Rose v. Raleigh Fitkin-paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp.-ann May Found..
| Decision Date | 10 May 1947 |
| Parties | ROSE v. RALEIGH FITKIN-PAUL MORGAN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-ANN MAY FOUNDATION. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Ida C. Rose against the Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital-Ann May Foundation to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a fall due to the alleged negligence of an employee of the defendant.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
Parsons, Labrecque, Canzona & Combs, of Red Bank, for plaintiff.
Durand, Ivins & Carton, of Asbury Park, for defendant.
This case was tried before the court without a jury on stipulation by the parties that a trial by jury be waived and the matter heard and determined by the court.
The case involves the right of a private nurse, caring for a patient at the Fitkin Hospital, to recover damages from the hospital for injuries sustained by her as the result of a fall due to the alleged negligence of an employee of the defendant-hospital.
The evidence shows that on December 7, 1943, the plaintiff, a registered nurse, 52 years of age, was attending a patient in the defendant-hospital. The plaintiff was privately employed and personally paid by the patient. On the day in question, she had gone into the kitchen to procure a meal for her patient. On her way back to her patient, she was carrying the patient's tray in front of her, when she was thrown by a pan which had been placed on the floor under a leaking pipe by a hospital employee.
The plaintiff's version of the accident was corroborated by other witnesses, one of whom was the hospital employee who had placed the pan under the leak.
On cross-examination, the plaintiff testified that she was one of a number of nurses who were registered at the hospital for service. She admitted that having been a graduate of the Ann May School of Nursing, which is the training school for nurses operated by the defendant-hospital, she obtained a preference granted to such graduates when nurses were desired at the hospital; and that this registry service was operated by the hospital as a matter of courtesy, and that she paid nothing for this service. Plaintiff also admitted that while attending patients at the hospital, she was permitted to obtain her meals at the hospital, which meals were paid for by the patient.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff was a recipient of the benefactions of the defendant-hospital, or a beneficiary of the hospital, and that the hospital, being admittedly a charitable corporation, was not liable as such for the mere negligence of its servants. The defendant-hospital has subsequently stated through counsel that it does not propose to offer any testimony. Therefore, the court may grant the motion for a nonsuit; and if it does not, a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff will be in order.
There is no uniformity among the courts of the several states concerning the liability of a charitable institution to respond in damages for nigligence of its servants. Some states have adopted the rule of absolute or unqualified immunity so far as charitable institutions are concerned. The courts of New Jersey, on the other hand, have adopted the rule of qualified immunity.
In D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 A. 340, the Court of Errors and Appeals held that a hospital patient was a beneficiary of the institution, and as such was not entitled to recover for the negligence of the hospital's servants. The court made no distinction between a paying patient and a charity patient.
In Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 108 N.J.L. 453, 158 A. 832, the rule as to the nonliability of hospitals to beneficiaries was extended by the Supreme Court to include as beneficiaries persons injured while visiting patients. At page 456 of 108 N.J.L., at page 833 of 158 A., the Court held: ‘Accepting the principle, as applied to a charitable institution maintaining a hospital, that public policy denies recovery to a patient injured through the negligence of a nurse, we consider that the logic of the rule holds the same negation against those who, in visiting a patient, are injured from like cause.’ Verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs were set aside by the Supreme Court, and when the case was re-tried before Circuit Court Judge Lawrence without a jury, Judge Lawrence rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. An appeal was taken and the Court of Errors and Appeals, in an opinion reported in 110 N.J.L. 509, 166 A. 146, unanimously affirmed the trial court, thereby approving the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court.
In Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 A. 237, the immunity of charitable institutions was restricted by our highest court. In that case, the plaintiffs were injured in a highway collision through the negligence of the servant of the defendant-church. The rule was laid down that a charitable institution is liable in damages for injuries sustained by a person on the public highway through the negligent operation of the charitable institution's truck by its servant, where the injured person was a stranger having no beneficial relation to the institution.
The Court held 112 N.J.L. at page 132, 170 A. at page 238:
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