Rosen v. State

• Decision Date: 31 January 2022
• Docket Number: S-21-0080
• Parties: ROBERT CHARLES ROSEN, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Respondent.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

2022 WY 16

ROBERT CHARLES ROSEN, Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF WYOMING, Respondent.

No. S-21-0080

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 31, 2022

Original Proceeding Petition for Writ of Review District Court of Teton County The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Petitioner: Devon W. Petersen, Fleener Petersen Law, Laramie, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Petersen.

Representing Respondent: Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Eames.

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS ^[*] , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

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FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Robert Charles Rosen was eighteen years old when the State charged him with third-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment, both of which he allegedly committed when he was seventeen years old. Mr. Rosen moved to transfer his case from district court to juvenile court, and the State objected. It argued that the juvenile court lacked concurrent jurisdiction because Mr. Rosen was an adult when the State filed the charges against him. The court agreed that the juvenile court's jurisdiction depended on Mr. Rosen's age when he was charged, rather than his age when he committed the offense, and it dismissed Mr. Rosen's transfer motion. We reverse.

ISSUE

[¶2] The sole issue in this appeal is whether a juvenile court's concurrent jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c) depends on an offender's age at the time of the offense or at the time charges are filed.

FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Rosen was two months past his seventeenth birthday on January 25, 2019, when, the State alleged, he was in a hot tub with a female friend and touched her breasts and buttocks without her permission and prevented her from leaving the hot tub. Law enforcement learned of the alleged incident on March 4, 2020, and on April 23, 2020, it charged Mr. Rosen with felony third-degree sexual assault and misdemeanor false imprisonment.

[¶4] On January 22, 2021, before his arraignment in district court, Mr. Rosen moved to transfer his case to juvenile court. The court assigned the matter to the Honorable Marvin L. Tyler for the limited purpose of ruling on Mr. Rosen's transfer motion, and the State then filed its opposition to the motion. The State argued transfer would be improper because the juvenile court could exercise its concurrent jurisdiction only in a criminal case brought against a minor, and Mr. Rosen was not a minor when he was charged.

[¶5] The district court agreed with the State. It concluded (citations omitted):

There is no need for judicial interpretation of Wyo. Stat Ann. § 14-6-203(f)(ii)/(iii). As a matter of law, when the words and phrases are given their plain and ordinary meaning and when each of the Juvenile Justice Act statutes are read together in light of the express specific purposes contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § [14-6-201(c)], the legislative intent is apparent, clear, and unambiguous. The Juvenile Justice Act

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applies only to commencing cases or transferring cases involving a "minor" or a "child."

The plain and ordinary meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(f)(ii)/(iii) is that "[a]ll misdemeanors" and "[f]elony cases in which the minor has attained the age of seventeen (17) years" "may originally be commenced either in the juvenile court or in the district court or inferior court having jurisdiction" only as long as the individual is a "minor" or "child" at that time. If the individual is not a "minor" or a "child" at that time, the juvenile court lacks concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. If the juvenile court lacks concurrent subject matter jurisdiction, then a motion to transfer must be dismissed.

Since [Mr. Rosen] was "an adult" when the charges were filed, this District Court case is NOT within the concurrent subject matter jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Accordingly, the Motion, filed after [Mr. Rosen] was "an adult," must be dismissed.

[¶6] Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 13.02, Mr. Rosen filed a petition for writ of review seeking interlocutory review of the order dismissing his transfer motion. We granted the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] "We review whether a court has jurisdiction over a case de novo." Interest of RR, 2021 WY 85, ¶ 53, 492 P.3d 246, 261 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Interest of BG, 2019 WY 116, ¶ 6, 451 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Wyo. 2019)). This appeal also presents questions of statutory interpretation and construction, which are questions of law that we consider de novo. Matter of Adoption of ATWS, 2021 WY 62, ¶ 8, 486 P.3d 158, 160 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Matter of Adoption of MAJB, 2020 WY 157, ¶¶ 9, 13, 478 P.3d 196, 200-01 (Wyo. 2020)).

DISCUSSION

[¶8] The question in this case is whether a juvenile court's concurrent jurisdiction in a criminal case depends on an offender's age at the time of charging, or his or her age at the time of the criminal offense. Our answer turns on our interpretation of the Juvenile Justice Act's jurisdictional provision, which provides:

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction in all cases

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. . . in which a minor is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(c) (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added).^[1]

[¶9] "When interpreting statutes, we first look to the statute's plain language to determine the legislature's intent and we examine the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine whether the statute is ambiguous." Matter of Adoption of ATWS, 2021 WY 62, ¶ 9, 486 P.3d at 160 (quoting Matter of Est. of Frank, 2019 WY 4, ¶ 7, 432 P.3d 885, 887 (Wyo. 2019)). "A statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability. A statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." Vahai v. Gertsch, 2020 WY 7, ¶ 27, 455 P.3d 1218, 1227 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting State v. Bannon Energy Corp., 999 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Wyo. 2000)).

[¶10] The State argues, and the district court found, that the Juvenile Justice Act is unambiguous and that under its plain terms, the juvenile court has jurisdiction only in cases involving one who is a minor at the time of charging. Mr. Rosen does not take a position on whether the Act is ambiguous but contends that, based on the purposes of the Act, the relevant age for determining jurisdiction is plainly the offender's age at the time of the offense. "[D]ivergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity but is not conclusive. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court." Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd., 2021 WY 65, ¶ 15, 486 P.3d 990, 995 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2010 WY 21, ¶ 19, 225 P.3d 1061, 1066 (Wyo. 2010)). We conclude that the Act is ambiguous as to whether a juvenile court's concurrent jurisdiction depends on an offender's age at the time of charging, or his or her age at the time of the criminal offense.

[¶11] The disputed provision, section 14-6-203(c), grants a juvenile court jurisdiction over "cases . . . in which a minor is alleged to have committed a criminal offense." The language "in which a minor is alleged" may plausibly be read to describe the case itself- that is, a case brought against a minor. Under that reading, the juvenile court would have jurisdiction only when charges are brought against a person who is a minor at the time of charging. The language may also, however, be read to describe when the person is alleged to have committed the criminal offense-that is, when he or she was a minor. In that case, the court would have jurisdiction if charges were brought against one alleged to have committed a criminal offense as a minor, regardless of his or her age at the time of

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charging. Given these varying interpretations and their effect on the court's jurisdiction, we conclude that subsection 203(c) is ambiguous.^[2]

[¶12] Because we find the language of section 14-6-203(c) ambiguous, we must apply our rules of statutory construction "to construe any ambiguous language to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature." Matter of Adoption of MAJB, 2020 WY 157, ¶ 20, 478 P.3d at 203 (quoting In re Est. of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d 629, 636 (Wyo. 2016)). To determine the legislature's intent, we must consider statutes relating to the same subject in harmony. Id. Additionally, we "must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances . . . to determine the intention of the lawmaking body." Id.

[¶13] In keeping with our rule that we discern legislative intent by looking to statutes related to the same subject matter, we begin with the legislature's statutory grant of general jurisdiction to juvenile courts. It provides in relevant part:

(a) The juvenile court has general jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings commenced therein or transferred to it by order of the district court concerning:

(i) Any minor alleged to be delinquent as defined in W.S. 14-6-201;

(ii) Any minor alleged to have committed a delinquent act before attaining the age of majority;

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(iii) Any minor alleged to be neglected as defined in W.S. 14-3-402;

(iv) Any minor alleged to be in need of supervision as defined in W.S. 14-6-402; [and]

(v) The parents, guardian or custodian of any minor alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision or neglected, and all persons living in the household with the minor[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-8-102 (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis...