Ross v. Chambers

• Decision Date: 24 May 1938
• Docket Number: 27066.
• Citation: 14 N.E.2d 1012,214 Ind. 223
• Parties: ROSS et al. v. CHAMBERS.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

14 N.E.2d 1012

214 Ind. 223

ROSS et al. v. CHAMBERS.

No. 27066.

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 24, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, Delaware County; Claude Ball, judge.

Brady & Watson, of Muncie, Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Paul K. Shephard, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Horace G. Murphy, of Muncie, for appellee.

SHAKE Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in mandate rendered in an action brought by the appellee, a justice of the peace of Center township, Delaware county, Ind., against the appellant Carl E. Ross, as trustee of said township. The suit was to compel the trustee to pay the appellee a claim for salary and an allowance for office rent.

The action involves the construction and validity of Burns' Ann.St.1933, § 5-1701, section 2008, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, Acts 1913, ch. 308, and Burns' 1933, § 5-1702, section 1840, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, Acts 1913 ch. 323. These statutory provisions will be referred to in this opinion by their chapter numbers. Both were passed at the same session of the General Assembly, both received the approval of the Governor on the same day, both became effective at the same time, and both carried clauses repealing all laws in conflict therewith.

Chapter 308 is a general act entitled: 'An Act concerning justices of the peace, presenting their number and fixing their compensation.' The text of the act prescribes the number of justices of the peace to be elected in each township of the state, fixes the fees to be charged by these officers, and contains specific provisions relative to townships of certain sizes. Among these provisions is the following: 'That in any township in the state having therein a city of not less than forty-five thousand and not exceeding one hundred thousand population, according to the last preceding United States census, * * * the justices of the peace of such township, and each of them, shall receive * * * a salary at the rate of one thousand dollars per annum * * * and each of them shall receive for office rent, unless the county commissioners in the county embracing cities of the population herein mentioned shall furnish each of said justices an office in the court house of said counties rent-free, the sum of one hundred fifty ($150) dollars per annum * * *.'

Chapter 323 is entitled: 'An Act concerning justices of the peace in townships having one or more cities with a combined population of not less than 45,000 and not more than 60,000 and repealing all laws in conflict herewith.' It provides: that 'Justices of the peace in townships having one or more cities with a combined population according to the last preceding United States census of not less than 45,000 and not more than 60,000 shall receive from the township trustee $1,000 each per annum in full for their service * * *: Provided, further, That in no event shall the compensation provided herein exceed the amount paid to the township trustee by the justice of the peace in such township.'

It was stipulated on the trial 'that there is only one city in said Center Township, Delaware County, Indiana, namely, the city of Muncie, Indiana, which has a population of 46,548.' It follows that if chapter 308 is the law, the appellee, as justice of the peace of said township, is entitled to receive a fixed salary of $1,000 per year, plus $150 per year for office rent, unless the board of commissioners of Delaware county provides him with office accommodations in the courthouse. On the other hand, if chapter 323 is to prevail, the appellee will not be entitled to any allowance for office rent under any circumstances, and he will not be entitled to an annual salary of $1,000 unless the fees paid by him to the township trustee during the year equal that sum.

There are many rules of statutory construction to which courts may resort in construing and interpreting conflicting acts and provisions. It wil not be necessary to set them all out in this opinion. We should, if possible, so construe the two acts before us as to harmonize the same and give full force and effect to each. We find such irreconcilable conflict between them, however, that it is impossible to apply this rule in the present case. Both cannot prevail and one must give way to the other.

In determining which of the acts shall stand as the law of the state, we become at once concerned with the question as to which of them is the last pronouncement of the General Assembly. The problem is not simple for the reason that, as pointed out above, both were passed, approved, and promulgated on the same date. The Governor's approval was the last essential step in the legislative process excepting, of course, the administrative act of proclaiming them effective after the distribution of the printed laws by the Secretary of State. It was physically...