Ross Clinic, Inc. v. Tabion
Decision Date | 16 April 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-1179A316,3-1179A316 |
Citation | 419 N.E.2d 219 |
Parties | ROSS CLINIC, INC., an Indiana Corporation, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Napoleon C. TABION, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert F. Peters, Lucas, Clifford & Holcomb, Merrillville, for appellant.
George W. Carberry, Thomas, Burke, Dyerly & Cuppy, Merrillville, for appellee.
On June 7, 1974 Dr. Napoleon Tabion, the defendant herein, entered into a one-year employment contract with Ross Clinic, Inc. of Merrillville, Indiana. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Dr. Tabion began working on or about July 1, 1974. Difficulties soon arose and on October 16, 1974, Dr. Tabion gave written notice of the termination of his employment agreement. He ceased working for the Clinic in January of 1975 and in February, he joined another medical group in Munster, Indiana. This litigation was initiated by Ross Clinic to recover damages from Dr. Tabion for his alleged violation of the restrictive covenant and the liquidated damages provisions of his employment contract. These contractual restrictions read:
Following a trial before the court and a six-member jury, judgment was entered for the defendant and against the plaintiff. The defendant was also permitted to recover his costs and charges from the plaintiff.
Ross Clinic now brings this appeal, alleging numerous errors in the trial court's management of this case. The first two assignments of error both challenge the court's failure to decide or instruct the jury on the legality of the restrictive covenant and the liquidated damages clause. The appellant maintains that these are both purely questions of law for the court and should not be presented as issues to the jury. In reviewing a restrictive covenant, the Indiana Supreme Court has established the following standards:
" "
Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp. (1955), 234 Ind. 398, at 408, 127 N.E.2d 235, at 239.
The length of time and the geographical area which are covered by the covenant can be decisive factors in the determination of reasonableness. The courts of this state have consistently held that "the ultimate determination of whether a covenant is reasonable is a question of law for the courts." Frederick v. Professional Bldg. Maintenance (1976), 168 Ind.App. 647, at 648, 344 N.E.2d 299, at 301.
In support of its contention that the trial court erred in failing to decide this issue, the appellant cites Waterfield Mortg. Co. v. O'Connor et al. (1977), 172 Ind.App. 673, 361 N.E.2d 924, in which this Court reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the employee for the alleged breach of a restrictive covenant. While it is true that the Waterfield decision gives basic support to the plaintiff's position, the Court also stated:
(Emphasis added.) 361 N.E.2d at 926.
When a question of law rests on certain factual determinations, the court will be unable to render a decision on the legal issues until the factual determinations have been developed and resolved.
For this reason, the plaintiff's allegation of error on this issue must fail. A dispute in facts existed which precluded the court from making its decision on the legality of the covenant. The dispute concerned the reasonableness of the geographical area covered by the covenant. The plaintiff presented evidence, including a computer printout representing the geographical distribution of all patient accounts, which tended to show that the Ross Clinic service area included all of Lake County and, therefore, the covenant was reasonably intended to protect the Clinic's business. To the contrary, the defendant testified that he treated no more than ten patients from Ross Clinic at his new office. The defendant's evidence also tended to prove that less than 2% of the patients residing east of Cline Avenue, in the Ross Clinic service area, would cross over the imaginary boundary line at Cline Avenue and go to the west side of the county for treatment. The determination of the correct service area for Ross Clinic was a matter properly left for the jury's consideration. Therefore, no reversible error existed in the court's failure to decide the legality of the covenant and remove it from the jury's contemplation.
The interrelationship of legal and factual issues presented in this case places particular emphasis on the instructions to the jury. 1 The appropriate course of action for a trial court confronted with this situation is discussed in Winney v. Board of Com'rs of Cty. of Vigo (1977), Ind.App. 369 N.E.2d 661, at 663-664.
A very similar factual situation was presented to this Court in the case of Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n (1980) Ind.App., 405 N.E.2d 65. The summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the clinic was reversed on appeal.
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