Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 07 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:95 cv 245 AS.,1:95 cv 245 AS. |
| Citation | 955 F.Supp. 1025 |
| Parties | Marvin O. ROSS, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA STATE TEACHER'S ASSOCIATION and Indiana State Teacher's Association Insurance Trust, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Alan VerPlanck, James Fenton, Barrett and McNagny, Fort Wayne, IN, for Marvin O. Ross.
Wayne O. Adams, III, David D. Robinson, Johnson Smith Pence Densborn Wright and Heath, Indianapolis, IN, for Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n.
Howard E. Kochell, Michael A. Moffatt, Barnes and Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, Richard J. Darko, Lowe Gray Steele and Hoffman, Indianapolis, IN, for Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n Ins. Trust.
Plaintiff Marvin O. Ross ("Ross") filed this action against the Indiana State Teacher's Association ("ISTA") and the Indiana State Teacher's Association Insurance Trust ("Trust") on July 27, 1995, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as well as several pendent state law claims. ISTA filed a motion for summary judgment on September 9, 1996, on all claims pending against it. The same day, the Trust filed a motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim against it, a motion for summary judgment on the pendent state law claims against it, and a motion for partial summary judgment on the ERISA claim against it. On October 9, 1996, Ross responded to the various motions, and conceded the motions for summary judgment filed by the Trust on the ADA and state law claim issues. On October 18, 1996, the Trust filed a reply to Ross's response, and on October 24, 1996, ISTA did likewise. On November 5, 1996, oral argument was held on the pending motions in South Bend, Indiana before this judge. As the issues have been fully briefed, this court is now ready to rule.
As a preliminary matter, ISTA has filed a motion to strike Ross's affidavit, attached to his appendix of evidentiary materials as appendix J. That motion is now denied. However, this court will give the affidavit only the weight it deserves, bearing in mind that one cannot by affidavit "effectively oppose a motion for summary judgment by contradicting his own deposition testimony." Cherry v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 225, 232 (7th Cir.1995). Furthermore, to the extent that the affidavit characterizes the contents of letters already admitted into evidence, this court will rely on the letters, and not Ross's characterization thereof.
Marvin O. Ross was hired by the Fort Wayne Education Association ("FWEA") in 1971 as its executive director. When the FWEA merged with the ISTA in 1972, Ross became an employee of the ISTA as the UniServ Director for the Fort Wayne area, where he served until the events of this complaint. In 1958, Ross suffered an injury to his hip-thigh area, which caused him to walk with a cane, and required him to have several surgeries, both before and during his employment with ISTA.
In September, 1992, Ross traveled to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, at which time his doctors there placed him on indefinite sick leave from his employment. In March, 1993, Ross qualified for, and began receiving, long term disability ("LTD") benefits from the Trust, and in July, 1993, Ross began receiving Social Security disability payments. In 1994, the Trust's third party administrator of the benefit plan, the Huttleston Group, requested that Ross submit to an independent medical examination ("IME") to show that he continued to be totally disabled. After the IME, a three person panel at the Huttleston Group determined that Ross was not totally disabled and that his LTD benefits should be discontinued. The LTD benefits were discontinued as of October 31, 1994. Ross appealed that decision to the Board of Trustees of the Trust, which affirmed the Huttleston Group's decision in February 1995. The discontinuation of benefits forms Ross's ERISA claim.
During October, 1994, before his LTD benefits were discontinued on October 31, 1994, Ross made inquiries to ISTA through his own union, the Professional Staff Organization ("PSO"), about returning to work. The ISTA had previously filled his position in Ft. Wayne in September, 1993, after Ross was unable to return to it at that time. However, the ISTA offered Ross a position as UniServ Director in its Shelbyville, Indiana, office, and asked Ross what accommodations would be needed for Ross to assume the position. On October 28, 1994, the PSO representative sent a letter to ISTA with Ross's suggested accommodations. ISTA sent a response to the PSO representative on November 1, 1994, requesting that Ross have his doctor provide "a comprehensive statement of the medical restrictions on his ability to work." To the extent the accommodations requested by Ross in the October 28 letter were not recommended by his physician, the ISTA requested that Ross explain why such accommodations were necessary and reasonable. The PSO representative sent the ISTA a letter on November 3, 1994, stating that they would have Ross's doctor provide a statement, and requesting that the ISTA define the essential functions of Ross's job, for purposes of determining what accommodations were required. On November 9, the ISTA responded that all duties listed in the job description of a UniServ Director were essential functions. The November 9 letter further stated that ISTA would make necessary and reasonable accommodations at the Shelbyville office and would expect Ross to begin at the Shelbyville office on November 28, 1994. If Ross did not begin work in Shelbyville on November 28, ISTA would consider such as a notice of resignation and would terminate the employment relationship. The same day, ISTA sent a letter to Ross, informing him that he had been assigned to the Shelbyville office, where he was to start on November 28, that ISTA would make all reasonable accommodations, and that if he did not start on November 28, ISTA would take that as a resignation.
On November 10, Dr. Philip Johnson, Ross's personal physician, sent a letter to ISTA which stated that he did not believe that Ross should return to work, but which listed 16 accommodations, all of which would be required for Ross to return to work without placing him at risk of injury. On November 18, 1994, ISTA responded to Dr. Johnson's list of accommodations to the PSO representative, stating that ISTA could accommodate Ross in 15 of the requested areas, but could not assure Ross that all meetings would be held in the UniServ office. On November 21, ISTA received a letter from Ross, dated November 16, 1994, in which Ross stated he would report to the Shelbyville office on November 28, 1994 Ross went on to state that his own doctor had not released him to work; rather, the independent doctor hired by the Trust had concluded Ross was ready to work. On November 23, 1994, ISTA wrote a letter to the PSO representative regarding the letters from Dr. Johnson and Ross. In that letter, ISTA questioned Ross's desire to return to work, based on the "no intention of being insubordinate language," and suggested that ISTA had been misled by the PSO's representations that Ross was able to return to work. ISTA informed the PSO that Ross was not to report to Shelbyville until he presented a letter from his physician releasing him to work. Further, unless Ross provided such a letter, as he was no longer on long-term disability leave, his employment would be terminated as of December 5, 1994. Although Ross had sent a letter to ISTA dated November 22, 1994, responding to ISTA's letter regarding accommodation, that letter was apparently not received by ISTA until after the November 23 letter was sent, and no further efforts were made by ISTA to accommodate Ross at the Shelbyville office.
Ross did not provide ISTA with a physician's release, nor did he attempt to obtain one prior to ISTA's deadline. Rather, Ross's attorney sent a letter to ISTA threatening the present action if ISTA did not continue to pay Ross benefits during the pendency of his appeal with the Trust. ISTA responded by terminating Ross's employment on December 4, 1994, when Ross failed to provide the requested physician's release.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.1993). A thorough discussion of Rule 56 can be found in a trilogy of cases decided in 1986 by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has...
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Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n Ins. Trust
...dismissed the remaining state law claims against ISTA without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n, 955 F.Supp. 1025, 1030-32 (N.D.Ind.1997). In addition, the district court granted the Trust's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the......
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Ross v. Indiana State Teachers Ass'n
...the Trust's partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of standard of review on the ERISA count. See Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n, 955 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.Ind.1997). The remaining ERISA claim was tried to the court without a jury in two trial days, April 14 and 15, 1997. Since ......