Rosnagle v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 10 November 1909
• Citation: 17 Idaho 246,105 P. 216
• Parties: CHARLES ROSNAGLE, Respondent, v. JOSH ARMSTRONG, G. W. WILSON, R. J. MOURNING, W. E. KNUDSON, ERNEST RANDALL, JOHN RANDALL, MELVIN LOVELL, O. A. MOWREY, F. B. JONES, P. R. SULLIVAN, M. M. SHELDON, G. M. TOMER, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

105 P. 216

17 Idaho 246

CHARLES ROSNAGLE, Respondent, v. JOSH ARMSTRONG, G. W. WILSON, R. J. MOURNING, W. E. KNUDSON, ERNEST RANDALL, JOHN RANDALL, MELVIN LOVELL, O. A. MOWREY, F. B. JONES, P. R. SULLIVAN, M. M. SHELDON, G. M. TOMER, Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 10, 1909

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT.

1. In an action where the issue involved is the execution and delivery of a promissory note to the agent of the payee, and the defendants offer to introduce a certificate of stock issued by the officers of the defendant company, who had organized as a company for the ownership and management of the property for which the note is alleged to have been given, and such certificate is offered for the purpose of corroborating their statements that they did not sign the note sued on, and it appears that the word "joint" appearing in such certificate was crossed out by the agent of the payee at the time of the transaction, it is not error for the court to reject such offer, for the reason that the real issue is the execution of the note and the written contract must prevail, and the action of the agent with reference to such certificate cannot affect the liability of the defendants where the note is in the hands of an innocent purchaser.

2. Where the question of the authority and action of an agent is involved, it is not error for the court to permit the principal to answer the following question: "Now, Mr Gray, you may tell the jury whether or not you gave to Mr Hughes or authorized him in any manner to have notes in that style, or any note other than the note which is offered in evidence, and the yellow paper, taken in settlement of that horse."

3. It was not error in this case for the court to permit the witness to testify to declarations made to him by one of the defendants.

4. It was error to allow such witness to testify to statements made by the witness to one of the defendants as to what the principal would be willing to do, but such error does not appear to have prejudiced the rights of the defendants, and is not ground for a reversal of the judgment.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for Latah County. Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

Action on a promissory note. Judgment for the plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs in favor of respondent.

Morgan & Morgan, for Appellants.

It is relevant to put in evidence any circumstances which tend to make the proposition at issue more or less probable. (Wharton on Ev., secs. 21, 22; Moran v. Abbey, 58 Cal. 163.) Any testimony which will assist the court or jury in determining which party speaks the truth as to the issues in the action is relevant, and should be received. (Prior v Oglesby, 50 Fla. 248, 39 So. 593; 2 Enc. of Ev. 173, and authorities there cited.)

Forney & Moore, for Respondent.

This court will not review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict or a judgment, on an appeal from the judgment, unless the bill of exceptions contain a specification of the particulars in which it is claimed the evidence is insufficient. (Humphrey v. Whitney, ante, p. 14, 103 P. 389.)

AILSHIE, J. Stewart, J., concurs. Sullivan, C. J., did not sit at the hearing and took no part in the decision.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

--This action was instituted for the recovery of a balance of $ 1,340.67 alleged to be due from the defendants on a joint and several promissory note executed by them for the sum of $ 3,600. The defendants answered, denying all the material allegations of the complaint and denying the execution of the note. They alleged that the note was a forgery and that they never executed the same. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants moved for a new trial; their motion was denied and they appealed from the judgment and order denying their motion.

It seems that this note, if ever executed at all, was executed by the defendants in payment of the purchase price for a stallion. It is admitted that the defendants purchased of one M. C. Gray, through an agent Hughes, a stallion for which they agreed to pay $ 3,600. They contend, however, and so testify, that they refused and declined to execute a joint note for this sum, but that on the contrary they executed their individual notes, each to the amount of $ 360, in payment for this purchase. It was claimed, on the other hand, by the plaintiff, who alleged that he was an innocent purchaser for value, that the agent Hughes delivered the animal to one of the defendants in accordance with written instructions and received this joint obligation for $ 3,600, and thereafter delivered this note to his principal, Gray, who sold and transferred the obligation to the plaintiff, Rosnagle.

It seems that at the time of the transaction Hughes was present apparently making all kinds of representations to the defendants, who appear to have been as credulous in accepting them as he was reckless in making them, and during that time they organized themselves into a company for the purpose of owning and controlling this animal, and elected Randall as president and Lovell as secretary. Hughes seems to have had...