Ross v. Reynolds

Citation91 A. 952,112 Me. 223
PartiesROSS v. REYNOLDS.
Decision Date08 October 1914
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

On Motion and Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Washington County, at Law.

Action by George W. Ross against Foster S. Reynolds. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts and moves for a new trial. Exceptions and motion overruled.

Argued before SAVAGE. C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

H. E. Saunders, of Lubec, W. R. Pattengall, of Waterville, and R. J. McGarrigle, of Calais, for plaintiff. J. H. Gray, of Lubec, for defendant.

SAVAGE, C. J. Action for deceit in the sale of an automobile. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the case conies up on the defendant's exceptions and motion for a new trial.

In his writ the plaintiff alleged that the defendant in making the sale to him deceived him in three respects, namely, that he said the car had not been in use for more than a year, and that it was in good running order and condition, and that the defendant agreed that he would give the car a thorough overhauling and put it in first-class shape. The presiding justice properly ruled that no recovery could be had in this case for failure to keep this agreement.

The exceptions are eight in number and relate to the admission and exclusion of evidence.

1. The plaintiff testified that in one of the conversations he had with the defendant relative to the purchase of the car, the defendant suggested that he make a trade with a Mr. Calkins with regard to the security to be given. Exception was taken to the admission of this testimony. This evidence may not be relevant to the issue of deceit, but it is not perceived how it can be regarded as prejudicial. To secure the reversal of a ruling, on exceptions, it is necessary to show, not only that the ruling was erroneous, but also that it was harmful. Bath v. Reed, 78 Me. 276, 4 Atl. 688. Besides, when the terms of an oral contract are in dispute, it is proper, as a general rule, to let in the whole conversation concerning the trade, and the various negotiations leading up to the trade. Though much that is said may not bear directly upon the disputed points, it may nevertheless throw valuable light upon the inquiry; it may help to strengthen the probabilities and improbabilities, the one way or the other. When a witness is asked to narrate a conversation which ended in a contract, it is impossible to tell in advance how much of it may be wheat, and how much chaff. It must be left to the discretion of the court to keep the witness within as narrow limits as reasonably may be, for the eliciting of the truth and the whole truth. It is within bounds to say that few verdicts could stand if the admission of merely irrelevant evidence were a good ground for reversal.

2. There were certain obvious defects in the car, which the plaintiff knew about and which he alleges the defendant agreed to repair. His counsel was asking him about them in detail, for the purpose, as he stated to the court, of explaining why the plaintiff took the car immediately to the defendant's garage. The defendant then objected. The court ruled the evidence admissible for that purpose. But no answer was made to the question objected to, and no further question on this line was asked at that time.

3. The defendant objected to the plaintiff testifying that he, the defendant, wanted a mortgage on certain real estate for security. Though the evidence was immaterial, it could not have been harmful.

4. The plaintiff was permitted to testify that he took the car to the defendant's garage to be overhauled. Whether it was because of the agreement to make repairs, or because of some newly discovered defect in the car, the record fails to disclose. If the car was taken to the garage on account of some newly discovered defect, the evidence of it would be relevant to the alleged false representation that the car was in good running order and condition. If the car was taken to the garage for the repair of defects as agreed to be made, the evidence of it was immaterial, but, in view of the express ruling of the court, not prejudicial.

5. The plaintiff was permitted to testify as to the contents of a letter...

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28 cases
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1974
    ...to show the special interests of an individual in testifying. Stetson v. Caverly, 133 Me. 217, 175 A. 473 (1935); Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me. 223, 91 A. 952 (1914). This is especially true where the witness claims to be an accomplice of the defendant. Sound judicial policy demands that defens......
  • Appeal of Heath
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1951
    ...they), are not sustainable. Clearly, no ruling did prejudice to any legal right. Neal v. Rendall, 100 Me. 574, 62 A. 706; Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me. 223, 91 A. 952.' They must be Our only reason for discussion of the exceptions contained in part 2 and lettered G is for the purpose of reaffir......
  • Miller-Cahoon Co. v. Wade
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1923
    ... ... fair success, there is no fraud. (12 R. C. L. 361; Brown ... v. Bledsoe, 1 Idaho 746; Kemmerer v. Pollard, ... 15 Idaho 34, 96 P. 206; Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me ... 223, 91 A. 952; 12 R. C. L. 254; note, 59 Am. St. 129; note, ... 18 Am. St. 558; 26 C. J. 1090; Pocatello Security Trust ... ...
  • Herrick v. State
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1963
    ...of civil deceit Thompson, supra 75 Me. at p. 60; Hotchkiss v. Bon Air Coal & Iron Company, 108 Me. 34, 44, 78 A. 1108; Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me. 223, 226, 91 A. 952; and Shine, supra 130 Me. at p. 444, 157 A. at pp. 319-320. And generally 'the sense in which they (the representations) were ......
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