Rosfeld v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
| Decision Date | 10 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:20-cv-225,2:20-cv-225 |
| Parties | MICHAEL H. ROSFELD, Plaintiff v. THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH - OF THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
The Court previously dismissed Mr. Rosfeld's complaint based on his failure to plead facts showing either (1) that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment as a University of Pittsburgh police officer; or (2) that his resignation from the University was coerced. In his amended complaint, Mr. Rosfeld addresses the former issue by alleging that he was employed under a collective bargaining agreement forbidding termination without "just cause." But on the latter—the voluntariness of his resignation—Mr. Rosfeld's new allegations come up short.
In fact, Mr. Rosfeld now clarifies that resigning was his idea. Defendants intended to terminate him, but he offered to resign instead, presumably to avoid the professional stigma of termination. Defendants then chose to accept his offer. Mr. Rosfeld has not alleged that anyone demanded (or even asked) that he resign, nor that he was deceived into doing so. And while the termination meeting convened by Defendants was undoubtedly a stressful experience for Mr. Rosfeld, the "duress" that is inherent in any involuntary termination meeting does not somehow compel an employee to offer up his resignation instead.
In short, while Defendants may well have been required to provide Mr. Rosfeld with due process before terminating him, his unprompted decision to resign instead relieved them of that obligation. Thus, the Court will again grant Defendants' motion to dismiss, this time with prejudice.
The following facts are drawn from the allegations in Mr. Rosfeld's operative complaint, which the Court must accept as true for purposes of this motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [ECF 39].
Mr. Rosfeld was employed as a University of Pittsburgh police officer, subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, from October 15, 2012 until January 18, 2018. [Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 13, 27]. On the evening of December 9, 2017, Mr. Rosfeld was dispatched to an incident at the Garage Door Saloon on Atwood Street. [Id. at ¶ 14]. He arrived on scene at 11:02 p.m. to assist two other university police officers, Josh McGinnis and Adam Dimit. [Id. at ¶ 15]. Upon his arrival, Mr. Rosfeld encountered Timothy Riley, Jacob Schilling, and Daniel Humphrey—all of whom were being detained by Officer McGinnis. [Id. at ¶ 16].
After he arrived on scene, Mr. Rosfeld learned that Messrs. Riley, Schilling, and Humphrey had been ejected from the Garage Door Saloon for their "unruly behavior." [Id. at ¶ 17]. Mr. Rosfeld entered the Garage Door at approximately 11:10 p.m. to investigate the incident and review security footage of what had occurred. [Id. at ¶ 18]. His review showed: (1) Mr. Riley and an unidentified malebeing "removed from the premises," and the unidentified male "kick[ing] the entry door to the bar, causing it to shatter," [Id. at ¶ 19(a)]; (2) Messrs. Schilling and Humphrey being "ejected from the premises" and Mr. Schilling "str[iking] a Garage Door employee with his fists," [Id. at ¶ 19(b)-(c)]; (3) Messrs. Riley and Humphrey "rais[ing] [their] fists and str[iking] a Garage Door employee," [Id. at ¶ 19(d)]; and (4) Messrs. Schilling, Riley, and Humphrey "attempt[ing] to regain entry to the Garage Door." [Id. at ¶ 19(e)].
Following his review of the surveillance video, Mr. Rosfeld exited the bar. [Id. at ¶ 20]. Based on the video footage and his "personal encounter" with each suspect, Mr. Rosfeld arrested Messrs. Riley, Schilling, and Humphrey. [Id. at ¶ 21]. The charges included simple assault, disorderly conduct, defiant trespass, and public intoxication. [Id.]. Mr. Rosfeld transported the three arrestees to the Allegheny County Jail and concluded his shift at approximately 7:00 a.m. on December 10, 2017. [Id. at ¶ 22].
The following day, the Deputy Chief of the University of Pittsburgh Police (Holly Lamb) and Officer David Basile appeared at Mr. Rosfeld's home and "informed [him] that an investigation concerning him had been initiated." [Id. at ¶ 23]. Mr. Rosfeld was not told "the nature of the investigation, only that one had been commenced." [Id.]. Deputy Chief Lamb confiscated Mr. Rosfeld's police identification card, informed him that he was on administrative leave, and instructed him to await further contact from his superiors. [Id. at ¶ 24]. Six weeks later, University of Pittsburgh Police Commander Robert Holler contacted Mr. Rosfeld, and directed him to appear at headquarters on January 18, 2018. [Id. at ¶ 21].
Upon arrival at headquarters, Mr. Rosfeld was met by the Chief of the University of Pittsburgh Police (Defendant James Loftus), Deputy Chief Lamb, Commander Holler, and Officers Scott Debrosky and Ray Petersen. [Id. at ¶ 26]. Immediately upon his arrival, Mr. Rosfeld was, "without discussion or explanation," provided a memorandum which stated:
Your employment with the University of Pittsburgh Police is terminated effective today, Thursday, January 18, 2018. This is in reference to Internal Investigation #17-04683.
Mr. Rosfeld believes that "the investigation involved the Garage Door Saloon arrest" because "the incident report generated by [Mr. Rosfeld] was identified as Complaint / Incident Number 17-04683." [Id. at ¶ 28] (cleaned up). Mr. Rosfeld was not provided with notice or an explanation of the charges against him at the time he was presented with the termination notice. [Id. at ¶ 29]. According to Mr. Rosfeld, the "extreme duress" created by this situation "coerced" him into "immediately requesting resignation in lieu of termination." [Id. at ¶ 30].
Defendants accepted Mr. Rosfeld's offer to resign rather than be fired, and Mr. Rosfeld was permitted to add the following language to the termination letter: [Id. at ¶ 31]. Defendants did not offer Mr. Rosfeld any option besides termination or resignation. [Id. at ¶ 34]. Mr. Rosfeld did not consult with counsel beforehand, because he "was unaware of the purpose" of the meeting. [Id. at ¶ 34]. After the meeting, without Mr. Rosfeld's knowledge, Chief Loftus added the following words to the termination document: "BY REQUEST OF HIS UNION REPRESENTATIVE, MICHAEL ROSFELD WAS ALLOWED TO RESIGN, WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AT 11:45 A.M., 1/18/18." [Id. at ¶ 41].
Mr. Rosfeld alleges that Defendants' failure to provide him with "notice of the charges" against him, an "explanation of [Defendants'] evidence," or an "opportunity to respond to the charges alleged" violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the analog provision of the Pennsylvania state constitution. [Id. at ¶ 51]. More specifically, Mr. Rosfeld contends that Defendants unconstitutionally deprived him of a "property right in his employment" as a police officer without affording him due process in the form of a Loudermill hearing. [Id.].
Mr. Rosfeld filed this lawsuit in state court on January 16, 2020 and amended his complaint on February 10, 2020. [ECF 1-3; ECF 1-2]. Defendants removed the case to this Court on February 13, 2020 based on federal question jurisdiction. [ECF 1].
Following removal, Mr. Rosfeld initially moved to remand the case, [ECF 8], but later withdrew that motion, [ECF 22], and instead filed a second amended complaint to assert federal constitutional claim more explicitly. [ECF 23]. In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [ECF 28]. The Court granted the motion on May 12, 2020, but dismissed Mr. Rosfeld's claims without prejudice and gave him leave to amend his complaint "one last time." [ECF 36].
Mr. Rosfeld timely filed a third amended complaint on May 20, 2020. [ECF 39]. Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss on June 3, 2020. [ECF 40]. That motion is now fully briefed and ready for decision.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 3d 108, 113 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (Stickman, J.) (citation omitted). Such a motion "may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
To evade dismissal, the plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible" and permit a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Allegations that are "conclusory or bare-bones," such as "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," will not suffice. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (cleaned up). However, "detailed pleading is not generally required." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the complaint need only contain a "short and plainstatement" showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully." Id. (cleaned up).
The burden of establishing that no plausible claim has been presented lies with the defendant. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). When evaluating a defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court can only consider the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, the exhibits attached to it, and any documents that are integral to or explicitly relied on by the complaint. Popa, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 113 (citations omitted).
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