Rosenfeld v. Peoria

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Zollars
• Citation: Rosenfeld v. Peoria, 103 Ind. 121, 2 N. E. 344 (Ind. 1885)
• Decision Date: 24 September 1885
• Parties: Rosenfeld v. Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co.

103 Ind. 121

2 N.E. 344

Rosenfeld

v.Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed September 24, 1885.

Appeal from Vanderburg circuit court.

C. L. Wedding, for appellant.

Denby & Kumler, for appellee.

Zollars, J.

Appellant delivered to appellee a barrel of whisky to be transported and delivered to James O'Brien at Litchfield, Illinois. It was never delivered, and appellant brought this action to recover its value. When it was delivered to appellee, appellant received from its agents a bill of lading. In that there is a statement of the name and residence of the consignee, and a description of the article as “1 bbl. whisky, of 400 pounds weight.” Following the statements there is a blank, followed by printed stipulations, one of which reads thus: “In the event of loss or damage under the provisions of this agreement the value or cost at the point of shipment shall govern the settlement of the same.” In the blank there are letters and figures which witnesses say are “L. & O. Ex. $20. R. R. Val.,” but they are so run together and illegible that it would be impossible for any one, not knowing for what they were intended, to decipher them all. The interpretation of these characters, as given by the agents of the railway company, is, “Leaks and outs excepted, $20 railroad valuation.” The contention in behalf of the railway company is that because of those characters in the bill of lading appellant is limited in his recovery to $20, and the interest on that amount from the time the whisky should have been delivered. The court below adopted this theory, rendered judgment for appellant for $21.40, although the barrel of whisky was shown to have been worth $96. On the other hand, appellant contends that the printed stipulations as to the amount of recovery should control, and that if the characters in the blank space, with the interpretation given them by witness, should be regarded as a part of the contract, it would be such a contract as the court should not uphold. Thus we have the questions presented by the argument of counsel- First, can a railway company make and enforce a contract limiting the amount against it for the loss of articles received by it for transportation as a common carrier? Second, do the characters in the blank in any way have the force and effect of a contract binding upon appellant? These in their order.

It is the settled law of this state, abundantly supported by authority and reason that while common carriers may by contract limit their liability as insurers, they cannot by contract relieve themselves from the consequences of their own negligence or fraud. The law will not allow a common carrier to contract to be safely negligent or dishonest. Michigan Southern & N. I. R. Co. v. Heaton, 37 Ind. 448;Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471;St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302;Adams Exp. Co. v. Fendrick, 38 Ind. 150;Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Allen, 31 Ind. 394. See Lawson, Carr. § 31 et seq., and the numerous cases there cited.

In the case of Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, after holding that common carriers cannot contract against their liability for negligence, the court reached the following conclusions: (1) That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law; (2) that it is not just and reasonable, in the eye of the law, for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants. Under these rules, and the elaborate reasoning upon which they are based, may common carriers arbitrarily, or by contract, place a value upon articles received for carriage, and in this way limit the amount of recovery against them in case of loss? If they may contract against all liability for loss by means other than their own negligence or fraud, of course they may contract for the amount of recovery in such cases. But in case of a loss through their negligence or fraud, the same reasons at first view would seem to exist against contracts limiting the amount of recovery as exist against contracts for total exemption. And hence some of the courts have held such contracts invalid. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645;S. C. 2 Pac. Rep. 821;U. S. Exp. Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144;Black v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 55 Wis. 319;S. C. 13 N. W. Rep. 244;Moulton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 85;S. C. 16 N. W. Rep. 497.

If, without any representation of value by the shipper, or a request of him for a statement of value, and without notice and contract, and a valuable consideration, the carrier should place a value upon the articles received for carriage, that would not bind the shipper. In such case he would clearly have the right to recover the full value of the articles lost by the carrier. If, on the other hand, for the purpose of getting reduced rates, the shipper should place a value upon the article for carriage, or, if by any kind of artifice he should induce the carrier to place a lower value upon the articles, and thus get reduced rates, it seems to be settled by the weight of authority that he could not recover beyond the value so fixed by him, or the value which, by deceit, he caused the carrier to fix. To hold otherwise would be to enable the shipper to take advantage of his own wrong. Carriers have the right to fix their charges according to the value of the article to be carried. The greater the value, the greater the responsibility and liability in case of loss. For assuming these, the carrier is entitled to charge increased compensation. Lawson, Carr. 88, 89, and cases there cited. If the shipper may, by false statements or artifice, deceive the carrier as to value, and thus get lower rates, and still recover from the carrier the full value, he is enabled to consummate a wrong upon the carrier which should not be sustained by the courts. Graves v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 137 Mass. 33;Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331;S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151. To hold the carrier liable in such a case for the full value of the article, beyond the representations of the shipper, would seem to be neither just nor reasonable, and, if neither just nor reasonable, such a holding is not demanded by any considerations of public policy. This limitative liability is not regarded as in conflict with the general rule that common carriers cannot, by contract, limit their liability for loss occurring through their negligence, but as an exception to it. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 215; Lawson, Carr. 87, and cases there cited; Story, Bailm. §§ 565-567; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251.

Another rule of the law that seems to be settled by the weight of authority is that if the carrier claims that, by contract or the misconduct of the shipper, his common-law liability has been limited, the burden is upon him to clearly show it, and that all such contracts will be interpreted most strictly against the carrier. In the case of St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302, this court said: “But, in our opinion, contracts not clear in their meaning, by which common carriers seek to avoid the responsibility which the law imposes upon them, should be construed most strongly against them.” Indianapolis & Cen. R. Co. v. Cox, 29 Ind. 360; Lawson, Carr. §§ 135-246, and cases there cited. And so, too, that carriers may, by fixing value, limit their common-law liability, it must be shown that the shipper had some kind of knowledge of such fixing of value, and for a sufficient consideration consented thereto, or that his statements or conduct justified the carrier in so fixing the value, as we have before stated.

Tested by these rules of the law, how stands the case before us? As we have seen, there is an express and definite stipulation in the bill of lading that in case of loss the value or cost at the point of shipment shall measure the amount of recovery. To overthrow this specific stipulation, appellee relies upon the figures and letters in the blank, which, as we have seen, are so written that no one could read or interpret them, unless he had previous knowledge of their import. We think that it would not be reasonable to hold that these shall overthrow the express and plainly printed stipulations above referred to, and that the only proper and reasonable construction of the contract is that it fixes the amount of recovery, in case of loss, at the value of the barrel of whisky at the point of shipment.

The evidence shows that the agents of appellee put the letters and figures upon the bill of lading without the knowledge or consent of appellant. He had no understanding, or knowledge of their import, except what they of themselves import, and that was practically nothing. He made no representations as to the value of the barrel of whisky, nor was he asked to make any. The testimony by the agents of appellee tends to show that less freight was charged than would have been charged had the value been stated at a greater amount; but there is no evidence that appellant was a party to such an arrangement, nor that he had any knowledge of it. There is evidence that he had accepted several like bills of lading for barrels of whisky shipped, but they of themselves would not furnish any information that the carrier, by such letters and figures, was limiting...