Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne
| Decision Date | 09 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–2826. |
| Citation | 14 F.Supp.3d 631 |
| Parties | Steven ROSEMBERT, Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF EAST LANSDOWNE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Geoffrey V. Seay, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Suzanne McDonough, Michael P. Laffey, Robert P. Didomenicis, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, for Defendants.
This case involves the alleged illegal search, arrest and incarceration of Plaintiff, Steven Rosembert. Plaintiff alleges that numerous police officers unlawfully entered his home to perform an arrest, unnecessarily used a Taser gun, and maliciously prosecuted him because he is an African–American. Plaintiff has also brought claims against the municipalities employing these officers pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Defendants have filed four motions to dismiss, as well as a motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff alleges that on the night of May 24, 2011, he was driving a motorcycle in the Borough of East Lansdowne. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) He acknowledges that at some point while operating his motorcycle, Defendant police officers McGrenera, Hartnett, Selimis, Albertoli, Burns and “Does 1–5” (collectively, “Defendant Officers”) observed him violate the motor vehicle code. (Id. at ¶ 25.) These officers attempted to pull over Plaintiff, and when Plaintiff did not comply, a chase resulted. (Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.) In the course of fleeing from the police, Plaintiff ran into his home, which the Officers entered without a warrant. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff alleges that, once inside his home, the Defendant Officers used excessive force to apprehend him, despite the fact that he did not offer any resistance. (Id. at ¶¶ 30–31.) Plaintiff claims that all Defendant Officers repeatedly struck him on his face and upper body, that Officers Burns and McGrenera excessively used Taser guns on him, and that Officer McGrenera “pistol whipped” him in the face with a Taser. (Id. at ¶¶ 33–36.) Plaintiff asserts that he suffered serious bodily injury and long-term pain and suffering from the attack. (Id. )
Plaintiff claims that Officer McGrenera then unlawfully arrested him and wrongfully charged him with numerous crimes related to this incident. (Id. at ¶ 37.)
Plaintiff ultimately negotiated a plea agreement, wherein he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and fleeing or attempting to elude police, and, in return, the other twenty-eight charges against him were dismissed.2 (Defs. McGrenera & Hartnett's Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 29, Exs. B–D.)3
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Borough of Lansdowne, Borough of East Lansdowne and Borough of Yeadon (collectively, “Defendant Boroughs”) have an agreement that their police officers may assist officers from neighboring boroughs in their respective police functions.4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiff, these Boroughs were on notice that the Defendant Officers have a history of violating African–American citizens' constitutional rights, but have chosen to ignore these unconstitutional actions, and have failed to implement training or discipline to correct the issue. (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.) Plaintiff alleges he has witnessed violent beatings of African–Americans by police officers employed by these Boroughs, and that the Defendant Boroughs have an unlawful custom, policy and practice of maliciously arresting African–American citizens. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–55.) Plaintiff asserts that his injuries are a direct result of these policies and/or customs. (Id. at ¶ 63.)
On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant Officers in both their individual and official capacities,5 as well as the Defendant Boroughs, for violations of his constitutional rights. The claims brought are as follows:
Defendant seeks monetary compensation, as well as a declaratory judgment that all Defendants' actions recited in the amended complaint are unconstitutional, and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from violating his constitutional rights in the future.
Defendants have filed four motions to dismiss, as well as a motion to strike in response to the amended complaint. These motions are now fully briefed and ready for disposition.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The plausibility standard requires more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the Court must take the following three steps: (1) the Court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim;” (2) the court should identify the allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;” and (3) “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir.2011) (citations omitted).
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff lists several grounds for his Fourth Amendment claim, including unlawful search, false arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76–83.) Defendants argue that all Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed, other than the claims for excessive force against the Defendant Officers. Essentially, Defendants assert that the claims for unreasonable search and seizure are not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), in light of Plaintiff's guilty plea; and in any event, they argue his guilty plea establishes the existence of probable cause for his arrest, any search associated with his arrest, and his imprisonment. Further, Defendants posit that the claims against the Defendant Boroughs fail to state a claim under the requirements of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). We address each of these arguments in turn.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court considered whether a person convicted of a crime may recover damages related to his conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The main question to be addressed in this analysis is whether Plaintiff's claims “necessarily imply the invalidity of [Plaintiff's] conviction.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined that a guilty plea is sufficient to bar a subsequent section 1983 claim under Heck . Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 n. 8 (3d Cir.2005). However, Heck does not bar a claim where a plaintiff seeks damages for the defendant's use of improper procedures, so long as the validity of a plaintiff's conviction is not called into question. McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623, 632 (E.D.Pa.2011). A claim for excessive force generally does not call a conviction into question, and Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's ability to bring this claim against the Defendant Officers. See Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3d Cir.1997) (). Therefore, Plaintiff's excessive force claim will survive.
However, we find that Plaintiff's claims for illegal search and false arrest are Heck -barred. Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant Officers entered his home without a valid warrant and illegally arrested and detained him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The amended complaint notes that Defendants were not aware that Plaintiff's blood alcohol level was elevated until a chemical test was completed twenty-one days later. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) This blood test was only able to be conducted as a result of the police entering Plaintiff's house to make the arrest, and therefore, a finding that the search and/or arrest was unlawful would likely result in the exclusion of this evidence. See Mosby v. O'Brie, 532...
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