Roselli v. Affleck

Citation373 F. Supp. 36
Decision Date25 February 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 5359.
PartiesRoseanna ROSELLI et al. v. John J. AFFLECK, Individually and in his capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cary J. Coen, and Jay C. Lipner, of Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs.

W. Slater Allen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, R. I., for defendant.

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

The named plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other Rhode Island recipients of financial assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, "AFDC", who are residing in and obligated to pay for housing other than that financed and operated by Public Housing Authorities created pursuant to General Laws of Rhode Island, section 45-21-1 et seq.

On November 1, 1973 the defendant instituted a so-called "flat grant" system providing for a consolidated payment to "AFDC" recipients whereby all family units of the same numerical size receive precisely the same assistance payment. Within this consolidation there is an allotment for shelter which the plaintiffs contend is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and contravenes the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 602(a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)(1), 233.20(a)(3)(ii), 233.20(a)(3)(iii)(c). Specifically the plaintiffs make a four pronged attack contending that the defendant

1) failed to compute independently those recipient units living in public housing from those living in private housing in computing the average of shelter costs;

2) at the time of averaging, in keeping with its policy in regard to assistance to "non-square"1 or pro-rated families, irrebuttably presumed that the non-recipient household member was able and did in fact contribute a pro-rated share to defray the living expenses of the "AFDC" recipients and thus included said amount in computing the standard;

3) failed to average or even survey actual rents but instead used in the computation the rents previously budgeted by the state to the recipients; and

4) failed to account for the inflationary increase in rents from the date of the averaging of shelter costs in November 1972, a date when rent increases were tightly regulated under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended, P.L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 and the regulations issued thereunder by the Price Commission, 6 C.F.R. sec. 501 et seq. to the time of implementation in November 1973.

The plaintiffs argue that these failures, —which either singly or collectively, —violate the federal regulations cited supra, the Constitution and decisional law established in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970),—invidiously discriminate against the plaintiff class on a basis not rationally related to the legitimate purposes of the flat grant system; impinge on their right to dwell where they wish without a compelling governmental interest being served; and illegally diminish the content of the standard of need for shelter in that the standard, as established by the state prior to the institution of the flat grant system, was based on actual need; and that in its execution the state often did not meet actual need in violation of its own policy.

All this coalesces into the ultimate complaint that the shelter portion of the "flat grant" is illegal.

Jurisdiction

The plaintiffs have alleged a colorable constitutional claim. However, the parties have agreed to defer the consititutional issue and agree that the court proceed to hear the pendent statutory claim. The matter thus fits the pattern I followed in Rhode Island Fair Welfare Rights Organization, et al. v. John J. Affleck, CA 4818 (D.R.I. August 7, 1973).

"Although plaintiffs' constitutional claim arguably involves the constitutionality of a state-wide regulation and thus would trigger the requirement of a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. 2281, 2284, the parties agreed that adjudication of the constitutional issue be deferred and that this Court proceed to hear the pendent statutory claims. Such a procedure would be consonant with the policies of Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 90 S.Ct. 1207 (1970), that statutory claims be decided before constitutional claims and that non-constitutional claims be heard by a single judge. See also Rhode Island Fair Welfare Rights Org. v. Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, 329 F.Supp. 860 (D.R.I.1970). While I find no authority from the First Circuit Court of Appeals on this point, I am in agreement with Judge Newman in Connecticut Union of Welfare Employees v. White, 55 F.R.D. 481 (D.Conn.1972) that nothing in 28 U.S.C. sec. 2281 prevents a single judge from hearing pendent statutory claims prior to convening a three-judge court. Savings in judicial time and expediting of the action recommend this procedure." id. at pp. 4-5.

Jurisdiction also exists under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1343(4). In Giguere et al. v. Affleck, 370 F.Supp. 154, at pp. 157-158 (D.R.I.1974) this court stated:

"While other courts may differ on this question, see e. g. Wynn v. Indiana State Department of Public Welfare, 316 F.Supp. 324 (N.D.Ind.1970) I find compelling the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that an action alleging that under color of state law certain federal statutes or regulations are being violated may state a claim under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 even absent an allegation of constitutional invalidity. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) at p. 569 . . . See also Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F.Supp. 945, 949 N. 5 (S.D.N.Y.1971); Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 1404, 1417-21 (1972)."

