Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee

• Decision Date: 21 March 1933
• Citation: 116 Conn. 409,165 A. 211
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROSENTHAL v. STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE.

165 A. 211

116 Conn. 409

ROSENTHAL v. STATE BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 21, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John A. Cornell Judge.

Petition by Jacob Rosenthal against the State Bar Examining Committee for admission as a member of the bar. A demurrer to respondent's answer was overruled, and the petitioner having failed to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the petition, and petitioner appeals.

No error.

Jacob Rosenthal, pro se.

William H. Comley, State's Atty., of Bridgeport, for respondent.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

AVERY Justice.

In his petition, the applicant sets forth that he has complied with all the requirements for permission to take the examination for admission to the bar; that he had attended the session of the examining committee at New Haven June 23, 1932, for the examination of applicants; and that, thereafter, he was notified by the secretary of the examining committee that he had satisfactorily passed, but the committee refused to certify his name to the clerk of the court for admission on the ground that the school in which he had studied law was not approved by the committee in accordance with the rules of the court. He further alleges that the bar examining committee had adopted the following rule: " In the case of students beginning the study of law after January 11 1929, the schools approved under the rules are the same as those approved by the Council of the American Bar Association on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar" ; that the Brooklyn Law School, which the petitioner attended after January 11, 1929, was not on the list of schools approved by the American Bar Association since the year 1929; and he asked to be heard by the court as to his qualifications, and, after such hearing, to be admitted as a member of the bar.

The bar examining committee filed an answer admitting the allegations of the petition and setting forth that on January 25, 1932, the petitioner was informed that the evening course in the study of law conducted by the Brooklyn Law School was not approved by the committee of the State Bar under the rules of the Superior Court; that if the applicant's studies were limited to such evening classes, he could not be permitted to take the bar examination; that, thereafter, with full knowledge of the rules and disapproval of the state bar examining committee, the petitioner filed with the clerk of the court for Fairfield county his application, in which he stated that he had entered the Brooklyn Law School in September, 1929; that he had spent three years there and would be graduated on June 9, 1932. The answer further sets forth that, if the petitioner's application had disclosed that his studies had been limited to the evening classes of the law school, he would not have been permitted to take the examination; that while he was actually taking them, the committee received from the law school information that the studies of the petitioner were limited to the evening classes; and for that reason the committee refused to certify him for admission to practice.

The petitioner demurred to the answer of the bar examining committee on the ground that it furnished no legal excuse either in fact or in law for the failure of the committee to certify his admission. The demurrer was overruled by the court; and the petitioner, refusing to plead further, judgment was thereafter entered dismissing the petition.

On this appeal, the petitioner contends that under section 7 of the rules all successful candidates at any examination shall present themselves in the superior court and the court may admit them as attorneys, as well as the provision that the bar examining committee shall certify to the clerk of that court the names of all applicants who have been admitted to and have passed the examination, entitles him to admission upon the basis of his having passed the examination without regard to his having properly qualified under the rule concerning attendance at an approved law school. The provisions of section 7 presuppose that all persons successfully passing the examination have been admitted to it in accordance with the previous provisions in the rules limiting those who may take it. Section 7 cannot be construed as applying to other candidates than those who have been properly admitted to and have passed the examination.

The petitioner further contends that the rule of the bar examining committee is invalid; and that even if valid, by permitting him to take the examination, and notifying him that he had satisfactorily passed it, the committee had waived compliance with the rule, General Statutes, § 5343, provides that the superior court may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor, agreeably to the rules established by the judges, who may establish rules relative to the admission, qualifications, practice, and removal of attorneys. This section has existed substantially in its present form since at least 1866. Revision of 1866, p. 223, § 43. At least as early as 1890, the judges of the superior court adopted rules pursuant to this statute, providing for the requirements necessary for admission. Among the rules so adopted was one providing for the appointment of an examining committee by the judges of the superior court, consisting of fifteen members, of whom one or more should be judges of that court, and the rest attorneys residing in the state. An examining committee was appointed and has continued to function to the present time. The rules adopted specified subjects in which the candidates were required to pass a satisfactory examination; and provided for the examination of the candidates in such additional subjects as the committee should prescribe. Additions to these rules have been made from time to time since 1890, but it is unnecessary to set them forth at length. At the time when the petitioner commenced his legal studies, paragraph 4 of section 4 of the rules provided that a candidate must have pursued the study of law for a period of three years in a law school approved by the committee. Practice Book 1922. p. 237. The basis of the petitioner's claim upon this phase of the case is that the court could not delegate to the bar examining committee the power to determine the law school in which the petitioner should be required to study in order to be entitled to take the examination for admission.

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