal district court, complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeks review and rejection of that judgment." Berry, 688 F.3d at 298-99.

To determine the main focus of the plaintiff's grievance on this case — the judgment of foreclosure or, instead, something else — it is useful to consider Michigan's tax foreclosure procedures, which were established by its legislature. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 211.78 et seq. First, "[n]ot later than June 15 in each tax year, the [county seeking foreclosure must] file a single petition with the clerk of the circuit court of that county listing all property forfeited and not redeemed to the county treasurer under [Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78g] to be foreclosed under [Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k] for the total of the forfeited unpaid delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees." Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78h(1). "The petition shall seek a judgment in favor of the [county] for the forfeited unpaid delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees listed against each parcel of property," and "shall request that a judgment be entered vesting absolute title to each parcel of property in the foreclosing governmental unit, without right of redemption." Ibid.

Next, "[i]f a petition for foreclosure is filed under section 78h, not later than the date of the hearing, the [county] shall file with the clerk of the circuit court proof of service of the notice of the show cause hearing under section [Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78j], proof of service of the notice of the foreclosure hearing under this section, and proof of the personal visit to the property and publication under [Mich. Comp. Laws § 78i]." Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k(1).

Once that notice is given, "[a] person claiming an interest in a parcel of property set forth in the petition for foreclosure who desires to contest that petition shall file...

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