Ross v. Leggett

Decision Date10 June 1886
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesROSS v. LEGGETT.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

Charles B. Howell, for plaintiff.

Charles M. Swift and Otto Kirchner, for defendant and appellant.

SHERWOOD, J.

The defendant in this case was president of the Brush Electric Light Company, and had obtained from the city of Detroit the contract for lighting the city at night, by electricity displayed from towers. By its contract with the city it was authorized to erect suitable towers for that purpose, and to anchor them, by means of guys, within the streets of the city. In so doing, and for the purpose of anchoring one of its light towers, under the direction of the defendant, the company planted one of its guy-posts, from eight to ten feet high, and about nine inches in diameter, in the street lawn on the south side of Joy street, in front of the residence of the plaintiff, which was located at the south-east corner of Joy street and Third avenue. The post was placed in the lawn which was used for shade trees and ornamental purposes, about midway between the curb and sidewalk, a little one side of the walk leading from the plaintiff's yard to the carriage block, on Joy street. The plaintiff protested against the use of his street lawn for such purpose, and forbade the defendant setting the guy-post therein. His remonstrances were unheeded, and the post was placed in the lawn.

The plaintiff was offering his house and lot for sale at the time, and considered the use made of his premises by the company a damage to the property of at least $500. When the plaintiff learned of the intention of the defendant to thus mar the beauty of his lawn, he took counsel of an attorney as to the right of the company to thus appropriate the use of his property, and was informed that the planting of the post in his lawn was without authority and that he had the legal right to remove the same. Acting upon advice thus received, after the post was set, and the guy-line was attached thereto, he took a saw and cut into the post about four inches. A short time after defendant came to his house, and demanded that plaintiff should pay him six dollars for the post, and setting the same, and informed him that he had ordered his arrest, and that an officer would be there in a few moments for that purpose. The officer soon came, and, as the plaintiff claims, at the instance of the defendant, arrested him, in the presence of his wife and children, took him to the residence of the superintendent of police; and, after detaining him there about 20 minutes without any complaint having been made or warrant issued, (it then being between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening,) the officer, accompanied by the defendant a portion of the way, took him to the Freemont street station, and there searched him, and took from him his watch, some keys, a pocket-knife, and his money; and then locked him into a station cell, 8 by 10 feet, built of stone, and lined with iron, with a stone floor, and furnished with no bed or furniture, except two wooden benches, about 16 inches wide, extending the length of the cell; and in this condition he was imprisoned throughout the night, and until about 9 o'clock the next morning, when he was taken from the cell, and, accompanied by an officer, through the street, to a police office; and there kept until about half-past 11 o'clock, when the defendant appeared, and made a complaint against him for willfully and maliciously injuring "personal property of the Brush Light Company, to-wit, one guy-post," on the twelfth day of August, 1884, "to the damage of six dollars;" and, after detaining him there until about 12 o'clock, the police justice discharged him, upon his own recognizance, he declining to plead until he could see his counsel. What further was done with the plaintiff in the police court does not appear from the record, although we are informed by the brief of one of the counsel that the case against him was subsequently heard, and the plaintiff was discharged.

The plaintiff, feeling himself greatly aggrieved and injured in the premises, brought this suit against the defendant in the superior court of Detroit, alleging as his cause of action his wrongful detention and imprisonment, "whereby he was greatly injured in name and credit, and suffered great pain and mortification and disgrace, to his damage twenty thousand dollars." The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that he would show on the trial thereunder "that the plaintiff willfully and maliciously and feloniously did destroy and injure the personal property of the Brush Electric Light Company, to-wit, one wooden post, which was there used to support the guy-lines pertaining to a tower, the property of said company, contrary to the statute in that behalf made and provided, against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Michigan;" and, further, gave notice that he would show "that he had reasonable and probable cause to believe that plaintiff was and had been guilty of willfully, maliciously, and feloniously destroying and injuring the said guy-post, as above set forth."

The cause was tried before Judge CHIPMAN, by jury, and a verdict obtained for $4,500 against the defendant, who now brings error.

The record contains all the testimony taken in the case upon the trial, and the charge of the court in full.

Twenty-seven errors are assigned, and most of them relied upon for reversal. Six relate to the decisions of the court overruling defendant's objection to testimony offered by counsel for plaintiff; one to the ruling of the court in sustaining the objection of plaintiff's counsel to a question put upon cross-examination. We have carefully examined the exceptions upon which these assignments are based, and are satisfied none of them are well taken.

Of the remaining errors assigned, eleven are to the refusals of the court to charge as requested, and nine relate to exceptions taken to as many different portions of the charge of the court. An examination of the requests and the charge shows several of the defendant's requests were given by the court. The remainder were properly refused.

The exceptions needing most consideration are those relating to the charge on the question of damages. The able briefs of counsel on both sides have been carefully reviewed, and the authorities consulted, but we are unable to concur in the conclusions reached by the learned counsel for the defendant. The court in his charge to the jury, assumed that defendant had the right to plant the post in the lawn where he did, so that if there was any doubt or question upon that subject the charge was in the defendant's favor, and it is unnecessary to discuss that question here. It is not questioned or disputed that the arrest was made without any warrant or other process being issued for that purpose, and whether or not it was made by direction of the defendant was properly submitted to the jury, and they found against the defendant.

The court further charged the jury that if the plaintiff was guilty of any offense in cutting the post, he was not guilty of felony, but of a misdemeanor; "and that no arrest can be made for a misdemeanor unless by warrant, upon complaint duly made, or by an officer or bystander who actually sees the offense which constitutes the misdemeanor. In the case of felony it is different. There, upon proper information,--such information as would justify a reasonable man in acting upon it,--an arrest may be made without warrant, and by one who does not see the actual commission of the offense. For the purposes of this case, I instruct you that the arrest, if an arrest was made, being without warrant, was an illegal arrest. *** The law of the land, under the circumstances of this case, demanded a warrant, *** because, if made at all, it was made by a party who did not see the commission of the misdemeanor, and therefore had no authority to make the arrest."

We think these instructions stated the law applicable to the case correctly. The facts upon which they were based were substantially undisputed, and we do not think the offense, if any was committed, was anything more than a misdemeanor, if all the testimony given upon this point is to be taken as true. 2 Cooley, Bl. 243; 4 Bl.Comm. 244; 2 Bish.Crim.Law, � 1000; Black v. State, 2 Md. 376; State v. Beekman, 27 N.J.Law, 124; Hanway v. Boultbee, 4 Car. & P. 350; Rex v. Bright, Id. 387; People v. Smith, and reference in defendant's brief to same, 5 Cow. 258; State v. Briggs, 1 Ark. 226; 4 Brok.Comm. 5, note 5; Rex v. Powell, 2 Barn. & Adol. 75.

Upon the subject of damages the court charged the jury "There are two kinds of damages,--the law has divided them into two classes. *** In the first place, there are what are called, 'actual' damages. Then there are what are called, 'vindictive' or 'punitory' damages, or what our own supreme court calls 'added' damages, for want of a better name. Actual damages are such compensation for the injury as would follow from the nature and character of the act. Actual damages, in this case, would be compensation for such injuries as would fall upon any man who underwent the same treatment which Mr. Ross is shown to have undergone in this case. What are those damages? What are the elements? There is the pain and suffering which any man would be supposed--which the average citizen would be supposed--to suffer under those circumstances. There is being shut up,--the physical discomfort. There is the sense of shame, mortification, wrong, and outrage. All these matters enter into the actual damages. You are to view Mr. Ross as you would any other man in that regard. You are to be guided in that matter by your common sense, because there...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT