Rosemont Taxicab Co. v. Phila. Parking Auth.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-3601
• Citation: 327 F.Supp.3d 803
• Parties: ROSEMONT TAXICAB CO., INC. and Germantown Cab Company, Plaintiffs, v. The PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, William Schmid, and Steven Marshall, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

327 F.Supp.3d 803

ROSEMONT TAXICAB CO., INC. and Germantown Cab Company, Plaintiffs,

v.The PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY, William Schmid, and Steven Marshall, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-3601

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 26, 2018

Brett Adam Berman, Ryan Thomas Becker, Fox Rothschild LLP, Michael S. Henry, Salaman/ Henry PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Patrick J. Doran, Gary D. Fry, Archer & Greiner PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Padova, District Judge.

The Philadelphia Parking Authority ("PPA") through its Taxi and Limousine Division ("TLD") routinely seizes without a warrant vehicles that are suspected of being used as taxicabs that do not have a PPA inspection sticker. Plaintiffs Rosemont Taxicab Co., Inc. ("Rosemont") and Germantown Cab Company ("GCC") filed this lawsuit alleging that the PPA's practice violates their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Counts I and II). They also seek declaratory relief that a Pennsylvania statute and the PPA implementing regulations permitting warrantless seizures of taxicabs are unconstitutional "as applied" (Count III). Finally, GCC alleges state law claims for conversion (Count IV), trespass to chattels (Count V), and fraud (Count VI). Presently pending are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment based on a stipulation of facts ("Stip.").¹ We conclude that the PPA's warrantless seizure of Plaintiffs' vehicles is prima facie unconstitutional, and the absence of pre-deprivation procedures denied Plaintiffs due process of law. We also conclude that Defendants have failed to meet their summary judgment burden to show they are entitled to their proffered affirmative defenses on Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Finally, we conclude that, while Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their constitutional claims, GCC cannot demonstrate the elements of its state law claims as a matter of law. Accordingly, with limited exceptions to be discussed later, we grant Plaintiffs' Motion on liability issues on Counts I, II, and III and deny Defendants' Motion on those Counts; we grant Defendants' Motion for summary judgment with regard to Counts IV, V, and VI.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is not genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record that] it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the movant's initial Celotex burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court [ ] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party has the burden of identifying specific facts to show that, to the contrary, a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That is, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

"In evaluating the evidence, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all reasonable inferences in [their] favor." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 680 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). "Speculation, conclusory allegations, and mere denials are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact." Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Indeed, evidence introduced to defeat or support a motion for summary judgment must be capable of being admissible at trial. Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 252 n.11 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1234 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) ).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD

GCC is a taxicab operator that holds a certificate of public convenience ("CPC") issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ("PUC") authorizing it to provide taxicab service in parts of the City of Philadelphia and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (Stip. ¶ 1.) Rosemont is a taxicab operator that holds a CPC issued by the PUC authorizing it to provide call or demand taxicab service in parts of Delaware County and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 5.) Both companies generate revenue by leasing taxicabs to drivers. (Id. ¶ 4.) GCC's CPC provides for limited or "partial" operating rights within Philadelphia; it does not authorize "city wide" rights. (Id. ¶ 2.) Only taxicabs with medallions issued by the PPA are authorized to provide citywide service in Philadelphia. (Id. ¶ 3.)

Prior to 2004, the PUC was solely responsible for the regulation of taxicab and limousine operations throughout Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 6.) In Act 94 of 2004, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5701 - 5725 ("Act 94"), the Pennsylvania General Assembly transferred the regulatory responsibility over taxicab and limousine operations within Philadelphia from the PUC to the PPA. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) The PUC retained jurisdiction over all other taxicab and limousine services provided outside of Philadelphia. (Id. ¶ 8.) The PPA regulates the Philadelphia taxicab industry through the TLD. (Id. ¶ 9.) TLD's Enforcement Division is responsible for enforcing the PPA's regulations and governing statute. (Id. ¶ 11.) At all relevant times, Defendant William Schmid ("Schmid") has been TLD's Manager of Enforcement and, in 2013, became TLD's Deputy Director. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Defendant Steven Marshall ("Marshall") is a TLD Enforcement Officer who reports to Schmid. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)

When the PPA assumed responsibility for regulating the Philadelphia taxicab industry in or about 2005, Section 5714 of Act 94, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5714 (superseded) (" Section 5714"), set forth the PPA's authority to impound taxicab vehicles. (Stip. ¶ 16.) Section 5714 did not require the PPA to impound vehicles when violations were discovered; neither did it require the PPA to obtain a warrant before impounding a vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) At that time, the PPA interpreted and applied Section 5714 as authorizing it to impound without a warrant any non-medallion vehicle found to be providing "hail service" in Philadelphia without legal authority to do so, including licensed taxicabs operating under valid CPCs issued by the PUC, such as those operated by Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 19.)

After having taxicabs seized without warrant under Section 5714, Plaintiffs, along with Sawink, Inc. (another taxicab company), filed suit in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, docketed at Sawink, Inc., v. PPA, No. 84 M.D. 201 (2011) ("Sawink"), challenging the constitutionality of the PPA's impoundment of their vehicles. (Stip. ¶ 20.) On January 6, 2012, the Commonwealth Court issued a decision in favor of the petitioners in Sawink, concluding that Section 5714"does not authorize the impoundment sanction where a taxicab, certificated by the PUC, accepts a hail in Philadelphia," a decision that was ultimately affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Sawink, Inc. v. PPA, 34 A.3d 926, 932 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff'd , 618 Pa. 466, 57 A.3d 644 (2012). In the aftermath of Sawink, the PPA has only seized private "hacks"—vehicles providing unlawful taxicab service in Philadelphia—as well as vehicles providing Uber or Lyft service prior to the Legislature's legalization of those services in Philadelphia in November, 2016. (Stip. ¶ 22.) The PPA has not impounded any taxicab vehicle operating under a valid CPC issued by either the PPA or the PUC merely for operating outside of its territorial rights. (Id. )

On July 6, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted Act 119 of 2012, which modified the relevant language of Section 5714 ("Act 119") following the Sawink decision. (Id. ¶ 23.) Like its predecessor, Section 5714 as amended by Act 119 (the "Current Impoundment Statute"), does not require the PPA to obtain a warrant before impounding a vehicle.² (Id. ¶ 25.) Although empowered to do so, the Current Impoundment Statute likewise does not require the PPA to impound any vehicles. (Id. ¶ 26.) Vehicles impounded under the Current Impoundment Statute are not subject to civil forfeiture. (Id. ¶ 27.)

In 2014, following the Legislature's adoption of the Current Impoundment Statute, the PPA promulgated new regulations, approved by the PPA's Board on March 13, 2014 and codified at 52 Pa. Code §§ 1017.51 and 1017.52 (the "Current Impoundment Regulations"), setting forth the circumstances under which it would impound vehicles and establishing a procedure for such impoundments.³ (Stip. ¶¶ 28-30.) The Current Impoundment Regulations define five circumstances as an "impoundable offense." See 52 Pa. Code § 1017.51. One of the "impoundable offenses" occurs when "[a]n unauthorized taxicab provides, or attempts to provide, call or demand service [i.e. taxicab] in Philadelphia." (Stip. ¶ 32 (bracket in...