Ross v. Crofutt

• Decision Date: 15 June 1911
• Citation: 80 A. 90,84 Conn. 370
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROSS v. CROFUTT, Deputy Sheriff.

80 A. 90

84 Conn. 370

ROSS

v. CROFUTT, Deputy Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 15, 1911.

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3280.]

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; Howard B. Scott, Judge.

Habeas corpus by John Ross to obtain his release from the custody of Frederick B. Crofutt, deputy sheriff. From an order overruling a demurrer to the return and remanding relator to custody, he appeals. Affirmed.

His return showed that the plaintiff was held under a warrant from the Governor of Connecticut, directing his arrest as a fugitive from justice in response to a demand from the Governor of New York, in pursuance of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and delivery to an agent of that state. Said demand was accompanied by properly attested copies of the proceedings in said state against the plaintiff, and with proper affidavits of witnesses, whereby said plaintiff is charged with the crime of conspiracy. Said Governor certifies in said warrant that "said demand is conformable to law and ought to be compiled with." The plaintiff demurred to the return because in the warrant it does not appear that he is charged by the authorities of New York with having committed any high crime, and it does not appear but that the crime charged, conspiracy, is a mere misdemeanor in the Penal Code of New York.

William H. Cable, for appellant.

Stiles Judson, State's Atty., and Norman C. Beers, for appellee.

WHEELER, J. (after stating the facts as above). The purpose of article 4, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which requires that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime," is to make it the imperative duty of the chief executive of a state to deliver up criminals fleeing from justice for removal to the state from which they flee, and it effectuates its purpose by defining the class of criminals to be surrendered. In the Articles of Confederation appeared a similar provision, except that the word "crime" was substitued for "high misdemeanor," "thereby showing the deliberate purpose to include every offense known to the law of the state from which the party charged had fled." Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor, 24 How. 66, 99, 16 L. Ed. 717. The word "crime" embraces not only misdemeanors, but treason and felony as well, and the language was made "broad enough to include every possible crime committed within the borders of the United States, and that no state should be an asylum for fugitives committing crimes in other states." Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 697, 23 Sup. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 649, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148, 29 L. Ed. 250; Knox v. State, 164 Ind. 226, 233, 73 N. E. 255, 108 Am. St. Rep. 291. The meaning of the words "other crime" is settled by the highest judicial authority in repeated decisions, and that meaning fixed by the history surrounding the enactment of this constitutional provision.

The act of Congress, now section 5278, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3597), provides the procedure for carrying out this constitutional provision. In this constitutional provision is found the authority for the Governor to act, and in this statute the procedure to govern him.

The questions before the Governor on an application for the surrender of a person under this provision are twofold. Whether the person demanded has been substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justice it is alleged that he has fled by an indictment, Information, or affidavit properly certified, and whether he is a fugitive from justice from that state. Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372, 25 Sup. Ct. 282, 49 L. Ed. 515; Bruce v. Rayner, 124 Fed. 481, 482, 62 C. C. A. 501; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95, 6 Sup. Ct 291, 29 L. Ed. 544.

Before issuing his warrant, the Governor should have before him a copy of the indictment or information, or affidavits before a magistrate in the demanding state, charging the fugitive with crime committed by him in such state. Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 6, 29 Sup. Ct. 605, 53 L. Ed. 885.

The warrant of the Governor is prima facie evidence of the regularity of its issue. Davis Case, 122 Mass. 324, 328. And it is prima facie evidence sufficient to hold the accused until the presumption in its favor is overthrown by contrary proof. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 711, 23 Sup. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657; Farrell v. Hawley, Sheriff, 78 Conn. 150, 155, 61 Atl. 502, 112 Am. St. Rep. 98. It need not make such indictment, information, or affidavits a part of it either by incorporation or attachment. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, 245, 16 Sup. Ct. 297, 40 L. Ed. 406; Nichols v. Cornelius, 7 Ind. 612, 614; Moore on Extradition (Ed. 1891) vol. 2, § 621. Our own practice accords with this, as does the practice in all of the states with few exceptions. Forms of rendition warrants for most of the states are given in Moore on Extradition (volume 2, pp. 1193-1514).

The return to the writ of habeas corpus sets out the Governor's warrant in due form, complying with the requirements of the law, and fully justifying the sheriff in detaining the plaintiff, unless its recital that the petitioner "stands charged with the crime of conspiracy" fails, as the petitioner urges, to substantially charge a crime for which a fugitive from justice may be apprehended and surrendered. The petitioner relies upon the provisions of our own statutes prescribing the procedure on requisitions upon the Governor and the prerequisites to his compliance with the demand. Under these the demand must be for the surrender of a person charged with a high crime. Conspiracy is not, he insists, a high crime in New York, but a misdemeanor. This is not entirely accurate. We understand conspiracy in New York may be either a felony or a misdemeanor. A high crime is one nearly allied to and equal in guilt to felony, but technically does not fall within its definition. State v. Knapp, 6 Conn. 415, 417, 16 Am. Dec. 68. Hence the...