Rosenberg v. Hudson Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-CV-00137-MJH,2:22-CV-00198-MJH |
| Parties | KIMBERLY L. ROSENBERG, HOWARD I. ROSENBERG, Plaintiffs, v. HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, HOWARD I. ROSENBERG, KIMBERLY L. ROSENBERG, Plaintiffs, v. CHUBB INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
In this consolidated action, Plaintiffs, Howard I. Rosenberg and Kimberly L. Rosenberg, bring the within actions seeking declaratory judgment for defense and indemnification under Defendants, Hudson Insurance Company and Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company's, insurance policies. (ECF No. 1 at 2:22-CV-00137 and ECF No. 1 at 2:22-CV-00198)[1]. Said requests for defenses and indemnification arise from a lawsuit filed by Intervenor, T. Lee Rouse, against the Rosenbergs in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Docket No GD21-14912.
The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 23, and 25). Those matters are now ripe for consideration.
Following consideration of the relevant pleadings and stipulations (ECF Nos. 1, 15, 18, and 31 at 2:22-CV-00137 and ECF No. 1 at 2:22-CV-00198), the parties' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 23, and 25), the respective briefs and appendices (ECF Nos. 22, 24, 26-29, 34-37)), and for the following reasons, the parties' motions will be disposed as follows: the Rosenbergs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against Chubb will be denied; Chubb's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against the Rosenbergs will be granted; the Rosenbergs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against Hudson will be denied; and Hudson's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against the Rosenbergs will be granted.
The Rosenbergs' Declaratory Judgment actions stem from an underlying lawsuit filed by T. Lee Rouse against the Rosenbergs in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (Rouse Complaint). The Rosenbergs have sought coverage for defense and indemnifications under insurance policies issued by Chubb and Hudson. The Rosenbergs seek a Declaratory Judgment that each of the Chubb and Hudson policies require insurance coverage to provide them with a defense and/or indemnification in the Rouse Complaint. Chubb and Hudson both contend that, under the facts and claims alleged in the underlying lawsuit, coverage for defense and indemnification is not available under the language of the policies.
A. Rouse Complaint[2]
In her complaint, Ms. Rouse alleges that, on December 21, 2019, the Rosenbergs' son, Adam Rosenberg, invited Ms. Rouse's son, Christian Moore-Rouse, to the Rosenbergs' residence, whereupon he murdered Christian with a handgun owned by the Rosenbergs. (ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 20-22). Adam then allegedly dragged Christian's body across the roadway and hid it in a wooded public park near his parents' residence. Id. at ¶ 22.
Ms. Rouse alleges that Adam either confessed and gave the gun to the Rosenbergs, or that the Rosenbergs found the handgun and knew that, for a variety of reasons, it was “likely to be evidence of a crime committed by their son Adam.” Id. According to the Rouse Complaint, at some point between the shooting and January 20, 2020, the Rosenbergs gave the handgun to Martha Laux, their marriage counselor, “in an effort to prevent or delay the arrest and prosecution of Adam Rosenberg.” Id. at ¶ 28. On January 20, 2020, Ms. Laux then allegedly turned the gun over to the investigating homicide detectives, telling them that she found the handgun “on a trail . . . while walking her dog,” rather than revealing that the gun came from the Rosenbergs. Id. at ¶ 29-30.
Ms. Rouse averred that, as a result of the above actions, the Rosenbergs and Ms. Laux “delayed the police investigation and ultimate March 3, 2020 discovery of Christian's decayed remains in the woods across the road from the Rosenbergs' residence.” Id. at ¶ 32. As a result, Ms. Rouse allegedly experienced “the natural fear and severe emotional distress a Mother emotionally close to her young adult son would experience during that period of time.” Id. at ¶ 35. The Rouse Complaint contains a single count against Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Specifically, the Rouse Complaint recites of the elements of this offense, and states “as the direct result of [Defendants] above described extreme and outrageous actions . . . Defendants intentionally and/or recklessly caused Plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer severe emotional distress.” Id. at ¶¶ 37, 39.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and view all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Gingrich, No. 1:10-CV-405, 2010 WL 4362450, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)). “A court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings must consider the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's answer, and any written instruments or exhibits attached to the pleadings.” Anthony v. Torrance State Hosp., No. CV 3:16-29, 2016 WL 4581350, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Perelman v. Perelman, 919 F.Supp.2d 512, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2013)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted where “‘the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved' and that it is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Wiseman Oil Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 878 F.Supp.2d 597, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Pennsylvania courts apply traditional rules of contract interpretation to insurance policies. The goal is to ascertain the parties' intent, as manifested by the policy language. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). Pennsylvania courts give words of common usage their “natural, plain, and ordinary sense.” Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). In so doing, courts may consult dictionary definitions to determine their meaning. Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 108 (“Words of common usage in an insurance policy are to be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense ... and we may inform our understanding of these terms by considering their dictionary definitions.”). Clear and unambiguous terms must be given their effect. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CPB Int'l, 562 F.3d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 2009); Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 897. “[A] provision is ambiguous only if reasonable people could, in the context of the entire policy, fairly ascribe different meanings to it.” Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999). An insured's “mere assertions that [it] expected coverage will not ordinarily defeat unambiguous policy language excluding coverage.” Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn Nat'l Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
In determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend, Pennsylvania courts follow the “four corners” rule, which requires comparison of “the four corners of the insurance contract to the four corners of the complaint.” Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry's Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 (Pa. 2010). “[O]nly allegations contained within the underlying complaint pertaining to injuries which are either actually or potentially within the scope of the insurance policy obligate the insurer to defend the insured.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 355-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1999); see also Scopel v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (). This prevents “the use of artful pleadings designed to avoid exclusions in liability insurance policies.” Haver, 725 A.2d at 745.
“The duty to defend is a distinct obligation, different from and broader than the duty to indemnify.” Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 225 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Muff, 851 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F.Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, there is no duty to indemnify if there is no duty to defend.” Id. (citing Haver, 725 A.2d at 746 n.1; Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 356 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)); see also Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 900 (Pa. 2006) ().
1. Chubb Policy
For a policy period from April 15, 2019 to April 15, 2020, Chubb issued a Masterpiece Homeowner's Liability Policy No 11273641-01 to Howard I. and Kim K. Rosenberg. (2:22-cv-00198 at ECF No. 1-2 at 11). The Policy's Personal Injury Liability Coverage Part...
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