Rosencranz v. Tidrington

• Decision Date: 30 March 1927
• Docket Number: No. 24756.,24756.
• Parties: ROSENCRANZ v. TIDRINGTON.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

199 Ind. 140

155 N.E. 705

ROSENCRANZ

v.TIDRINGTON.

No. 24756.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 30, 1927.

Appeal from Vanderburg Circuit Court; Philip C. Gould, Judge.

Ernest G. Tidrington applied for admission to the bar, being opposed by Richard Rosencranz. From a judgment overruling motion of said Rosencranz to set aside order of admission, he appeals. Appeal dismissed.

See, also, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N. E. 58, 28 A. L. R. 1136.

W. C. Welborn and Richard Waller, both of Evansville, for appellant.

Daniel H. Ortmeyer, of Evansville, for appellee.

MARTIN, J.

The appellee filed in the Vanderburg circuit court his application to be admitted to the practice of law. The court referred the application to the committee on admissions to the courts of Vanderburg county with instructions to report thereon at 9 a. m. December 28, 1923. The committee made no report at the time indicated, whereupon Charles P. Bock of the Vanderburg county bar, who is now judge of the Vanderburg circuit court, moved that appellee be admitted. The court, acting by its regular judge, Philip C. Gould, heard the application, found “that the said Ernest G. Tidrington is entitled to admission to practice law” and ordered his admission and oath. Appellee was then duly sworn and admitted, and the clerk was directed to place his name on the roll of attorneys and to issue to him a certificate of admission.

At 10:30 a. m. the same day, appellant, appearing by two attorneys, who constituted a minority of the committee on admissions, orally moved the court to set aside the order of admission and filed written “objections” reading as follows:

“The undersigned, a citizen of Vanderburg county, state of Indiana, objects to the admission of Ernest Tidrington as an attorney of this court and demands a jury to try and determine the question of his character, fitness and qualifications for admission to the bar of this court.”

But no notice of the filing of these objections was given to appellee. On the following day, December 29, the objector filed a motion and affidavit for a change of venue from the judge. At the hearing on this motion January 30, 1924, appellant appeared by new counsel, two other attorneys appeared as amici curiæ, and the court overruled the motion. On January 31, 1924, appellant offered to file a verified written motion to vacate and set aside the order of the court admitting appellee to the bar, and requesting an order directing that notice issue to Tidrington of the filing of said motion. On February 7, 1924, the court refused to permit appellant to file his verified written motion, overruled his oral motion made December 28, and struck from the files the written objections also filed on that date.

The verified written motion, which appellant offered to file, recited that Tidrington had “heretofore” filed a similar application, and that Rosencranz had filed objections thereto, secured a change of venue from the judge and a trial by jury of the question of Tidrington's character; that the jury found in Tidrington's favor; that the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court and was reversed and remanded for a new trial; that Tidrington had dismissed that application, “but that this objector never withdrew his objections filed therein.” The motion then recounts the filing of appellee's second application December 26, 1923, and the several steps taken thereafter as outlined above. The former application referred to was an application for admission to the bar filed by Tidrington December 17, 1919. From a judgment admitting appellee to the bar based on the jury's verdict which found that appellee was of good moral character, Rosencranz appealed and presented as error the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence. The judgment was reversed by this court October 9, 1923, with directions to sustain the motion for a new trial. Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N. E. 58, 28 A. L. R. 1136.

[1] Following the decision of that case, appellee, Tidrington, moved the trial court to dismiss his petition, which motion was granted and said petition was dismissed, and this proceeding which he instituted December 26, 1923, was an entirely new one. Appellee's dismissal of the first petition necessarily took with it the objection of appellant in the former proceeding. We cannot join in appellant's criticism of appellee for dismissing the cause which was sent back for a new trial and filing a new application. He may have had reason to believe that his opponent would not again bring up against him the alleged specific acts which appellant attempted to bring up four years before, and in any event he was within his legal rights in pursuing the course which he took.

The appellant relies upon the following alleged errors: (1) Overruling his motion for a change of venue from the judge; (2) refusal of the court to call a jury to...