The matter has been certified as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) (2).

The "Flat Grant"

The State of Rhode Island employed the American Data Systems, Inc. to develop the flat grant. In doing so they selected at random 4265 active "AFDC" cases from the approximately 13,000-14,000 total as of November 1, 1972. They classified this selected group into plan or "family" sizes of 1 through 10 and then surveyed each to ascertain the amount the state budgeted for each need item to be included in the flat grant. Shelter needs were included as budgeted for November 1972. No survey was made to ascertain the actual cost of shelter being paid by the recipients, nor was any attempt made to determine the number of recipients paying rent different from the sum budgeted to them; nor did the survey account for actual rent or budgeted rent increases occurring between the date of the survey and November 1973, the date the flat grant was implemented.

The net of these computations concerning the cost of purchasing shelter are best set forth in the following chart.2

Approximately 90% or more of the total of all these columns which is paid to the recipient perhaps represents the rent allotment. See N. 2 & 3, supra.

The "AFDC" program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism and is largely funded by the Federal Government on a matching fund basis and administered by the states. States are not required to participate in the program 3 but those which do participate and take advantage of the available federal funds must comply with the terms of the applicable federal legislation, 42 U.S.C. sec. 601 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 45 C.F.R. sec. 201 et seq. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1967); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). States have traditionally been at liberty to pay as little or as much as they choose. Rosado v. Wyman, supra, noted that

"First, it is necessary to establish a `standard of need,' a yardstick for measuring who is eligible for public assistance. Second, it must be decided how much assistance will be given, that is, what `level of benefits' will be paid. On both scores Congress has always left to the States a great deal of discretion. King v. Smith, 392 U.S., at 318 88 S.Ct., at 2133-2134. Thus, some States include in their `standard of need' items that others do not take into account. Diversity also exists with respect to the level of benefits in fact paid." id. 408, 90 S.Ct. 1216.

Approving the concept of averaging assistance payments in order to establish a flat grant, the Court in Rosado enunciated, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 602(a)(23), the basic guidelines to be followed in the conversion procedure. 42 U.S.C. sec. 602(a)(23) provides:

"The States shall provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted."

Despite the almost totally nonexistent legislative history behind this statute, the Court ascribed two distinct purposes to 42 U.S.C. sec. 602 (a) (23):

"First, to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need; second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a more equitable basis. Consistent with this interpretation of § 402(a) (23), a State may, after recomputing its standard of need, pare down payments to accomodate budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the actual standard of need .
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Blue v. Craig
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 18 Octubre 1974
    ...1973), 492 F.2d 986; Gilliard v. Craig (D.C.N.C.1971), 331 F.Supp. 587, aff'd 409 U.S. 807, 93 S.Ct. 39, 34 L.Ed.2d 66; Roselli v. Affleck (D.C.R.I.1974), 373 F.Supp. 36; Bass v. Rockefeller (D.C.N.Y.1971), 331 F.Supp. 945, vacated on other grounds (2 Cir.), 464 F.2d 1300; Ojeda v. Hackney ......
  • Metcalf v. Trainor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 7 Mayo 1979
    ...for reasons inconsistent with the Illinois Public Aid Code standard of "health and well-being." 22 The decision in Roselli v. Affleck, 373 F.Supp. 36, 48 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 1277 (1st Cir. 1974), is distinguishable. The court's decision to require a survey of actual rent paid was base......
  • Andrews v. Maher
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 24 Octubre 1975
    ...therefore is heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . . .13 Cover, supra note 11, at 25.14 Accord, Roselli v. Affleck, 373 F.Supp. 36 (D.R.I.) (alternate ground of jurisdiction), aff'd without discussion of jurisdiction, 508 F.2d 1277 (1st Cir. 1974); Bass v. Rockefeller......
  • Roselli v. Noel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • 25 Mayo 1976
    ...Roselli has also joined the Governor of the State as a defendant. In the first suit, which hereinafter will be referred to collectively as Roselli I, this Court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the shelter portion of the State's flat grant program as a violation of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT