Rosenkrantz v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 01 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 05-3836 GAF (AJW).,CV 05-3836 GAF (AJW). |
| Citation | 444 F.Supp.2d 1063 |
| Parties | Robert M. ROSENKRANTZ, Petitioner, v. John MARSHALL, Warden Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Marc E. Grossman, Law Offices of Marc E. Grossman, Upland, for Petitioner's counsel.
Amanda Lloyd, Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, Respondent's counsel.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Court has reviewed the entire record in this action, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge ("Report"), and petitioner's objections. The Court concurs with and adopts the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations contained in the Report after having made a de novo determination of the portions to which objections were directed.
When petitioner was 18 years old, his younger brother, Joey, and his brother's friend, Steven Redman, secretly spied on him in order to confirm their suspicion that petitioner was a homosexual. Joey and Redman watched petitioner with a male companion through a window of petitioner's parents' beach house. Redman decided that they should enter the house in order to take pictures of petitioner and his companion so he could prove to others that petitioner was gay. Before doing so, Redman and Joey obtained a flashlight and a stun gun from Joey's car. Redman then kicked in the door of the house, yelled "Get the fuck out of here you faggots," and struck petitioner with the flashlight, breaking his nose. Joey burned petitioner's hands with the stun gun. Petitioner obtained a BB gun from his car and attempted to prevent Redman and Joey from leaving. Petitioner's father was called to the house, and Redman told him that he and Joey had seen petitioner with another male who had his pants down.
The next morning, petitioner insisted to his father that he was heterosexual, and that Redman and Joey had lied. Petitioner's father was extremely upset and angry. Petitioner was kicked out of his parents' home. He spent that night in his car. During the next few days while he was living alone in his car, petitioner obtained a firearm.1 Petitioner then confronted Redman with the firearm, demanding that he recant what he had told petitioner's father. Redman refused and continued to taunt and ridicule petitioner. Petitioner shot Redman ten times, killing him.
Petitioner was acquitted by a jury of first degree murder. He was convicted of second degree murder, and sentenced to fifteen years to life, plus a two year term for using a firearm.
In the two decades since his crime, petitioner has had a perfect prison record. He has never committed a violent act, or engaged in any other conduct warranting discipline. While in prison, he has earned an A.A. degree from Chapman College, and a B.S. degree in computer science from Columbia Southern University. He has completed every therapy and self-help program available, and has obtained numerous vocational certifications. Petitioner has received exceptional work reports including special recognition for developing software programs for staff training, tracking sexually violent predators, and managing the inmate welfare fund. He has earned glowing recommendations from prison psychiatrists and correctional counselors, all of whom have opined that petitioner presents no more risk of danger than the average person in the community. Petitioner has realistic parole plans, including family and community support, employment, and a residence. He has letters urging that he be granted parole from the trial judge, family members, legislators, the arresting officer, and the victim's only living relative. Further, although they subsequently changed their minds, both the District Attorney and the Sheriff's Department have previously not opposed granting petitioner parole. He even saved another inmate's life.
Not surprisingly, after petitioner's second parole unsuitability hearing in 1996, the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT")2 concluded that petitioner did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety, and that he was suitable for parole. [See Petitioner's Ex. B]. As the BPT explained, petitioner had no criminal record; a stable social history; no drug or alcohol involvement; excelled in school; participated in prison programs; upgraded educationally; participated extensively in self-help and therapy so as to "come to an understanding of why he reacted so violently" in committing his offense; received excellent work reports; possessed realistic parole plans; maintained positive institutional behavior indicating "significant improvement in self-control;" and demonstrated acceptance of responsibility and remorse. [Petitioner's Ex. B at 2-3]. The panel also found that petitioner committed the crime as a result of significant stress in his life, namely, being exposed as a homosexual to his father, who then rejected petitioner because of the revelation. In addition, the panel noted that psychological reports from 1989, 1994, and 1996 all supported release. Further, the panel pointed out that the trial judge supported granting parole, opining that petitioner's offense was "situational," and that petitioner was "highly unlikely to re-offend." [Petitioner's Ex. B at 4]. Finally, the panel noted that the governor's legal advisor and the district attorney supported petitioner's release. [Petitioner's Ex. B at 4]. Consequently, petitioner received a March 30, 2000 parole date. [Petitioner's Ex. B at 1].
The 1996 decision, however, was disapproved by the BPT's decision review committee, on the ground that the panel had not considered some of the facts of the commitment offense. See In re Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal.App.4th 409, 414 n. 3, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 (2000).
After parole hearings in 1996, 1997 and 1998, BPT panels found petitioner unsuitable for parole. The December 1996 decision was the rehearing on the panel's grant of parole earlier in 1996. One of the panel members at the rehearing had served on the decision review committee that had reversed the original panel's grant of parole. This rehearing panel considered, among other things, a letter from the investigating homicide detective, which addressed some of the points in the decision review unit's decision and reflected the detective's view that petitioner should be paroled. In particular, the detective stated that when investigating the crime, he had found a knife on Redman's body. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 631, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980, 123 S.Ct. 1808, 155 L.Ed.2d 669 (2003). Despite this additional favorable evidence, the panel ultimately denied parole based upon the finding that the commitment offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. See Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal. App.4th at 416 n. 5, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.
The panel at the 1997 hearing included two of the three panel members who had served on the decision review committee which reversed the 1996 grant of parole. The new evidence presented at the hearing was entirely positive, and included the District Attorney's statement that he was "not opposed to this man receiving a parole date." Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal.App.4th at 417, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279. In addition, letters written by Assemblywoman Carole Migden, Assemblywoman Martha Escutia, and Senator John Vasconcellos wrote to urge the BPT to consider that, although Redman's violence "obviously does not absolve [Rosenkrantz] of responsibility" for Redman's death, it was a factor to be considered, and opined that "[t]he action of the Board in overturning the June 1996 decision to release Mr. Rosenkrantz raises the disturbing possibility that the reprehensible gay-bashing endured by Mr. Rosenkrantz is not being viewed in the same light as other hate crimes, despite the fact that the law of California recognizes it as an equally grave offense." Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal.App.4th at 418 n. 8, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279. Nevertheless, the panel denied parole, finding that (a) the offense was carried out in a cruel and callous manner with a disregard for the life and suffering of another, in a dispassionate and calculated manner, and (b) petitioner had not sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help and therapy programming. See Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal. App.4th at 418, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.
In 1998, the BPT reached a split decision, with two of the three members of the panel finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. The majority explained its reasoning as follows: Rosenkrantz, 80 Cal.App.4th at 418, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.3
The California Superior Court reviewed the 1996, 1997 and 1998 decisions denying parole, and reversed them, ordering the BPT to set a parole date. The Superior Court found that the decisions to deny parole were "contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing" and that "[a]ll of the evidence ... indicated that the defendant is not a danger to society." The Superior Court rejected the BPT's reliance upon statements that the crime was "dispassionate," "calculated" and "carried out in a manner which exhibits a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another," concluding that no evidence supported such conclusions4
Pursuant to the Superior Court's direction, a new hearing was held in 1999. At the hearing, additional favorable evidence regarding petitioner's performance in prison was submitted, as well as additional letters in support of...
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