Ross v. Robinson
Decision Date | 28 April 1942 |
Citation | 124 P.2d 918,169 Or. 293 |
Parties | ROSS v. ROBINSON. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Josephine County; H. D. Norton, Judge.
Action by Frank P. Ross, administrator of the estate of Lyna M Ross, deceased, against Everett E. Robinson to recover damages for the death of Lyna M. Ross. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Don R. Newbury, of Medford, for appellant.
W. T Miller, of Grants Pass (Orval J. Millard, of Grants Pass, on the brief), for respondent.
Before KELLY, C.J., and BAILEY, LUSK, RAND, ROSSMAN, and BRAND, JJ.
The defendant, Everett E. Robinson, has appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Frank P. Ross, administrator of the estate of Lyna M. Ross, deceased, in this action brought by Ross to recover damages for the benefit of the decedent's estate. Mrs. Ross died December 14, 1939, from injuries received by her December 12, 1939, in a collision between her husband's automobile, in which she was riding as a passenger, and an automobile owned and driven by the defendant.
The accident occurred on what is commonly known as the Redwood highway, approximately two miles west of the city of Grants Pass. Frank P. Ross, accompanied by his wife Lyna M. Ross, in the front seat of his car, a 1935 Chevrolet sedan, was driving in a westerly direction. According to his testimony, he was driving at a rate of thirty to thirty-five miles an hour, when he overtook C. C. Pritchett, driving a 1926 Studebaker pick-up car in the same direction. Pritchett testified that his car was proceeding at about twenty-five to thirty miles an hour, while Ross's testimony was that the Studebaker was traveling at a speed of twenty to twenty-five miles an hour.
Ross testified that when he was within thirty or forty feet of the Studebaker he looked ahead in the highway and noticed a car approaching at a distance he estimated as about three hundred yards. He turned to the left side of the highway and undertook to pass the Studebaker, and when about opposite the Studebaker his own car collided with the defendant's automobile, a 1939 Buick coupe, which was the car he had seen approaching. The impact occurred at the left edge of the highway, almost off the pavement and on the shoulder of the road. The right front end of the defendant's car struck the right side of the Chevrolet, near the front.
The accident occurred at approximately 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12. Headlights were not required for visibility and none of the cars had any burning. The roadway is straight and practically level for a distance of half a mile or more in both directions from the place of the collision. The paved part of the highway is nineteen feet in width, and the shoulders along the sides are between eight and nine feet wide.
When Pritchett saw that a collision appeared inevitable, he drove his car far to the right, on the north side of the highway, to leave room for the other two cars to pass.
The acts of negligence charged by the plaintiff against the defendant are the following:
Two of the assignments of error are based on the failure of the court (1) to grant the defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit and (2) to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict in his favor. The motions were in writing and submitted without argument. The motion for a directed verdict, worded similarly to that for an involuntary nonsuit, was "on the ground and for the reason that there has been no evidence received sufficient to establish or prove the allegations of the complaint and the issues of the case."
One of the reasons urged by the defendant in his brief, in support of the above mentioned motions, is that there was no evidence that he "was violating the basic rule of the Oregon statute as to speed". The plaintiff, in order to prove that the defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed, introduced evidence as to two skid marks, presently to be discussed, which, he asserts, were made by the defendant's Buick. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that there is no evidence that the longer of the two marks was made by his car. He contends, in fact, that the evidence is conclusive that that skid mark was not caused by his car at all. We shall first refer to the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses concerning the two skid marks.
Jay Williams, a state police officer stationed at Grants Pass, arrived at the scene of the accident at 5:10 P. M. After rendering assistance to those injured, he looked around for skid marks. He found one at the place of the accident which extended about thirty-nine feet westerly, in the direction from which the defendant's car had come, and another mark, about one hundred thirty-six feet long, the east end of which was one hundred and one feet west of the first skid mark. By the time the officer observed the skid marks it was becoming dark and he had to use a flashlight to see them. That evening, he designated on the pavement the location of the marks; and the next afternoon, about 2:30 o'clock, accompanied by Corporal Lloyd Harrell, another state police officer, he went to the place of the accident, measured the length of the skid marks and made a close observation of them. Concerning the marks he gave the following testimony:
On cross-examination, his testimony was as follows:
Corporal Harrell, who assisted Officer Williams in making the measurements, had been a member of the Oregon state police force four years. He stated that he had made a study of automobile traffic conditions. In reference to the skid marks he thus testified:
John Louis Frost, who lived in the immediate vicinity of the place where the accident occurred, testified that he saw the collision and at once went to the two cars, to render what assistance he could. About six o'clock that evening, in company with Officer Williams and at least one other individual, he examined both the skid marks to which attention has been called. With reference to what he did, he said:
There was testimony to the effect that the two skid marks were caused by the left wheel or wheels of a car proceeding in an easterly direction, and that parallel with those marks and farther south on the pavement were other marks, less distinct, apparently caused by the right wheels of the same car....
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