Rose v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 June 1936 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 628-630.,s. 628-630. |
| Parties | ROSE v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK, Inc. SAME v. SOCONY-VACUUM CORPORATION. ROCHA v. SAME. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Three petitions, by Manuel Rose against the Standard Oil Company of New York, Incorporated, and against the Socony-Vacuum Corporation, and by Joseph Rocha against the Socony-Vacuum Corporation, for writs of certiorari to quash the record of the denial by the superior court of the plaintiffs' motions for leave to file second amended declarations.
Records of superior court' denying motions of plaintiffs for leave to file second amended declaration quashed.
William A. Needham, Albert A. Baker, and Baker & Spicer, all of Providence, for petitioners.
Francis I. McCanna, Edward M. McEntee, and Lee & McCanna, all of Providence, for respondents.
These are proceedings on petitions which have been filed in this court by the plaintiffs in three actions at law in the superior court, named as above, and which seek the issuance of writs of certiorari for the purpose of quashing in each of these cases the record of the denial by the superior court of the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended declaration. Writs have been issued as prayed, and the superior court papers and records in the three cases are now before us.
From a legal point of view, the three cases are just alike and the proceedings therein have been the same. In the rest of the body of this opinion, therefore, we shall, for convenience, refer only to one of the cases. The plaintiff therein brought an action which is described in the writ as "an action of trespass on the case for causing a nuisance," and filed a declaration and later an amended declaration. In the latter he set forth many details, but the substance is that the defendant had a tract of land on which it operated a large oil refinery, preparing gasoline and other petroleum products; that in the operation of this refinery it from time to time permitted to be discharged on its land large quantities of petroleum, gasoline, and other petroleum products and waste substances, which it was its duty to confine to its own land; but that it wrongfully permitted large quantities of such products to escape from time to time from its own land, by means of percolations, into and through the plaintiff's farm nearby, thus creating a nuisance, and damaging greatly his land, polluting the drinking water therein, and causing great loss of life among his hogs and hens and otherwise causing him great damage.
No negligence by the defendant was alleged, and on that ground a demurrer filed by the defendant to the amended declaration was sustained by the superior court. That ruling was brought to this court by the plaintiff on a bill of exceptions and was affirmed. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corporation (1934) 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627. The gist of the decision of this court, then, was that there is no absolute duty upon any one carrying on a necessary business, like that of oil refining, in an industrial region, to prevent the escape from its land, by percolation in unknown, underground courses, into and through neighboring land, of deleterious substances which it uses or produces in the ordinary course of its business operations and which thus cause damage to the owner of such neighboring land; and that, as the declaration did not allege that the plaintiff's damage was caused by any negligence or willful misconduct by the defendant, the demurrer was properly sustained.
Almost immediately after the case had been returned to the superior court and before any judgment had been entered for the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended declaration. Later he submitted a form for such a declaration, which he proposed to file, if given leave by the court. This was in seven counts. In each of these, damage to the plaintiff was alleged to have been caused in substantially the same way as alleged in the first amended declaration, except that in each count some particular instance or manner of the escape of deleterious matter into its land and from that into his land was alleged, and it was further alleged that such escape was caused by negligence on its part, in certain ways described, in failing to use due care to prevent the escape of such matter into its land and thence into his land. He thus tried to supply the element of wrongful action or inaction by the defendant, the lack of which had been held to be a fatal defect in the first amended declaration.
When the plaintiff's motion for leave to file such second amended declaration came before the superior court for hearing, the defendant objected, and the court denied the motion, basing the denial on the ground that the proposed declaration set forth a different and new cause of action. In particular it held that the proposed amendment would introduce a new and different cause of action, because the same evidence would not support both of the pleadings, and because the allegations in the two would not be subject to the same defenses.
Without seeking to have this action of the superior court, in denying the motion to amend, reviewed by this court on a bill of exceptions, the plaintiff filed the petition for a writ of certiorari. The defendant opposes the petition on two grounds. The first is that such an action by the superior court is not reviewable in certiorari proceedings but only by bill of exceptions. The second is that the action was correct for the general reason given, viz., because the proposed declaration alleged a different and new cause of action.
To take up in their order these two grounds, it was held by this court in Hebert v. Handy, 28 R.I. 317, 67 A. 325, 326, that: It went on to say that the decision of such a motion is left to the discretion of the court. It said also that a declaration may be amended, in the discretion of the superior court, after a substantial demurrer has been sustained to it; and that, when the case has been sent back after this court has overruled an exception to such a ruling, the superior court has the same power to permit an amendment of the declaration as if no exception had been taken to the previous ruling.
As the superior court in that case had denied the motion to amend the declaration on the ground that it then had no power to grant it, this court directed that the motion be reheard and decided by that court. There has been no statutory change which could alter the matter, and the case still stands for the rule that a decision by the superior court on a motion to amend a declaration cannot be brought to this court for review on a bill of exceptions based only on an exception to such ruling.
Counsel for the defendant urge that in Plaine v. Samdperil, 54 R.I. 214, 172 A. 330, the plaintiff brought his case before this court on exceptions to the denial by the superior court of his motion to amend his declaration, and that this court sustained his exceptions, thus approving that course of procedure. In that case the action was on an assigned debt, as appeared on the face of the declaration, but the writ was in the name of the assignee only, instead of being in the name of the assignor for the use and benefit of the assignee, as required by the established procedure in this state. When the case was called for trial the plaintiff moved for leave to amend the writ and declaration to conform with that procedure. This motion was denied, and at the conclusion of the trial a verdict for the defendant was directed on his motion therefor, evidently because of the way in which the action was brought.
The plaintiff then brought the case to this court on exceptions taken by him to these two separate actions by the superior court. This court sustained both exceptions, saying that the motion to amend should have been granted, since the mistake clearly appeared in the declaration, which recited the assignment, and the trial court had the statutory power, in such a situation, to allow the plaintiff to correct the mistake. This court remitted the case to the superior court for a new trial, with direction to allow the writ and declaration to be amended. In that case, the refusal to allow the amendment led directly, at a trial which followed immediately, to a final decision of the case, against the plaintiff, to which an exception was taken. Of course, a review by a bill of exceptions was available and the case is clearly distinguishable from Hebert v. Handy, supra, and the instant case.
On the other hand, it was recognized in Colitz v. Gilbert, 53 R.I. 319, 166 A. 685, that certiorari was the proper procedure for reviewing the action of the superior court in granting the plaintiff's motion to amend his declaration after eight years had elapsed and the defendant had died; and such action was quashed. This court said that generally the action of the superior court in granting or denying such a motion will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the lower court, but that in such a matter the discretion of the court must be exercised in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action. See, also, Atlantic Mills v. Superior Court, 32 R.I. 285, 79 A. 577. We do not find that any of the authorities cited for the...
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